城市配送中心布局政府干预机制研究

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2019, Vol. 19 ›› Issue (5): 7-12.

城市配送中心布局政府干预机制研究

卫振林^*，李世龙

北京交通大学交通运输学院，北京 100044

收稿日期:2019-02-01 修回日期:2019-03-05 出版日期:2019-10-25 发布日期:2019-10-25
作者简介:卫振林(1972-)，男，山西运城人，副教授，博士.
基金资助:
国家重点研发计划/National Key Research and Development Program of China (2018YFB1601600).

Governmental Intervention Mechanism of Urban Distribution Centers' Layout

WEI Zhen-lin, LI Shi-long

School of Traffic and Transportation, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China

Received:2019-02-01 Revised:2019-03-05 Online:2019-10-25 Published:2019-10-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

物流设施外迁导致配送活动负外部性增加，损害了公众福利. 本文应用演化博弈论对政府运用经济政策干预城市配送中心布局问题进行了研究，建立了政府和配送企业的静态演化博弈模型，并在模型中考虑了消费者绿色偏好，分析了政府和配送企业的相互作用机理. 此外，还建立了动态税收演化博弈模型，探究动态税收机制下博弈系统演化方向. 通过仿真计算，对比了静态和动态干预机制的优劣；并对税收和消费者绿色偏好系数做了灵敏度分析. 研究结果表明，静态机制下演化博弈系统无法达到渐进稳定状态，动态税收机制下系统能够达到渐进稳定状态，而且税收水平和消费者绿色偏好水平对配送企业抉择有显著影响.

关键词: 物流工程, 城市配送中心, 演化博弈论, 设施布局, 干预机制, 物流设施外迁

Abstract:

Logistics sprawl has leaded to the increase of negative externalities of distribution activities, which has damaged the public welfare. This paper applies the evolutionary game theory to study the governmental intervention mechanism for the layout of urban distribution centers, establishes a static evolutionary game model between the government and distribution enterprises with considering consumers' green preferences, and analyzes the interaction mechanism between the government and distribution enterprises. Moreover, dynamic tax evolutionary game model is established to explore the direction of system evolution under the dynamic scenario. In the simulation, we compare the merits and demerits of the two scenarios, and make a sensitivity of taxation and consumers' green preferences. The research results show that the evolutionary game system can't reach the asymptotic stable state under the static mechanism, but can reach the asymptotic stable state under the dynamic taxation mechanism, and the level of taxation and consumers' green preference has a significant impact on the decision-making of distribution enterprise.

Key words: logistics engineering, urban distribution centers, evolutionary game theory, facility layout, intervention mechanism, logistics sprawl

中图分类号:

U268.6

卫振林，李世龙. 城市配送中心布局政府干预机制研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(5): 7-12.

WEI Zhen-lin, LI Shi-long. Governmental Intervention Mechanism of Urban Distribution Centers' Layout[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2019, 19(5): 7-12.

导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX

链接本文: http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract19898.shtml

http://www.tseit.org.cn/CN/Y2019/V19/I5/7

参考文献

[1] ALJOHANI K, THOMPSON R G. Impacts of logistics sprawl on the urban environment and logistics: Taxonomy and review of literature[J]. Journal of Transport Geography, 2016(57): 255-263.

[2] LI S L, WEI Z L, HUANG A L. Location selection of urban distribution center with a mathematical modeling approach based on the total cost[J]. IEEE Access, 2018 (6): 61833-61842.

[3] GUYON O, ABSI N, FEILLET D, et al. A modeling approach for locating logistics platforms for fast parcels delivery in urban areas[J]. Procedia- Social and Behavioral Sciences, 2012, 39(none): 360-368.

[4] YUAN Q, ZHU J. Logistics sprawl in Chinese metropolises: Evidence from Wuhan[J]. Journal of Transport Geography, 2019(74): 242-252.

[5] WOUDSMA C, JAKUBICEK P, DABLANC L. Logistics sprawl in North America: Methodological issues and a case study in Toronto[J]. Transportation Research Procedia, 2016(12): 474-488.

[6] FEUCHT Y, ZANDER K. Consumers' preferences for carbon labels and the underlying reasoning. A mixed methods approach in 6 European countries[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2017(178): 740-748.

[7] HONG Z, WANG H, YU Y. Green product pricing with non-green product reference[J]. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics & Transportation Review, 2018(115): 1-15.

[8] 陈亮, 王金泓, 何涛, 等. 基于SVR的区域交通碳排放预测研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息2018, 18(2): 13-19. [CHEN L, WANG J H, HE T, et al. Forecast study of regional transportation carbonemissions based on SVR[J]. Journal of Transportation Systems Engineering and Information Technology, 2018, 18(2): 13-19. ]

[9] CHEN W, HU Z H. Using evolutionary game theory to study governments and manufacturers' behavioral strategies under various carbon taxes and subsidies[J]. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2018(201): 123-141.

[10] LIU C, HUANG W, YANG C. The evolutionary dynamics of China' s electric vehicle industry- taxes vs. subsidies[J]. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 2017 (113): 103-122.

[1]	张英贵, 姚璎华, 高全, 雷定猷. 铁路集装箱混合货物平衡装载布局优化模型与算法[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(2): 214-222.
[2]	姜晓红, 陈莎, 张毅. 物流企业碳排放总量与效率测算方法[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(2): 313-321.
[3]	周小祥, 黄承锋. 农村物流末端共配联盟演化博弈及稳定性研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2022, 22(1): 265-272.
[4]	张名芳, 马艳华, 吴初娜, 王力. 公交驾驶员心理状况影响因素分析与疾病判别模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(6): 96-104.
[5]	王清斌, 于江宁, 郑建风. 甩挂运输模式下新增运输任务的干扰管理模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(6): 160-166.
[6]	柳伍生, 李旺, 周清, 迭纤. “无人机-车辆”配送路径优化模型与算法[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(6): 176-186.
[7]	珠兰, 马潇, 刘卓凡. 时间依赖型绿色车辆路径问题研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(6): 187-194.
[8]	奇格奇, 张子贤, 卫振林, 李宝文. 基于语义挖掘的快递运输货品风险评价研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(4): 248-255.
[9]	杨森炎，宁连举，商攀. 基于时空状态网络的电动物流车辆路径优化方法[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(2): 196-204.
[10]	杨华龙，辛禹辰，高浩然. 随机扰动项呈离散分布的库存路径和定价问题的模型与算法[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2021, 21(2): 211-216.
[11]	辛禹辰，施胜男，杨华龙. 基于订单拆分的线上到线下连锁门店配送优化模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(5): 212-217.
[12]	于江霞，杜红亚，罗太波. 基于客户分类的即时配送路径优化研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(4): 202-208.
[13]	刘杰，黎浩东，张萌. 基于点线能力约束的多层级节点协同布局优化模型及算法研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2020, 20(2): 107-113.
[14]	尹小庆，莫宇迪，董陈晨，林云. 考虑行程时间可靠性的城市冷链末端配送站选址研究[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(6): 176-183.
[15]	曾庆成，马佳慧，张晓琳. 混合下单模式下在线餐饮订单配送优化模型[J]. 交通运输系统工程与信息, 2019, 19(6): 184-190.