交通运输系统工程与信息

交通运输系统工程与信息 ›› 2021, Vol. 21 ›› Issue (3): 193-199.

• 系统工程理论与方法 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于组合拍卖与统一价格的停车位最优分配研究

谭冰清1，徐素秀*1, 2a, 2b，许钢焱3a, 3b，周耀明4   

  1. 1. 暨南大学，管理学院，广州 510632；2. 暨南大学，a. 物联网与物流工程研究院，b. 智能科学与工程学院，广东 珠海 519070；3. 哈尔滨工业大学，a. 城市应急管理与交通安全中心，b. 建筑学院，广东 深圳 518055； 4. 上海交通大学，工业工程与管理系，上海 200240
  • 收稿日期:2021-02-11 修回日期:2021-03-15 出版日期:2021-06-25 发布日期:2021-06-25
  • 作者简介:谭冰清(1993- )，女，江西景德镇人，博士生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金/National Natural Science Foundation of China(71804034，72001137)；2019年度“广东特支计划”本土创新创业团队项目/Guangdong Special Support Talent Program-Innovation and Entrepreneurship Leading Team (2019BT02S593)。

Optimal Parking Space Allocation Based on Combinatorial Auction and Uniform Price

TAN Bing-qing1 , XU Su-xiu*1, 2a, 2b , XU Gang-yan3a, 3b , ZHOU Yao-ming4   

  1. 1. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 516032, China; 2a. Institute of Physical Internet, 2b. School of Intelligent Systems Science and Engineering, Jinan University (Zhuhai Campus), Zhuhai 519070, Guangdong, China; 3a. Center of Urban Emergency Management and Traffic Safety, 3b. School of Architecture, Shenzhen 518055, Guangdong, China; 4. The Department of Industrial Engineering and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200240, China
  • Received:2021-02-11 Revised:2021-03-15 Online:2021-06-25 Published:2021-06-25

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摘要：

考虑停车服务平台同时提供预约和即到即停两类停车模式，建立基于组合拍卖与统一价格的停车位最优分配整数规划模型，实现最大化竞标者与平台的整体效用。将长期停留在以竞价分配为目标的传统拍卖机制拓展为竞价分配与统一价格分配相结合的新式单边 VickreyClarke-Groves(O-VCG)组合拍卖机制，对预约与即到即停模式进行最优分配与定价，同时保证了激励相容、个体理性及配置效率这3个重要属性。通过算例分析，探讨了竞标者的出价分布、竞标者人数对两类模式停车分配策略及整体效用的影响。结果表明，当竞标者对单个停车时段出价的均值与单个停车时段的统一价格接近时，O-VCG组合拍卖机制能够实现两类停车模式的最优分配和系统鲁棒性。

关键词: 城市交通, O-VCG组合拍卖, 预约模式, 即到即停模式, 最优分配

Abstract:

This paper considers a parking service platform that provides two types of parking modes simultaneously: reservation mode and first-come- first-served mode. An optimal integer programming model is proposed to maximize the overall utility of bidders and the platform. The uniform price is introduced into a one-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (O-VCG) combinatorial auction mechanism. The proposed novel O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism helps to achieve the goals of incentive compatibility, individual rationality and allocative efficiency. The numerical study demonstrates the effects of the bid distribution and bidder quantity on the parking allocation strategy and the overall utility of the two modes. The results indicate that when the average value of bids is close to the uniform price of single parking time slot, the O-VCG combinatorial auction mechanism can realize the optimal allocation of the two types of parking modes and ensure the system robustness.

Key words: urban traffic, O-VCG combinatorial auction, reservation mode, first-come-first-served mode, optimal allocation strategy

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