When are subsidies to trans-European network projects justified?

The trans-European transport network (TEN-T) encompasses the major planned transport infrastructure in Europe, ranging from high speed rail to port infrastructure. Projects in this category are considered priority projects and receive European subsidies; but these have been insufficient to get these projects off the ground. This paper addresses two research questions. First, it sketches the basic economics of cross-boundary infrastructure projects: what pricing and investment policies can we expect, what is the role of through traffic and high fixed costs of infrastructure? Second, it examines briefly what lessons the EU could draw from the experience of other existing federal funding institutions like the US and Germany. These ideas are used to propose a new subsidy scheme for the TEN-T projects.     

Public–private partnerships: a review of economic considerations with particular reference to transportation projects

The paper sets in context some of the more recent work that has been conducted on public–private partnerships (PPPs) in the provision and operation of infrastructure. PPPs essentially involve a government or its agent signing an agreement with a private company or consortium to supply it with services with the private sector actor involved in major elements of designing, building, temporarily ‘owning’, and running the physical assets; basically they are long-term development and service contracts between government and a private partner. The paper outlines the development of economic thinking regarding the rationale behind PPPs, the extent to which unbundling is optimal and the forms that it may take, the nature of the contracts that are enacted and their renegotiation, the awarding of contracts, and matters of possible corruption. By way of focus, it also provides some indication of what empirical studies in the transportation have thrown up regarding the outcomes of PPPs.     

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

Abstract

This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.