关于国际海运反恐的若干问题

一、目前国际海运反恐立法状况简介 美国“9·11”事件以后,在美国大力推动下,国际海运反恐立法活动进展迅速,不但国际海事组织(IMO)已于2002年12月12日海上保安外交大会上通过了涉及海上保安内容的《1974年国际人命安全公约》修正案和《国际船舶和港口设施保安规则》(International Ship and Port Facility Se-curity Code, ISPS Code),美国通过国内立法或规范也已对国际集装箱运输实施了一系列海运反恐措施,有的国家如加拿大、澳大利亚、日本等也正在考虑制定海运反恐措施。 美国已采取的国际海运反恐措施,可以     

2002全球海事大扫描

蓝色反恐席卷全球 进入2002年,陆上反恐出师未捷,海事反恐却接踵而至.2月中旬,IMO海安会下属的海上保安临时过渡工作组提出了一系列海上保安强化措施,以预防和控制危害航运的恐怖活动.紧接着,美国率先提出了海事反恐法案,规定凡是外国港口不能维持有效反恐措施的,美国海岸警卫队有权禁止拒绝这些船只和货物进入美国.5月,IMO海安会第75届会议明确将海事反恐列为新的主题.不过,所有的船东都希望这只是空穴来风.然而事实上蓝色的海洋正成为恐怖分子的新乐土.10月6日,一艘法国油轮在也门海域遭袭,一艘满载炸药的小船撞入油轮,引起爆炸.     

海上反恐与国际海运安全制度的新发展

美国“9·11事件”之后,国际社会开始对海上反恐怖主义活动进行立法,从而形成了海运安全制度的重要组成部分,综观美国的海上反恐立法及国际海事组织、世界海关组织和国际劳工组织等制定的国际公约,港口安全、船舶安全和集装箱安全是他们共同关注的焦点。因此,在海上反恐立法实践基础上形成的港口安全制度、船舶安全制度和集装箱安全制度表明了国际海运安全制度的新的发展态势。     

美国加强海上集装箱运输安全及其影响

<正> 美国国会近日通过了“2002海上运输安全条例(MaritimeTransportation Security Act of 2002)。这个条例是为了防止来自海上对美国的恐怖活动而制定的。美国港口全年要接受来自全球的1700多万只集装箱,但是,只有3％受到检查。美国政府认为,这是反恐活动的一个极大的漏洞。采用了双管齐下的办法,即     

网络恐怖活动的特点及其对策

通过介绍网络恐怖活动的主要原因,网络恐怖活动的特点及主要方式,阐述采取架构网络信息安全防护体系,强化网络信息的安全管理,构筑网络信息安全统一战线等多种对策,加强国际组织和区域组织的合作,预防为主,主动出击,打击网络恐怖活动.     

“涉猎”海域范围渐趋扩大 海盗近期劣迹一览

11月23日在英国伦敦举行的第26届国际海事组织大会上。各国代表对海盗现象日益猖獗深感担忧。纷纷呼吁加强国际合作。打击海盗现象。自2008年以来，索马里海盗活动十分猖獗。严重威胁着海上人命和财产的安全。尽管国际社会为打击索马里海盗活动采取了一系列措施。但海盗劫持事件仍然不断。海盗活动日趋频繁，“涉猎”海域范围也渐趋扩大。     

船舶保安报警系统方案

当今国际社会日益重视反恐活动，海上的反恐、防盗防范措施已开始实施。本文围绕IMOSOLAS公约XI-2／6条的要求，介绍了目前可采用的船舶保安报警系统方案，从发展的眼光并兼顾我国通信网现状出发，提出了我国船舶保安报警系统最佳选择方案及应该完善的工作。     

国际海事组织通过关于海上保安的新要求

作为加强海上安全、打击针对海运的恐怖主义行为的一系列措施之一，国际海事组织召开的海上保安外交大会于2002年12月12日通过了一套涉及海上保安内容的《1974年国际海上人命安全公约》修正案(以下简称“修正案”)和《国际船舶和港口设施保安(ISPS)规则》(以下简称“保安规则”)。根据外交大会通过的决议，上述修正案和保安规则将按公约规定的默认接受程序于2004年7月1日生效。     

我国港口设施保安面临的问题与对策

当前．恐怖活动呈多发态势，国际国内反恐形势依然严峻．国内群体性事件时有发生．恐怖威胁和保安风险不断增大：同时，国内外对港口设施保安的具体要求也在不断提高．我国的港口设施保安工作也已经从被动履行国际公约向主动与我国港口发展需要紧密结合转变。这都要求各级交通（港口）管理部门、     

反恐保安：“苏州号”顺利过“关”赢得中国客轮第一

新年伊始,国际航运业为顺利通过反恐保安“关”正在加紧准备。1月5日,中日国际班轮“苏州号”在国家主管机关上海船级社的主持下,一举通过“国际保安规则”的审核,成为我国第一艘获得反恐保安“通行证”的客轮。 近年来,在全球反恐行动日益深入的背景下,反恐保安防范的重点区域已延伸到国际港口和运输船舶,由于国际航运海上航线     

New security measures for the international shipping community

On 1 July 2004 the new maritime security regulatory regime set out in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 as amended, namely the new chapter XI-2 on Special measures to enhance maritime security and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code entered into force only 18 months after adoption by the SOLAS Conference in December 2002. Following the devastating terrorist acts of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the international community recognised the need to protect the international maritime transport sector against the threat of terrorism. IMO responded swiftly and firmly by developing these new requirements, which represent the culmination of co-operation between Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and shipping and port industries.     

The place of the ISPS Code in the legal international regime

The adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) is the latest response of the international shipping community to the increasing threat posed by acts of terrorism at sea. The ACHILLE LAURO incident of 1985 showed that the traditional law against piracy was not adequate to deal with new types of unlawful acts against international shipping, especially those involving acts of terrorism. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention) and the technical and administrative measures adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee of IMO in 1986 and 1996 attempted to develop a broader regime to deal with unlawful acts against international shipping.However, the events of September 11, 2001 showed that additional measures were still needed to prevent terrorist attacks against ships.     

The international legal instruments in addressing piracy and maritime terrorism: A critical review

This paper critically reviews four international legal instruments in addressing piracy and maritime terrorism - UNCLOS, SUA, PSI and the ISPS Code. Piracy on high seas is currently becoming key tactics of terrorist groups - many of today's pirates are also terrorists with ideological bents and a broad political agenda. The intertwining of piracy and maritime terrorism poses substantial risks for global markets, understanding that much of the world's energy and cargoes being shipped through pirate-infested regions like Southeast Asia. Through investigating the contributions and limitations of the stated instruments, several constructive recommendations are offered to improve their effectiveness in controlling and deterring piracy and maritime terrorism from threatening the well-being of the maritime industries in the post-2008 world.     

Introduction to the special issue on maritime security

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 heightened awareness about the vulnerability of all modes of transportation to terrorist attack. The issue of maritime security has therefore become a major concern in the international maritime sector over the past several years. Globalization has led to a strong growth in seaborne trade; however, it simultaneously increases vulnerability to not only terrorism but also international criminal activities that threaten the world's supply chain. For example, in 2008, the rise in piracy activities in the Gulf of Aden brought the issue of maritime security to the forefront of international debate. In addition to the direct impact on ships, crews and cargoes, and on the maritime industry and governments, piracy also threatens global seaborne trade, and has an impact on energy security and the environment [UNCTAD, 2009, Review of Maritime Transport 2009 (New York: United Nations)]. Maritime piracy can pose substantial risks to seaborne trades, with considerable commodities, ranging between raw materials and energy to high-value manufactured products, being shipped between global economic powerhouses [FU, X. W., NG, A. K. Y., LAU, Y. Y., forthcoming, The impacts of maritime piracy on global economic development: The case of Somalia. Maritime Policy and Management]. Maritime security management, including the definition of security, maritime risk assessment, security measures, the regulation and policy of maritime security in shipping and port-related business operations has been receiving growing attention, both in practice and research.     

Maritime security: an update of key issues

This paper presents a comment on some of the key issues relating to piracy, terrorism, regulatory approaches and economic issues stemming from maritime security measures. It takes a wide ranging view of these issues and argues that security measures must be managed effectively so as not to be perceived as burdensome. Furthermore, any measures adopted must cover the whole of the international logistics supply chain and not just the shipping component of such distribution channels.     

A study on time constraints and task deviations at sea leading to accidents – a cultural-historical perspective

The high frequency of maritime accidents and incidents occurring at sea has been a major challenge for the maritime industry in the last decades. The majority of these accidents are attributed to seafarers’ poor performance. This, despite the fact that the international maritime domain continues to adopt and update conventions regulating maritime safety to mitigate these accidents from occurring. In this paper, utilising a qualitative research approach, we show through a socio-cultural contextual perspective that time constraints as a major influencing factor in causing task deviations at sea which leads to dangerous situations. We analyse how some of the present barriers in place to prevent accidents at sea are in effect prompt seafarers who are working under time pressure to deviate from their task. Moreover, the paper discusses the social constituents such as job insecurity and the seafarers’ viewpoint towards the ship operators’ commitment to safe ship operations are crucial in motivating seafarers’ deviating from the task at hand when faced with time pressure.     

Old laws for new risks at sea: mineral resources, climate change, sea lanes, and cables

Maritime security in a broad sense means more than piracy and terrorism. This paper concentrates on the risk potential of current and future resource-related activities on the seabed. The seabed mining of hard mineral resources??in addition to hydrocarbons??leads to new controversial maritime boundary claims of states in their effort to expand national access rights to raw materials. Outer continental shelf claims in the Arctic Ocean are today's test bench for law of the sea conflicts. Fiber-optic cables running through regional seas, straits, and land bridges may become another risky issue, while the pattern of maritime transport routes is moving from Northern to Southern waters. Under a medium-term perspective, the sea level rise will endanger ports and coasts. Borderlines of maritime zones will move and thus generate more injustice and conflicts among states. The tools to solve borderline conflicts and options for dispute settlement are available in UNCLOS. Some other legal gaps are covered by the 2005 SUA Convention and by bilateral agreements, while resolutions by the UN Security Council begin to broaden rights of intervention and interdiction. The need for new laws remains.     

试述"萨拉姆98"轮海难给航运(海事)带来的种种警示

详细介绍了“萨拉姆98”轮海难的经过及失事原因。并结合相关国际公约和国内海事管理法规,分析了这起海难给航运(海事)带来的种种警示。     

海事违章处罚加处罚款收缴难问题与对策探讨

行政处罚加处罚款制度的设立,旨在通过让不履行行政处罚决定的当事人承担更加不利的后果,从而督促当事人自觉履行行政处罚决定。但在海事管理机构执法实践中存在诸多难题。为进一步规范执行程序,有效解决其收缴难的问题,文中主要对海事管理机构在加处罚款执行过程中存在的若干问题进行简要剖析,并提出相关建议,以期达到有力打击海上违法行为,实现海事服务职能的最终目的。     

Private maritime security company (PMSC) in the Strait of Malacca

Recently, maritime security issues in the Strait of Malacca have been in the limelight. Statistics highlighting the risk of piracy faced by shipping in the Strait of Malacca and the possibility of a terrorist attack have led to an enhanced awareness of the need for heightened security. The declaration by Lloyd’s Joint War Committee (JWC) of the Strait as a “war risk area” has strengthened the perception that the littoral states have not done enough to make the Strait secure for international trade.