Deregulating European aviation — A case study

European international scheduled aviation has been characterised by bans on market entry, price collusion, and capacity sharing. High fares were charged compared to world standards and the fares charged by European charter airlines.In May 1986 new entrants with pricing freedom were permitted on the London-Dublin route which was then the third largest in European scheduled international aviation. Prior to deregulation the route experienced high fare growth. The unrestricted fare ex-London increased 72.6 per cent compared to a Retail Price Index increase of 41.5 per cent. There was a growth in passenger numbers in the years 1980–85 of 2.8 per cent.Since deregulation passenger numbers have risen to 2.3 million compared to 994,000 before deregulation. Fares have declined by an estimated 37 per cent ex-Dublin and 42 per cent ex-London in real terms. There have been four cases of market entry and one of market exit. The estimated share of the new entrants in the second half of 1989 was 28 per cent. The preregulation earnings data of Aer Lingus, the market leader, indicated that protection allowed staff to earn economic rents. A two-tier structure was introduced in response to competition.Remaining barriers to contestability in UK/Ireland aviation include hub airport dominance, ground handling monopolies, and the ability of airlines with routes in both regulated and deregulated markets to engage in geographical price discrimination against airlines with routes in deregulated markets only. A pro-contestability aviation policy in Europe will require measures to prevent the abuse of dominant positions by established airlines over new market entrants and to prevent collusion between established airlines.     

Competition and public service obligations in European aviation markets

This paper analyzes the effect of universal service policies on the airline markets of five European Union countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) in the period 2002–2010. Results show that airfare discount schemes for island residents raise demand and positively affect competition and the number of flights at the route level. These effects are evident in France and Italy, but are particularly marked in Spain. By contrast, public service obligations (PSOs) reduce competition on the protected routes, while their effect on the number of flights differs depending on national regulations. In Spain, routes protected with PSOs have greater flight frequencies than those on unprotected routes of similar characteristics, but in France, Italy and the UK the opposite result is found. The empirical model also finds that on routes with low-cost airlines market concentration is smaller and there is a larger number of flights. This result is relevant for the design of universal service policy, since in recent years low-cost airlines have entered a number of thin routes and have increased access to air transportation.     

Regulating inter-firm agreements: The case of airline codesharing in parallel networks

We compare aviation markets under conditions of competition, codesharing contracts and anti-trust immune alliances, assuming that demand for flights depends on both fares and the level of frequency offered. Using a hybrid competitive/cooperative game theoretic framework, we show that the stronger the inter-airline agreement on overlapping routes, the higher the producer surplus. On the other hand, consumer surplus and overall social welfare are maximized under limited codesharing agreements. Partial mergers appear preferable to no agreement in ‘thin’ markets, in which both demand and profit margins are relatively low. Inter-governmental agreements are also analyzed and we show that bilaterals create the least favorable market outcomes for consumers and producers. Finally, a realistic case study demonstrates that under asymmetric and uncertain demand, codesharing on parallel links may be preferable to competitive outcomes for multiple consumer types.     

Bus policy — Conclusions from a case study

The main policy conclusions from a recent bus study in the new town of Telford in the U.K. are summarised and discussed. The choice of bus routes and their combination into networks is examined. Alternative fares systems are compared and the implications for the fare levels necessary to cover costs are discussed. It is argued that bus services can generally be financed from the fare-box but that, unless services are cut as passenger demand falls, unduly high fares will result and these will unnecessarily drive more passengers away from the buses. Several particular aspects of service marketing are then examined and the paper concludes by discussing the actual organisation of the bus services.     

Relationships between fares, trip length and market competition

This paper analyses equilibrium fares that arise from Collusion, Cournot, Stackelberg, Bertrand and Sequential Price Competition when two profit maximising transport firms produce symmetrically differentiable services and have identical costs. Special focus is placed on how different equilibrium fares are linked to trip length. Higher operator costs and higher demand from the authorities regarding the quality of transport supply result in steeper relationships (larger rate of change) between all fares and travel distance. Also, a higher degree of substitutability between the services will in most cases make these relationships steeper. The competitive situation has less influence on fares, both absolutely and relatively, the longer routes the operators compete on.     

Accounting for travel time variability in the optimal pricing of cars and buses

A number of studies have shown that in addition to travel time and cost as the common influences on mode, route and departure time choices, travel time variability plays an increasingly important role, especially in the presence of traffic congestion on roads and crowding on public transport. The dominant focus of modelling and implementation of optimal pricing that incorporates trip time variability has been in the context of road pricing for cars. The main objective of this paper is to introduce a non-trivial extension to the existing literature on optimal pricing in a multimodal setting, building in the role of travel time variability as a source of disutility for car and bus users. We estimate the effect of variability in travel time and bus headway on optimal prices (i.e., tolls for cars and fares for buses) and optimal bus capacity (i.e., frequencies and size) accounting for crowding on buses, under a social welfare maximisation framework. Travel time variability is included by adopting the well-known mean–variance model, using an empirical relationship between the mean and standard deviation of travel times. We illustrate our model with an application to a highly congested corridor with cars, buses and walking as travel alternatives in Sydney, Australia. There are three main findings that have immediate policy implications: (i) including travel time variability results in higher optimal car tolls and substantial increases in toll revenue, while optimal bus fares remain almost unchanged; (ii) when bus headways are variable, the inclusion of travel time variability as a source of disutility for users yields higher optimal bus frequencies; and (iii) including both travel time variability and crowding discomfort leads to higher optimal bus sizes.     

Transit fare differentials: A theoretical analysis

This paper compares the ridership. operator revenue, passenger-km, and consumer surplus in uniform pricing policy versus the differential fare pricing system. The comparisons are assumed that the flat fare is set equal to average differential fares. With mathematical derivation, the paper investigates some of the properties of fare differentiation and discusses characteristics of a general nature. The theoretical results have spelled out the conditions under which pricing policy may yield higher performances. A simple numerical example is used to demonstrate the sensitivity of the model. Some recommendations for setting transit pricing policy are drawn from the results.     

Transit pricing research

Several decades of research on transit pricing have provided clear insights into how riders respond to price changes in both the transit and automobile sectors. For the most part, riders are insensitive to changes in either fare levels, structures, or forms of payments, though this varies considerably among user groups and operating environments. Since riders are approximately twice as sensitive to changes in travel time as they are to changes in fares, a compelling argument can be made for operating more premium quality transit services at higher prices. Such programs could be supplemented by vouchers and concessionary programs to reduce the burden of higher fares on low-income users. Also, cross-elasticity research suggests that higher automobile prices would have a significantly greater affect on ridership than lower fares. Most research on transit fare structures shows that the common practice of flat fares is highly inequitable, penalizing short-distance and off-peak users. Free fare programs have proven quite costly for each new transit user attracted and have rarely lured motorists to transit. Free fares limited to downtowns have been more successful than systemwide free fare programs. While prepayment schemes have met with success in the U.S. and Europe, honor fares have suffered from excessive revenue losses in at least one case in the U.S. Some of the more noteworthy fare policy successes in North America have been Bridgeport's combined pass-fare program, Allentown's deep discounts, Ottawa's major fare reduction and differentiation, and Columbus's substantial midday discount. As paratransit and other new transit alternatives to conventional bus continue to emerge, new, more differentiated fare practices can be expected in the future.     

Robust weekly aircraft maintenance routing problem and the extension to the tail assignment problem

In this paper, we study two closely related airline planning problems: the robust weekly aircraft maintenance routing problem (RWAMRP) and the tail assignment problem (TAP). In real life operations, the RWAMRP solution is used in tactical planning whereas the TAP solution is implemented in operational planning. The main objective of these two problems is to minimize the total expected propagated delay (EPD) of the aircraft routes. To formulate the RWAMRP, we propose a novel weekly line-of-flights (LOF) network model that can handle complex and nonlinear cost functions of EPD. Because the number of LOFs grows exponentially with the number of flights to be scheduled, we propose a two-stage column generation approach to efficiently solve large-scale real-life RWAMRPs. Because the EPD of an LOF is highly nonlinear and can be very time-consuming to accurately compute, we propose three lower bounds on the EPD to solve the pricing subproblem of the column generation. Our approach is tested on eight real-life test instances. The computational results show that the proposed approach provides very tight LP relaxation (within 0.6% of optimal solutions) and solves the test case with more than 6000 flights per week in less than three hours. We also investigate the solutions obtained by our approach over 500 simulated realizations. The simulation results demonstrate that, in all eight test instances, our solutions result in less EPDs than those obtained from traditional methods. We then extend our model and solution approach to solve realistically simulated TAP instances.     

Time‐of‐day transit pricing: comparative US and international experiences

Experiences with time‐of‐day transit pricing in the U.S. are reviewed in this article and compared to those in other countries. Emphasis is placed on examining ridership, financial and efficiency impacts associated with time‐of‐day pricing, along with highlighting innovative approaches to implementing fare differentials. American time‐of‐day fare structures have been about evenly split between off‐peak discounts, peak‐period surcharges, and programmes involving differential rates of fare increases between peak and off‐peak hours. Although most American operators introduced time‐of‐day differentials to encourage ridership shifts to the off‐peak period, available evidence suggests that they have been only marginally successful in doing so. Off‐peak users were generally found to be far more fare‐sensitive to discounts than peak passengers were to surcharges. Only in a handful of American cities were significant efficiency and financial benefits from time‐of‐day pricing recorded, though in those few places, they tended to be substantial. The most successful American programmes have been those which collect fares on the basis of bus runs and direction of trips (rather than the exact time) and which aggressively market their programmes under the aegis of ‘bargain fares’. It is concluded that useful lessons can be gained by sharing policy insights from experiments with differential transit pricing in both the US and elsewhere.     

Direct to your destination: the size,scope and competitive status of express coach carriers in the United States

The advent of express coach bus lines offering guaranteed seating and emphasizing curbside pickup and drop-off is contributing to a revival in intercity bus travel in the United States. Relatively little is known, however, about the scale and geographic scope of these carriers or the competitive landscape in which they operate. To fill this void, this study evaluates the service networks operated by the two largest express coach operators in the country, BoltBus and Megabus, and evaluates a data set of 4775 fares sold on megabus.com. The results show that these carriers cumulatively serve 127 intercity segments and operate about 52.9 million bus miles per year. Together, these carriers have grown to about one third of the size of Amtrak, with Megabus and BoltBus providing 3.3 billion and .69 billion seat miles of service, respectively, compared to Amtrak’s 12.8 billion. With respect to the types of routes it serves and the competition it faces, Megabus has evolved into a carrier quite different than Boltbus; more than one third of Megabus’ bus miles are operated on segments without Amtrak service, while virtually all of BoltBus’ miles face this competition. The analysis of Megabus’ pricing shows that fares rise modestly within 2 weeks of departure, while the per-mile costs are much less ($.08/mile) for 300–399 mile trips than for those 50–99 miles ($.22/mile). Nevertheless, the dispersion of fares tends to fall as the departure date nears, regardless of distance. Together, these prominent bus lines serve 66 of the 100 most heavily traveled U.S. city pairs that have characteristics suitable for intercity bus service—which is more than Amtrak. With further growth on the horizon, planners, federal regulators, and researchers should collaborate on establishing reporting requirements for this expanding sector.

     

The impact of a carbon tax on international tourism

A simulation model of international tourist flows is used to estimate the impact of a carbon tax on aviation fuel. The effect of the tax on travel behaviour is small: A global tax of $1000/t C would change travel behaviour and reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation by 0.8%. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would particularly affect long-haul flights, because of high emissions, and short-haul flights, because of the emission during take-off and landing. Medium distance flights would be affected least. This implies that tourist destinations that rely heavily on short-haul flights or on intercontinental flights will see a decline in international tourism numbers, while other destinations may see international arrivals rise. If the tax is only applied to the European Union, tourists would stay closer to home and European tourism would grow at the expense of other destinations. Sensitivity analyses reveal that the qualitative insights are robust.     

Assessment of stratospheric fuel burn by civil commercial aviation

When jetliners fly in the stratosphere, their emissions tend to be longer-lived and therefore have greater environmental impact. Since the altitude of the tropopause is not consistent and can be as low as 23,000 ft., cruising flights may have a great chance to fly into the stratosphere. In this paper, we present a simple and rapid method to estimate the extent of US commercial passenger and cargo flight that currently occurs in the stratosphere, based on publicly available historical data from 2008 to 2012. We model the vertical profile of a flight and compare it with the height of the tropopause along its route. Our analysis covers 78% of the total travelled distance reported by the United States Bureau of Transportation Statistics, and shows that these flights burnt ∼11 million tons of fuel annually, or ∼31% of cruise fuel, in the stratosphere between 2008 and 2012. Our results also show that the chance of flying into stratosphere varies by area, but flights within the contiguous United States tend to stay below the stratosphere. Moreover, the stratosphere fuel burn of Asia-US flights may be significantly reduced by taking jet stream routes.     

Further developments in the pricing of local public transport

Abstract

This short paper supplements and updates the writer's Recent Developments in the Pricing of Local Public Transport Services, Transport Reviews, 1 (2), pp. 127–150 (1981). That paper described the situation as at 1980 in Britain, with some examples from other countries. This paper updates the position with regard to four main issues:

(a) Impact of the Transport Act 1980 in Britain, which has virtually removed fares control from stage carriage services, and removed all price and quantity control from express services by road.

(b) Further development of zonal pricing, travelcards and off‐bus fare collection on urban systems, and the effects of price reductions (and subsequent increases) in London, West Midlands, and Merseyside.

(c) Problems concerning the legality of financial support for fares policies in British cities.

(d) Following a presentation of work arising from the earlier paper at the meeting of the Transportation Research Board in Washington, D.C. in January 1983, the contrast between British and American policy is reviewed, with the writer's personal view on current policy there.

In addition, evidence on certain other points in the text is updated.     

One price for all? Price discrimination and market captivity: Evidence from the Italian city-pair markets

This paper tests whether, and to what extent, airlines exploit market captivity by using price discrimination strategies. The Italian passenger market is particularly fit for this purpose, given the high differentials in the degree of the inter-modal competition amongst domestic connections. Results show that, ceteris paribus, airlines adopt a different pricing behaviour depending on the degree of inter-modal market captivity. First, in highly concentrated markets with respect to air competitors, airlines price higher when the inter-modal competition is limited. This proves that inter-modal market captivity strengthens the effect of market power. Second, the inter-temporal price discrimination leads to a J-shaped distribution of fares over time, which is more pronounced when the inter-modal competition is effective. This suggests that airlines need to adopt a pricing technique that allows for a greater market segmentation in order to compete successfully with high-speed rail transport and to extract a larger part of passengers’ surplus. These results are relevant in terms of transport-investment implications and competition policy. The indirect benefits that investments in rail infrastructure would yield through downward pressures on competing airline fares should be embedded in any cost-benefit analysis of high-speed networks investments and in any policy evaluation of measures that aim to reduce the territorial gaps in infrastructure endowment and accessibility.     

Policy analysis of third party electronic coupons for public transit fares

Mobile technologies are generating new business models for urban transport systems, as is evident from recent startups cropping up from the private sector. Public transport systems can make more use of mobile technologies than just for measuring system performance, improving boarding times, or for analyzing travel patterns. A new transaction model is proposed for public transport systems where travelers are allowed to pre-book their fares and trade that demand information to private firms. In this public-private partnership model, fare revenue management is outsourced to third party private firms such as big box retail or large planned events (such as sports stadiums and theme parks), who can issue electronic coupons to travelers to subsidize their fares. This e-coupon pricing model is analyzed using marginal cost theory for the transit service and shown to be quite effective for monopolistic coupon rights, particularly for demand responsive transit systems that feature high cost fares, non-commute travel purposes, and a closed access system with existing pre-booking requirements. However, oligopolistic scenarios analyzed using game theory and network economics suggest that public transport agencies need to take extreme care in planning and implementing such a policy. Otherwise, they risk pushing an equivalent tax on private firms or disrupting the urban economy and real estate values while increasing ridership.     

The inclusion of aviation into the EU emission trading scheme – Impacts on competition between European and non-European network airlines

In 2008, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Council agreed on including international aviation in the already existing European Union carbon market. From 2012, allowances will be required for all international flights landing at and departing from any airport in the EU. Domestic aviation will be subject to the same rules as international air traffic. Model-based empirical estimations presented in this paper indicate a diverse set of effects influencing competition between European and non-European aircraft operators. Initially, this paper provides an overview on recent political developments on EU as well as on International Civil Aviation Organisation level on the subject of emissions trading and aviation. Subsequently, our modelling approach and the main results concerning impacts on operating costs, ticket prices and cargo rates for European and non-European aircraft operators are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions about the impacts on competition between European and non-European airlines are drawn.     

Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

Man and his transport behaviour Part 4a. User response to price changes: application of the ‘threshold’ concept

Summary

(1) The response of an individual consumer to change in such characteristics as price will be to change behaviour at a critical point, a ‘threshold’ at which a change of behaviour is perceived to be beneficial.

(2) Most choices can be viewed as binary, for example, between pairs of transport modes. A cumulative normal distribution of responses will give an S‐shaped curve, the mid‐point being at the average threshold value.

(3) An aggregate demand curve should show the response of a given group of people to a range of price changes at one point in time. Most curves derived from revealed behaviour do not permit this. To some extent, a demand curve must be derived from interviews and other tests, giving hypothetical behaviour. Such methods are used in non‐transport consumer tests, and work by Brög et al. gives a similar picture for transport users, supporting the concept of the S‐shaped curve.

(4) Allowance for frequency of trip‐making modifies this picture, suggesting that a smoother curve may be appropriate for some conditions, such as non‐work trips. These approaches may be combined by use of catastrophe theory, with two control factors. The hysteresis effect is found around the threshold where repeated changes in the basic stimulus produce successively smaller responses.

(5) There is some evidence of symmetrical response by public transport users to real increases and reductions in cash‐paid graduated fares, but this is not the case where different forms of pricing are involved.

(6) An example of threshold effects in private transport may be found in the monitoring of tolls on the Itchen Bridge by Atkins. Demand became particularly sensitive to price in a certain range.

(7) In the public transport field, there is similar evidence from the experience of introducing flat or zonal fares where graduated fares previously applied. Where travelcards are sold, the effect is much greater, and cases such as the West Midlands show little if any effect on sales despite real price increases. Here, trips are about 7% higher than would have been expected for the same revenue target, had graduated fares been retained. However, it may well be possible to exceed the threshold, especially where fares simplification and increases are combined, as the Trondheim experience suggests.     

Reprint of “Modelling the resilience,friability and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event”

This paper deals with developing a methodology for estimating the resilience, friability, and costs of an air transport network affected by a large-scale disruptive event. The network consists of airports and airspace/air routes between them where airlines operate their flights. Resilience is considered as the ability of the network to neutralize the impacts of disruptive event(s). Friability implies reducing the network’s existing resilience due to removing particular nodes/airports and/or links/air routes, and consequently cancelling the affected airline flights. The costs imply additional expenses imposed on airports, airlines, and air passengers as the potentially most affected actors/stakeholders due to mitigating actions such as delaying, cancelling and rerouting particular affected flights. These actions aim at maintaining both the network’s resilience and safety at the acceptable level under given conditions.Large scale disruptive events, which can compromise the resilience and friability of a given air transport network, include bad weather, failures of particular (crucial) network components, the industrial actions of the air transport staff, natural disasters, terrorist threats/attacks and traffic incidents/accidents.The methodology is applied to the selected real-life case under given conditions. In addition, this methodology could be used for pre-selecting the location of airline hub airport(s), assessing the resilience of planned airline schedules and the prospective consequences, and designing mitigating measures before, during, and in the aftermath of a disruptive event. As such, it could, with slight modifications, be applied to transport networks operated by other transport modes.