High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation: A vertical differentiation approach

This paper considers vertical differentiation between air transport and high-speed rail (HSR) with different ranges of travel distance to analyze the air-HSR competition effects on fares, traffic volumes and welfare, as well as the conditions under which air-HSR cooperation is welfare-enhancing. The analysis is conducted in a hub-and-spoke network with a network carrier, an HSR operator, and a spoke airline, taking into account potential hub airport capacity constraint. We find that air-HSR competition in the connecting market may result in the network airline charging an excessively high price in the HSR-inaccessible market. This effect is present even when the HSR-inaccessible route is a duopoly-airline market. On the other hand, air-HSR cooperation increases fares in the connecting market, and an improvement in rail speed or air-HSR connecting time reduces airfare on the routes where HSR and the airline compete. When the airline cannot serve all the markets due to limited hub airport capacity, it would withdraw from the market in which it has less competitive advantage over HSR. Finally, air-HSR cooperation is more likely to be welfare-improving when the hub airport is capacity constrained, and when either air transport or HSR exhibits strong economies of traffic density.     

Policy analysis of third party electronic coupons for public transit fares

Mobile technologies are generating new business models for urban transport systems, as is evident from recent startups cropping up from the private sector. Public transport systems can make more use of mobile technologies than just for measuring system performance, improving boarding times, or for analyzing travel patterns. A new transaction model is proposed for public transport systems where travelers are allowed to pre-book their fares and trade that demand information to private firms. In this public-private partnership model, fare revenue management is outsourced to third party private firms such as big box retail or large planned events (such as sports stadiums and theme parks), who can issue electronic coupons to travelers to subsidize their fares. This e-coupon pricing model is analyzed using marginal cost theory for the transit service and shown to be quite effective for monopolistic coupon rights, particularly for demand responsive transit systems that feature high cost fares, non-commute travel purposes, and a closed access system with existing pre-booking requirements. However, oligopolistic scenarios analyzed using game theory and network economics suggest that public transport agencies need to take extreme care in planning and implementing such a policy. Otherwise, they risk pushing an equivalent tax on private firms or disrupting the urban economy and real estate values while increasing ridership.     

Impact of congestion charging on the transit market: An inter-modal equilibrium model

An inter-modal equilibrium model links an urban road network subject to a congestion charge to a parallel urban transit market, with a view to finding the optimum congestion charge consistent with the commercial decisions of the transit operator(s). A congestion charge is set to maximise social surplus. Travel behaviour is assumed to conform to elastic-demand user equilibrium traffic assignment. The transit market is assumed to be either a profit maximising monopoly or a profit maximising duopoly competing non-cooperatively. The operator(s) set the fares to maximise profits and the supply of transit services are determined by the resulting demand. The problem has been formulated as a bi-level programme with the determination of the congestion charge on the upper level and the setting of transit fares on the lower level. In the case of non-cooperating operators, the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium fares are sought. The results of the model are analysed for a small example based loosely on Edinburgh. This reveals the importance of competition in the transit market for the trade off between the government, the transit provider(s) and the travellers.     

Relationships between fares, trip length and market competition

This paper analyses equilibrium fares that arise from Collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand and Sequential Price Competition when two profit maximising transport firms produce symmetrically differentiable services and have identical costs. Special focus is placed on how different equilibrium fares are linked to trip length. Higher operator costs and higher demand from the authorities regarding the quality of transport supply result in steeper relationships (larger rate of change) between all fares and travel distance. Also, a higher degree of substitutability between the services will in most cases make these relationships steeper. The competitive situation has less influence on fares, both absolutely and relatively, the longer routes the operators compete on.     

Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

This paper identifies some implications of the cost of public funds (CF) in public transit subsidization and regulation. Regulation is considered because a monopolistic operator is assumed. A social welfare maximization model is proposed, subject to individual rationality and vehicle capacity constraints. Optimality conditions are provided and a key formula is derived about CF’s role in balancing the need to cover the fixed operation cost through fares on the operator’s side and the effort to maintain the user surplus on the passengers’ side. Major findings from this model’s formulation include: (1) CF determines the extent to which the passengers’ surplus is compromised in order to cover the fixed part of the operating cost, and (2) subsidy is unjustified when CF exceeds the critical shadow price of the financial constraint. Analytical relations are illustrated through numerical examples.     

Regulating inter-firm agreements: The case of airline codesharing in parallel networks

We compare aviation markets under conditions of competition, codesharing contracts and anti-trust immune alliances, assuming that demand for flights depends on both fares and the level of frequency offered. Using a hybrid competitive/cooperative game theoretic framework, we show that the stronger the inter-airline agreement on overlapping routes, the higher the producer surplus. On the other hand, consumer surplus and overall social welfare are maximized under limited codesharing agreements. Partial mergers appear preferable to no agreement in ‘thin’ markets, in which both demand and profit margins are relatively low. Inter-governmental agreements are also analyzed and we show that bilaterals create the least favorable market outcomes for consumers and producers. Finally, a realistic case study demonstrates that under asymmetric and uncertain demand, codesharing on parallel links may be preferable to competitive outcomes for multiple consumer types.     

Sharing costs in Swedish road ownership associations

Usually transport systems, and roads in particular, are viewed as public goods. However, this is not always the case. In Sweden a large part of the road system is privately owned. Most of these privately owned roads are rural roads used by farmers and summer cottage owners, or used for forest transport. These roads are mainly provided by ownership associations.An important difference between public roads and these privately owned roads is that all investments- and maintenance decisions are made by the users themselves, who also have to pay the costs, whereas the usual case is that the owners/providers of a road-system are different agents than the users. Here the question is not how to charge the roads but how to split the costs of the roads among the users in an efficient and “fair” way.The motivation of this paper is the practical problem of how such an ownership association can divide the costs for the road network among the members in an efficient and “fair” way. The problem is treated from a game theoretical point of view, making use of the Shapley value. This means that the problem is associated with a game - a mathematical representation of the conflict situation. The Shapley value is a very important solution concept for cooperative games, like the game in this case. For games corresponding to this specific type of problems, it is shown that the Shapley value has excellent properties, such as beeing an element of the core, and beeing very easy to compute.     

Car ownership and public transport use: Revisiting the interaction

At the beginning of the 1980s, it seemed that a consensus was emerging among researchers that public transport service levels, fares or quality had a small but possibly important effect on car ownership, and that this should be taken into account for those purposes where car ownership forecasts are used for developing policy on public transport or roads. Somehow, the findings faded away, and had little effect on policy thinking or on analytical techniques. The results of six surveys carried out in South Yorkshire over the period 1972 to 1991, during which there were extreme changes in public transport policy, tend to support a prima facie case for reopening the question. At the household level, car ownership rates are shown to be more volatile than is often assumed, especially in multiple car households. This volatility provides a context within which the quality of public transport provision appears to influence both the level of car ownership and the relationship between changes in the level of car ownership and changes in public transport use.     

Monopoly,Subsidies and the Mohring Effect: A Synthesis

Abstract

This paper provides a unifying framework to analyze whether a monopoly transit provider will under or over-supply frequency. To this end we couch the problem in term of Spence [(1975). Monopoly, quality and regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 417–429] who analyzed the incentives to provide quality by a monopolist. We show that all of the results of a recent academic exchange discussing this topic are special cases of Spence [(1975). Monopoly, quality and regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 6, 417–429], albeit with an adjustment in order to take into account the cost structure of frequency provision in the case of public transport. In theory then, there are cases when a monopolist may offer optimal or above optimal levels of frequency without requiring subsidies. However, public transport is rarely provided by an unregulated monopolist. Rather, these services are usually provided either by an exclusive operator under regulated fares or by a group of competing operators, with or without fare regulation. We show that in the first case frequency will always be below the social optimal level.     

Identification and quantification of link vulnerability in multi-level public transport networks: a passenger perspective

Robust public transport networks are important, since disruptions decrease the public transport accessibility of areas. Despite this importance, the full passenger impacts of public transport network vulnerability have not yet been considered in science and practice. We have developed a methodology to identify the most vulnerable links in the total, multi-level public transport network and to quantify the societal costs of link vulnerability for these identified links. Contrary to traditional single-level network approaches, we consider the integrated, total multi-level PT network in the identification and quantification of link vulnerability, including PT services on other network levels which remain available once a disturbance occurs. We also incorporate both exposure to large, non-recurrent disturbances and the impacts of these disturbances explicitly when identifying and quantifying link vulnerability. This results in complete and realistic insights into the negative accessibility impacts of disturbances. Our methodology is applied to a case study in the Netherlands, using a dataset containing 2.5 years of disturbance information. Our results show that especially crowded links of the light rail/metro network are vulnerable, due to the combination of relatively high disruption exposure and relatively high passenger flows. The proposed methodology allows quantification of robustness benefits of measures, in addition to the costs of these measures. Showing the value of robustness, our work can support and rationalize the decision-making process of public transport operators and authorities regarding the implementation of robustness measures.     

The demand for public transport. part II. supply and demand factors of public transport

Abstract

This two‐part article, concerned with the way public transport ridership is affected by the various relevant factors, is based on the Executive Summary of The Demand for Public Transport (Webster and Bly 1980), the report of the TRRL‐sponsored International Collaborative Study on Factors Affecting Public Transport Patronage. Part I of the article, which was concerned with the social and economic conditions in which public transport operates, showed the importance of the background factors such as income, car ownership and land use on public transport usage: it also indicated how the longer‐term impacts of the more direct demand factors (fares, service levels) often show themselves in changes in car ownership levels, activity patterns (i.e. where people live, work, shop, socialize, etc) and land‐use development.

Part II reviews the current state of knowledge on the effects of changes in fare levels and quality of service and of the introduction of various traffic and transport measures (traffic restraint, bus priority, etc): it outlines current methodology on costing public transport services and draws the supply and demand sides together in a consideration of particular strategies which are at the disposal of the operator, the planner and the policy maker.     

One price for all? Price discrimination and market captivity: Evidence from the Italian city-pair markets

This paper tests whether, and to what extent, airlines exploit market captivity by using price discrimination strategies. The Italian passenger market is particularly fit for this purpose, given the high differentials in the degree of the inter-modal competition amongst domestic connections. Results show that, ceteris paribus, airlines adopt a different pricing behaviour depending on the degree of inter-modal market captivity. First, in highly concentrated markets with respect to air competitors, airlines price higher when the inter-modal competition is limited. This proves that inter-modal market captivity strengthens the effect of market power. Second, the inter-temporal price discrimination leads to a J-shaped distribution of fares over time, which is more pronounced when the inter-modal competition is effective. This suggests that airlines need to adopt a pricing technique that allows for a greater market segmentation in order to compete successfully with high-speed rail transport and to extract a larger part of passengers’ surplus. These results are relevant in terms of transport-investment implications and competition policy. The indirect benefits that investments in rail infrastructure would yield through downward pressures on competing airline fares should be embedded in any cost-benefit analysis of high-speed networks investments and in any policy evaluation of measures that aim to reduce the territorial gaps in infrastructure endowment and accessibility.     

A systematic analysis of multimodal transport systems with road space distribution and responsive bus service

A smart design of transport systems involves efficient use and allocation of the limited urban road capacity in the multimodal environment. This paper intends to understand the system-wide effect of dividing the road space to the private and public transport modes and how the public transport service provider responds to the space changes. To this end, the bimodal dynamic user equilibrium is formulated for separated road space. The Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD) model is employed to depict the dynamics of the automobile traffic for its state-dependent feature, its inclusion of hypercongestion, and its advantage of capturing network topology. The delay of a bus trip depends on the running speed which is in turn affected by bus lane capacity and ridership. Within the proposed bimodal framework, the steady-state equilibrium traffic characteristics and the optimal bus fare and service frequency are analytically derived. The counter-intuitive properties of traffic condition, modal split, and behavior of bus operator in the hypercongestion are identified. To understand the interaction between the transport authority (for system benefit maximization) and the bus operator (for its own benefit maximization), we examine how the bus operator responds to space changes and how the system benefit is influenced with the road space allocation. With responsive bus service, the condition, under which expanding bus lane capacity is beneficial to the system as a whole, has been analytically established. Then the model is applied to the dynamic framework where the space allocation changes with varying demand and demand-responsive bus service. We compare the optimal bus services under different economic objectives, evaluate the system performance of the bimodal network, and explore the dynamic space allocation strategy for the sake of social welfare maximization.     

Price-based regulation of oligopolistic markets under discrete choice models of demand

We propose a framework to find optimal price-based policies to regulate markets characterized by oligopolistic competition and in which consumers make a discrete choice among a finite set of alternatives. The framework accommodates general discrete choice models available in the literature in order to capture heterogeneous consumer behavior. In our work, consumers are utility maximizers and are modeled according to random utility theory. Suppliers are modeled as profit maximizers, according to the traditional microeconomic treatment. Market competition is modeled as a non-cooperative game, for which an approximate equilibrium solution is sought. Finally, the regulator can affect the behavior of all other agents by giving subsidies or imposing taxes to consumers. In transport markets, economic instruments might target specific alternatives, to reduce externalities such as congestion or emissions, or specific segments of the population, to achieve social welfare objectives. In public policy, different agents have different individual or social objectives, possibly conflicting, which must be taken into account within a social welfare function. We present a mixed integer optimization model to find optimal policies subject to supplier profit maximization and consumer utility maximization constraints. Then, we propose a model-based heuristic approach based on the fixed-point iteration algorithm that finds an approximate equilibrium solution for the market. Numerical experiments on an intercity travel case study show how the regulator can optimize its decisions under different scenarios.

     

Integrating congestion pricing,transit subsidies and mode choice

We model and analyze optimal (welfare maximizing) prices and design of transport services in a bimodal context. Car congestion and transit design are simultaneously introduced and consumers choose based on the full price they perceive. The optimization variables are the congestion toll, the transit fare (and hence the level of subsidies) and transit frequency. We obtain six main results: (i) the optimal car-transit split is generally different from the total cost minimizing one; (ii) optimal congestion and transit price are interdependent and have an optimal frequency attached; (iii) the optimal money price difference together with the optimal frequency yield the optimal modal split; (iv) if this modal split is used in traditional stand-alone formulations – where each mode is priced independently–resulting congestion tolls and transit subsidies and fares are consistent with the optimal money price difference; (v) self-financing of the transport sector is feasible; and (vi) investment in car infrastructure induces an increase in generalized cost for all public transport users.     

A survey of the Swiss public transport system and policy

This paper surveys Swiss public transport structure and policy. The regulatory regime is explained with the division between the two operators working under federal monopoly — the State railways (SBB) and the postbuses (PTT) — and the rest of the system. The rather complicated Swiss subsidy arrangements are described. The federal government's emphasis on introducing cheap public transport fares on environmental grounds through the federal transport measures (BTM) and the use of cheap fares in urban areas are discussed. The paper notes the Swiss people's rejection by a referendum of a federal commission's proposal for an integrated transport policy, though some of the solutions were introduced in their own right: the division of SBB into two parts, and the creation of the concept Rail 2000, later developed into Rail + Bus 2000. Finally, the paper reviews problems of the Swiss policy, including the future of cheap fares, making some comparisons with developments in Scandinavia.     

Future use of stage bus services

The reasons underlying the decline of stage bus services in the U.K. over the past 30 years seem to be well understood, and the probable future trends have been projected using a quantitative forecasting model. The model considers U.K. bus services at a very aggregate level, but it breaks the demand into specific user groups: work trips, children's travel, travel by the elderly, and all other travel, and separately for households with and without a private car. Forecasts depend very sensitively on the level of economic growth assumed, since this governs the two major factors which determine public transport use — car ownership and the cost of operating the services. If the economy could recover its historic growth rates, a further substantial decline in bus use seems inevitable under most realistic assumptions. However, with the present economic outlook, a lower growth rate seems likely to persist for some time, and in this case public transport use will become much more stable in the 1990's; a tendency which would be helped if there were large increases in fuel prices. Many of the Metropolitan Counties have adopted policies of strongly restraining future rises in fares, in some cases to the extent of freezing fares in monetary terms. The effects of such policies on both patronage and subsidies are considered here, and although much of the current political attention is focussed on controlling fares, the question of balance between fares and service levels is also discussed. Lastly, it must be admitted that these predictions are based on knowledge which is largely restricted to the short-term effects of transport policies. The nature of our uncertainty about longer-term effects, and the possible size of them, is considered in terms of sensitivity-testing of the prediction model.     

The impact of Gulf carrier competition on U.S. airlines

Gulf carriers, such as Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways, and Qatar Airways, have expanded aggressively and are creating an increasingly dense global network. These carriers’ future growth prospects, however, hinge on their ability to gain access to markets in Europe and America, for example. Existing bilateral agreements stifle the Gulf carriers’ ambitious expansion plans in some instances, and incumbent carriers lobby to restrict further market access. To contribute to this debate, the objective of this research is to empirically examine the effects of Gulf carrier competition on U.S. carriers’ passenger volumes and fares in international route markets. Based on data obtained from the U.S. Department of Transportation, the empirical results suggest that greater competition by Gulf carriers in U.S. international markets is associated with (1) significant growth in U.S.–Middle East traffic volumes and (2) small but statistically significant traffic losses and fare reductions for U.S. carriers in route markets connecting the U.S. with Africa, Asia, Australia and Europe.     

Optimal transport strategies for European cities

A new procedure for generating optimal transport strategies has been applied in nine European cities. A public sector objective function which reflects concerns over efficiency, environmental impact, finance and sustainability is specified and a set of policy measures with acceptable ranges on each, identified. Optimal strategies based on combinations of these policy measures which generate the optimal value of the objective function, are identified, and compared between cities. Resulting policy recommendations are presented. The results demonstrate the importance of an integrated approach to transport strategy formulation. They emphasise the role of changes in public transport service levels and of fares, and of charges for car use. By contrast, new infrastructure projects are less frequently justified. In the majority of cities the revenues from car use charges are sufficient to finance other elements in the strategy. However, private sector involvement either in initial financing or in operation may be desirable. Revised objective functions to reflect private sector involvement are specified, and optimal strategies with private sector operation of public transport are also identified. The requirement to meet private sector rates of return for public transport operation typically results in lower frequencies and higher fares; charges for car use then need to be raised to satisfy public policy objectives, but system performance is reduced. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Factors driving public support for road congestion reduction policies: Congestion charging,free public transport and more roads in Stockholm,Helsinki and Lyon

Based on an across-the-board survey conducted among residents of Stockholm, Helsinki and Lyon, we explore the opinions on three policy measures to combat road congestion: congestion charging, free public transport and building more roads. The support for the two latter policies is substantially higher than the support for congestion charging, which is only supported by a majority in Stockholm. Self-interest is important for the formation of the opinion to all three policies. However, fundamental values and general political views, indicated by four attitudinal factors, are even more important in forming opinions towards the three transport policies. Of all attitudinal factors, the one indicating environmental concern most influences the support for all policies. Equity concerns, however, increase the support for free public transport and opposition to taxation increases the support for building more roads.Our results further suggest that the opinions towards free public transport and building more roads can be mapped along the left–right political axis, where Environment and Equity are to the left and Pricing and Taxation are to the right. However, the opinion towards congestion charging cuts right through the political spectrum. The impact of the fundamental values and self-interest variables are similar for Stockholm and Helsinki, indicating that even if experience increases the overall support for charging, it does not change the relative strength of different political arguments to any major extent.