Optimal choice of capacity,toll and government guarantee for build-operate-transfer roads under asymmetric cost information

The private provision of public roads via the build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode has been increasingly used around the world. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of road capacity, toll and government guarantee, this paper investigates optimal concession contract design under both symmetric and asymmetric information about the marginal maintenance cost of private investors. Under asymmetric information, the government guarantee serves as an instrument to induce a private investor to reveal his true cost information. Compared with the situation under symmetric information, the government will suffer a loss of social welfare; the private investor will charge a higher toll that increases in his reported marginal maintenance cost, and specify a lower capacity that decreases with the reported cost. The results also show that the private investor obtains extra information rent beyond the reservation level of return and the rent decreases with his reported cost. However, the resulting volume-capacity ratios of the BOT road under both information structures are the same.     

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

Abstract

This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.     

Application of particle swarm optimization and robust net present value for BOT-type contracts

Major infrastructure construction projects contracted to private companies by governments are important for maximizing profitability. This paper extends an existing build–operate–transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) for identifying the reasonable concession period which would be profitable both to the government and to the private sector. There are some major limitations with BOTCcM – for example, the total investment cost is pre-given and the impact of uncertainty of parameters affecting the concession period were not considered. In this research, the total investment cost is assumed as variable which should be optimally determined and the uncertainty of net cash flows is considered. Further, the proposed model is implemented to calculate the robust concession period and required capital for the construction period, using the obtained values and particle swarm optimization method.     

The analysis of regulation on private highway investment under a build-operate-transfer scheme

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach has become an attractive instrument for public facility provision, especially for a project that faces difficulty with public finance. This study analyzes the regulation alternatives on private highway investment under a BOT scheme and their impacts on traffic flows, travel costs, toll, capacity, and social welfare (total user-benefit in the traffic system including congestion). For comparison, five cases are analyzed: (1) No BOT with maximizing welfare, (2) No BOT with breaking even on finance, (3) BOT without regulation, (4) BOT with a minimum flow constraint (the total users will not be less than those in Case 1), and (5) BOT with a maximum travel cost constraint (the travel cost for users on a non-tolled road will not exceed the maximum tolerance). After each case is modeled and simulated on some functional forms, we find that the case of BOT with regulations performs between the cases of maximizing welfare and that of maximizing profit. From the perspective of the government, regulation has less power in a project with low elastic demand. Furthermore, even when the regulation is strict, a high cost-efficient firm with BOT could result in a higher level of social welfare than that without a BOT scheme.     

Social welfare analysis of investment public–private partnership approaches for transportation projects

This paper has two objectives: (i) to introduce a new approach in order to gain widespread support for road pricing; and (ii) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe our novel approach that stimulates public support for road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public–private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to the citizens who own the newly priced facility. We then present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. A P3 project’s impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion than the often-used Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is absent from the literature. We use Fresno, California as our case study in order to conduct a welfare analysis on IP3s. Our results show that system-optimal tolling favors average users, but that government—and consequently taxpayers—should pay for costly tolling systems (negative profits). In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure’s citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social-welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed public and private tolling scheme offers such an improvement.     

Commercialising the management and maintenance of trunk roads in the United Kingdom

Public funding of new infrastructure from money raised through taxes or borrowing has been questioned globally in recent years. One alternative solution has been to finance major capital projects through Build, Operate & Transfer (BOT) schemes. In the United Kingdom, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) has become established as the procurement method of choice for many projects and services in central and local government. It is a natural development of other changes in government administration which have been introduced over the past few years. Projects delivered in this way enable government to become a buyer of services on behalf of the public rather than a direct provider of those services to the public, taking advantage of private sector management skills and resources in their delivery. The PFI has demonstrated its ability to deliver value for money solutions in projects across a range of capital-intensive public services, but the greatest success in delivering projects has been in the transport sector. This paper outlines how the British Government's Highways Agency has restructured and commercialised the management and maintenance of the strategic road network for which it is responsible, and how it has been at the forefront of developing successful privately financed projects. The paper explains the Agency's particular version of BOT – Design, Build, Finance and Operate (DBFO) projects. These projects are delivering new and improved road construction and maintenance, providing better services to users of the country's strategic road network and achieving significant value for money savings for taxpayers.     

Effect of advanced traveler information systems and road pricing in a network with non-recurrent congestion

The effect of the application of advanced transport information system (ATIS) and road pricing is studied in a transportation system under non-recurrent congestion. A stochastic network deterministic user equilibrium model (SNDUE) with elastic demand is formulated and used to evaluate the welfare and private impacts of different market penetrations of ATIS, together with road pricing for a simple network. Both marginal first-best road pricing and a second-best fixed road pricing are considered. The incentives of private users to use ATIS are analyzed and the characteristics of optimum tolls as a function of ATIS market penetration are shown. We conclude that ATIS is an efficient and necessary tool to reduce the effects of non-recurrent incidents in a transportation network, especially when non-recurrent congestion causes a significant deterioration of operational conditions of the network. If the impact of non-recurrent incidents on free flow costs is small or is reduced only to congestion effects, the use of road pricing would be more efficient. Social benefits obtained when jointly implementing ATIS and road pricing are practically the same whether first-best or second-best road pricing is used. Considering the private costs perceived by the network users, and the benefits experienced by equipped users, the maximum level of market penetration achieved could be limited because private benefits disappear after certain market penetration is obtained.     

Integrated modeling framework for leasing urban roads: A case study of Fresno,California

Increasing private sector involvement in transportation services has significant implications for the management of road networks. This paper examines a concession model’s effects on a road network in the mid-sized city of Fresno, California. Using the existing transportation planning models of Fresno, we examine the effects of privatization on a number of typical system performance measures including total travel time and vehicle miles traveled (VMT), the possibility of including arterials, and the differences between social cost prices and profit maximizing prices. Some interesting insights emerge from our analysis: (1) roads cannot be considered as isolated elements in a concession model for a road network; (2) roads can function as complements at some levels of demand and become substitutes at other levels; (3) policy makers/officials should consider privatizing/pricing arterials along with privatizing highways; (4) temporally flexible but limited price schedule regulations should be part of leasing agreements; and (5) non-restricted pricing may actually worsen system performance, while limited pricing can raise enormous profits as well as improve system performance.     

Viability of new road infrastructure with heterogeneous users

This paper explores the importance of heterogeneity in value of time and route choice when assessing the viability of new road infrastructure to alleviate congestion problems. The model incorporates strategic interaction between road operators in a cost-benefit framework and several competitive regimes are considered. It is then employed to establish the financial and socio-economic viability of a congestion pricing demonstration entering Madrid city centre, where road users have to choose between a free but highly congested road and a priced free-flowing road (semi-private regime). A logit estimation is undertaken with information from a questionnaire among road users in the Eastern Madrid area to obtain users’ value of time and of congestion.The tolls obtained generate a traffic reallocation towards the new roadway such that revenues suffice to render the infrastructure socio-economically viable. The private and the low toll regimes generate similar welfare gains that are close to the first best. Yet the former supposes large losses to users. The low toll and the semi-private regimes do not raise such distributional concerns. However, the low toll regime requires a sufficiently high traffic growth rate to make it financially viable; this does not happen for the other competitive regimes.     

Private road competition and equilibrium with traffic equilibrium constraints

Toll road competition is one of the important issues under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are two or more competing firms and each firm operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter-dependence in the network. In this paper we develop game-theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi-level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare-improving.     

Modeling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge,road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects

Government guarantees are frequently used to attract private investors’ participation into Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects. In this paper, we investigate the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and road capacity by taking perspective of the private investor. The main results are: (1) Minimum traffic guarantee increases toll charge while decreasing road quality. Under a low guarantee level, minimum traffic guarantee has no impact on road capacity. However, it improves road capacity when a high guarantee level is performed. (2) Under minimum revenue guarantee, if the guarantee level is sufficiently high, the optimal toll charge will be sufficiently large, but road quality and road capacity will approach zero. (3) Price compensation guarantee decreases toll charge and increases both road quality and road capacity. This paper further investigates the impact of government guarantees when the contract is auctioned. We find that auction reduces the impact of government guarantees on toll charge while failing to affect the impact of government guarantees on road quality and capacity. Some policy implications are also derived from our model results.     

Subsidizing and pricing private toll roads with noncontractible service quality: A relational contract approach

In private toll roads, some elements of the private operator’s performance are noncontractible. As a result, the government cannot motivate the private operator to improve them through a formal contract but through a self-enforcing contract that both parties are unwilling to deviate unilaterally. In this paper, we use noncontractible service quality to capture these performance elements. By employing a relational contract approach, we aim to investigate the optimal subsidy plan to provide incentives for quality improvement. We show that government subsidy is feasible in quality improvement when the discount factor is sufficiently high and marginal cost of public funds is sufficiently small. Under feasible government subsidy, we have demonstrated the optimal subsidy plans in different scenarios. Moreover, some comparative statics are presented. Based on the derived subsidy plans, we further investigate the optimal toll price. We find that the optimal toll price generates zero surplus for the private operator and positive surplus for consumers. We then make two extensions of our model to re-investigate the government’s optimal decisions on subsidy plan and toll price when her decision sequence is changed and when government compensation is present upon termination of the relationship. Some implications for practice have been derived from our model results.     

Flexible-term contracts for road franchising

Private participation in road projects is increasing around the world. The most popular form of franchising is a concession contract, which allows a private firm to charge tolls to road users during a pre-determined period in order to recover investments. Concessionaires are usually selected through auctions at which candidates submit bids for tolls or payments to the government. This paper discusses how this mechanism does not generally yield optimal outcomes and it induces the frequent contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new franchising mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible-term contract and bi-dimensional bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism improves outcomes compared to fixed-term concessions, by eliminating traffic risk and promoting the selection of efficient concessionaires.     

Transport policy for London in 2001 The case for an integrated approach

The paper reports the results of a series of studies conducted to enable the London Planning Advisory Committee to provide advice on strategic transport policy for London. The analytical approach combined the use of an area-based, multi-modal strategic model (LAM) and professional judgment. The performance of LAM as a basis for providing rapid advice on complex issues in transport policy is assessed.The resulting policy advice advocated a coherent approach, involving new infrastructure, particularly for rail; improved management of the road and public transport networks; the use of subsidy to enhance public transport service levels; and road user charges to reduce the impact of private vehicles on congestion and the environment. Road user charges emerged as the pivotal issue in the policy; the paper discusses their role, and the questions which still need to be resolved before they can be implemented.The main message of the study is that no one element of transport policy can tackle London's problems alone; an integrated policy in which infrastructure provision, management and pricing are used to complement one another is shown to be far more effective.     

A monopolistic market for advanced traveller information systems and road use efficiency

Advanced traveller information systems (ATIS) are likely to exhibit significant economies of scale in production and operation. Private provision would therefore typically occur under considerable market power. An important policy question is whether the resulting distortions would aggravate or reduce distortions in the transport market itself, notably external effects such as congestion. We consider such questions by presenting an integrated model that captures the interactions between a congested transport market and a monopolistic market for advanced traveller information systems (ATIS). Three market failures operate simultaneously: congestion on the road, a declining average benefit of information when information penetration rises, and monopolistic pricing by the provider of information. Some key results are as follows. Monopoly information pricing appears not to be the most attractive option from a system efficiency viewpoint. A subsidy in the information market can help realise a second-best optimum of road use. Relatively low uncertainty on the road and high information costs limit the monopolist’s profit on the information market, as well as relative system efficiency. While relatively inelastic demand for mobility, counter intuitively, negatively affects the monopolist’s profit, the relative social benefits from private information peak at intermediate demand elasticities.     

What type of road pricing scheme might appeal to politicians? Viewpoints on the challenge in gaining the citizen and public servant vote by staging reform

The greatest hurdle facing road pricing reform is political commitment. With rare exception, efforts to introduce significant reform in road pricing, aimed at raising sufficient revenue to ensure that road investment and ongoing maintenance is secured, without an additional impost to users above current outlays, while at the same time reducing traffic congestion, has fallen largely on politically non-supportive ears. The big challenge is to convince politicians (and their advisers) that it is possible to reform road pricing so that users are made better off (at least the great majority) in terms of time spent travelling and monies outlaid, and that government secures growing levels of revenue, but with at least some funds being used to improve public transport and the existing road network. This paper identifies the major issues that make much of the academic research into road pricing somewhat limited in terms of achieving real change. Staging reform is an appealing way forward, but ensuring the order and timing of events to secure progress is the big challenge. We offer some suggestions, including some ideas on new language designed to increase the level of buy in, and recognise that progress through action will require compromises in respect of an ‘ideal’ economically efficient pricing reform agenda.     

Bus routing strategies in a transit market: A case study of Hong Kong

Conventionally, the objective of transit routing is often set either to minimize the total operational cost, subject to a given level of service quality, or to maximize the service quality at a given acceptable cost. In a deregulated, commercial‐based environment however, such as bus and railway operations in cities of the UK and Hong Kong where several private firms compete in route‐based or area‐based market, routing becomes one of the means for higher returns rather than just for cost saving. In such a case, how do the transit providers set up their routes for profit‐maximization? Will the routing based on the provider's objective meet the user's objective? How do government regulations and policies affect the choice of transit provider's routing strategy? To answer these questions, we first examine the relationship between the objectives of users and transit providers, set up criteria for transit routing quality, and then investigate the possible routing configurations/patterns for a hypothetical case. These criteria include (1) the load factor of transit, (2) the level of route directness, (3) the level of route overlapping, and (4) the total number of routes and (5) the average of route length. These measures are finally applied to a real case in Hong Kong to examine the route changes of Kowloon Motor Bus from 1975 to 1995. The result of the empirical case reveais how key measures such as load factor are controlled by the bus operator and affected by government policies and how the bus routing pattern was adjusted to meet users' need. Facing the dilemma as evident in Hong Kong between the route directness and the efficiency of road use, we suggest that a rational multi‐modal routing structure be put in place if an institutional solution is introduced so that bus and other transit modes can form a sharing program or an alliance.     

Voluntary internalization of speeding externalities with vehicle insurance

High speed is an important determinant of accidents for speeders as well as for other motorists. This paper develops a framework for analyzing instruments that encourage drivers to internalize the full consequences of their behavior with respect to choice of speed using Pay-As-You-Speed (PAYS) insurance, possibly as an extension of Pay-As-You-Drive (PAYD) insurance. We demonstrate how the combination of a Pigovian taxation scheme and PAYS can be designed in a setting involving two principals (the state and an insurance company) that affect the incentives of commuters to choose between driving and other modes of transport and for those that use the car mode to drive carefully. While the government is assumed to maximize overall social efficiency and therefore wants to implement marginal cost pricing, insurance companies do actuarial pricing, i.e. average cost pricing within risk classes that are homogeneous to the degree that the insurers have information about actual behavior. PAYS insurance improves the insurance industry’s possibility to differentiate premiums according to behavior and therefore to target risk classes in a better way than today. Moreover, since our framework is designed to accomplish differentiation by self-selection, compulsory regulation is not necessary, although there may be reason for the government to facilitate the implementation of the new technology.     

Quality of institutions and private participation in transport infrastructure investment: Evidence from developing countries

In recent decades, owing to a series of public debt crises and constraints on government expenditure, infrastructure investment has dropped significantly in both developed and developing countries. To counterbalance this trend, Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) schemes have been increasingly adopted. In this paper, we explore the determinants of the degree of private participation in transport infrastructure projects in a large sample of developing countries. By using a large sample of transport projects included in the World Bank Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects database, we document that greater participation by private parties in PPP contracts is associated with better institutions in terms of lower corruption, civil freedom, and a better regulatory framework.     

Complementing distance based charges with discounted registration fees in the reform of road user charges: the impact for motorists and government revenue

The call for a congestion charge is getting louder and more frequent in many countries as major metropolitan areas experience increasing levels of road congestion. This is often accompanied by a recognition that governments need to find new sources of revenue to maintain existing road networks and to invest in new transport infrastructure. Although reform of road pricing is almost certain to occur at some time in the future in a number of countries, a key challenge is in selling the idea to the community of road users as well as a whole raft of interest groups that influence the views of society and politicians. Simply announcing a need for a congestion charge (often misleadingly called a tax) does little to progress the reform agenda. What is required is a carefully structured demonstration of what might be done to progressively introduce adjustments in road user charges that are seen as reducing the costs to motorists while ensuring no loss of revenue to government. In this paper we show, in the context of Sydney (Australia), that this can be achieved by the reform of registration fees in the presence of a distance-based charging regime that can deliver financial gains to motorists, with prospects of revenue growth to the State Treasury.