| 高铁运营安全监督博弈演化的系统动力学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李科宏,张亚东,郭进,王梓丞.高铁运营安全监督博弈演化的系统动力学分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2019,54(3):579-586. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李科宏 张亚东 郭进 王梓丞 |
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| 作者单位： | 西南交通大学信息科学与技术学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金青年基金资助项目（61703349）；中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（2682017CX101，2682017ZDPY10）；中国铁路总公司科技研究开发计划课题（2017X007-D） |
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| 摘 要： | 针对我国高速铁路委托运输管理模式下，高铁运营安全监督系统存在监管机构不独立和考核奖惩措施不明确的问题，建立了高铁运营安全监督系统演化博弈模型. 该模型是通过分析系统现状和委托代理模式，基于增强高铁公司主体地位和权威性的优化假设条件下建立的，由高铁公司、第三方监管机构和委托路局三方组成，并通过演化博弈理论证明，结合系统动力学（system dynamic，SD）仿真，可以揭示高铁运营安全监督系统博弈各方进行决策的行为特征及其稳定状态. SD仿真结果表明:该模型的8个纯策略均衡解和2个混合策略均衡解都不是演化稳定策略均衡，在任意非均衡解初始策略下，高铁公司和委托路局的博弈演化过程虽然都出现了波动，但第三方监管机构的安全监管率将始终向实时监管的状态演化，说明通过引入第三方独立监管机构和明确安全监督检查考核奖惩措施，可以有效提高高铁运营安全监督系统的安全监管率.
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| 关 键 词： | 高速铁路 运营安全监督 系统动力学 博弈论 委托代理 |
| 收稿时间： | 2018-01-16 |
System Dynamics Analysis Method of Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Supervision of High-Speed Railway Operation Safety |
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| LI Kehong,ZHANG Yadong,GUO Jin,WANG Zicheng.System Dynamics Analysis Method of Evolutionary Game Dynamics for Supervision of High-Speed Railway Operation Safety[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2019,54(3):579-586. |
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| Authors: | LI Kehong ZHANG Yadong GUO Jin WANG Zicheng |
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| Abstract: | On the issue of no-incentive restraint mechanism and the regulator not independent in the entrusted transportation management model of high-speed railways (HSR) in China, an evolutionary game model of the HSR operation safety supervision system has been established through the analysis of the current situation and principal-agent model of the system based on the optimization assumptions that enhance the status and authority of the HSR company. The system was composed of the HSR company, a third-party regulatory agency (RA), and commissioned railway bureau (RB). The results of the evolutionary game theory combined with system dynamics (SD) simulation revealed the behavioural characteristics and steady-state decision-making by the three parties in the system. The SD simulation results showed that eight pure strategy equilibrium solutions and two mixed strategy equilibrium solutions of the model did not comply with the evolutionary stable strategy. Under the initial strategy of any non-equilibrium solution, the game evolution process of both the HSR company and commissioned RB continually fluctuate; however, the safety regulation rate of the RA will always evolve towards the state of real-time supervision, indicating that the introduction of an independent third-party RA and a clear incentive restraint mechanism can improve the safety regulation rate of the HSR operations safety supervision system effectively. |
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