一种运输作业指派的迭代下降组合拍卖机制设计

针对4PL公司的卡车运输作业指派问题提出了一种基于内生投标的迭代下降组合拍卖机制设计。根据获胜者确定问题,构造出一个限制对偶规划,其最优解提供近似单条线路运输作业的价格信息。投标者(3PL企业)根据这些价格信息,在近视最佳反应投标策略下能够确定新的有利可图的线路组合,并以此进行下一轮的投标。数值试验显示,基于内生投标的迭代拍卖机制与基于外生投标的迭代拍卖机制相比具有更高的指派效率。     

Approximation algorithms for the bid construction problem in combinatorial auctions for the procurement of freight transportation contracts

Trucking companies (carriers) are increasingly facing combinatorial auctions conducted by shippers seeking contracts for their transportation needs. The bid valuation and construction problem for carriers facing these combinatorial auctions is very difficult and involves the computation of a number of NP-hard sub problems. In this paper we examine computationally tractable approximation methods for estimating these values and constructing bids. The benefit of our approximation method is that it provides a way for carriers to discover their true costs and construct optimal or near optimal bids by solving a single NP-hard problem. This represents a significant improvement in computational efficiency. We examine our method both analytically and empirically using a simulation based analysis.     

考虑交叉口转向延误的最短路径拍卖算法

为了改进传统算法求解最短路径时运算量大且无法计算交叉口转向延误的不足,提出可直接求解受限路网中两点之间最短路径的改进拍卖算法.将价格矢量扩展至二维,解决了价值量被不同转向行为共用的问题.设计了节省存储空间的数据存储结构,可准确描述交叉口转向行为,且便于检索.针对不同规模和密度的随机路网,比较了改进算法和Dijkstra算法求解单一起、终点之间的最短路径问题.结果表明,在含5 000个结点、20 000条路段的高密度路网中,改进拍卖算法的搜索时间约为Dijkstra算法的30%,能准确求解受限路网中的最短路径,并保留了原Auction算法可并行计算的基本性质.     

Auction-Based Congestion Pricing

Abstract

Planners, engineers and economists have introduced various demand management methods in an attempt to reduce the fast growing traffic congestion. The basic idea behind various demand management strategies is to force drivers to travel and use transportation facilities more during off-peak hours and less during peak hours, as well as to increase the usage of underutilized routes. In this paper, a new demand management concept – Auction-based Congestion Pricing – is proposed and modeled.     

How to restrain participants opt out in shared parking market? A fair recurrent double auction approach

We propose a fair recurrent double VCG (FRD-VCG) auction mechanism to approach the emerging shared parking management problem. In a given shared parking environment with a parking management platform and a double-side perspective, the proposed mechanism considers how to restrain the potential participants (parking slot demanders and slot suppliers) opt out, which is based on the participants’ priority attributes and are calculated with respect to historic auction records provided by the parking platform. Participants’ fairness bids are then generated combining their priority attributes and their submitted bids (bid price and parking time) with the support of a novel evaluation function, which integrates priority attributes, bid price and parking time into an output value. The parking slot allocation rule and transaction payment rule are further designed to dealing with these issues include winner determination and price setting, respectively. Simulations show advantages of the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism, i.e., comparing with the double VCG (D-VCG) mechanism for the shared parking management problem where priority attributes and evaluation function are not considered, the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism has the potential to persuade participants to remain in the market whilst it improves the market’s retention rate, the parking slot’s utilization rate and the participants’ utilities.     

集装箱航运服务组合拍卖模型研究

根据运输的“范围经济性”原理,阐述了集装箱航运服务组合拍卖的适用性,围绕价值因素和价值评价因素,分析了集装箱航运服务组合拍卖的比较优势,结合集装箱航运服务的特点,以拍卖者效用最大化和投标者总估值最大化平衡为目标,设计出了组合拍卖的机制和运作程序;针对组合拍卖中的竟胜标问题,建立了集装箱航运服务组合拍卖的一般优化模型,并通过引入集装箱航运服务质量属性参数和运量限制等约束条件,对其进行了改进。从而为实现集装箱航运服务在线拍卖提供理论支持和计算平台。     

罗兰C和卫星导航的组合应用

论述了目前罗兰C和卫星导航组合应用的几种方式,对罗兰C和卫星导航伪距组合定位以及罗兰C和卫星导航定位数据融合的原理和方法进行了论证,通过罗兰C和卫星导航的组合应用,可以克服单一导航系统的弱点,提高组合导航的性能,拓展了罗兰C的应用领域,延长了罗兰C的使用周期。     

密封拍卖和采购招标的比较静态分析

采用积分法对对称独立私人价值第一价格密封拍卖和招投标中的投标策略关于投标人的风险态度和信息分布的单调比较静态分析,其结果对风险中性、风险厌恶、风险追求以及混合风险的投标人均成立,是对Riley和Samulson的微分法所得结果的实质性推广.     

基于停车许可证的路外公共停车设施最优收费定价:基础模型及其扩展

为探求路外公共停车设施的最优收费定价机制及其实现手法,构建了基于停车许可证的最优停车设施收费定价基础模型及其扩展模型。在基础模型中,首先利用出行者对各停车设施的评价额度,构建停车许可证的最优分配模型;而后,通过拍卖机制（例如升价拍卖代理系统）即可确定各停车设施的最优收费定价。在扩展模型中,将购买停车许可证的时间点由一个扩展为多个,并开发了一种可实现最优收费定价的调优法。最后,通过数值算例验证了升价拍卖代理系统在实现路外公共停车设施最优收费定价方面的可行性以及调优法在求解扩展模型方面的有效性。分析结果表明：将停车许可证制度导入停车设施后的出行者均衡状态与社会最优状态是一致的;利用升价拍卖代理系统可求解得到最优许可证分配方式与最优停车设施收费定价;同时,最优停车设施收费定价具有防止出行者进行虚假申报的制约机制;相较评价额度,停车泊位总数的变化对最优收费定价的影响较大（即敏感因素）;多个停车许可证购买时间点条件下所实现的社会福利高于单一购买时间点;应用调优法可以使管理者在有限步骤内求解得到多购买时间点条件下的最优停车许可证分配方式及最优收费定价;利用此调优法可使政策在较少的步骤内实现较高的社会福利。     

交易成本与土木工程施工合同招投标的最优机制设计

笔者在文中采用现代信息经济学的机制设计的方法,分析和论证了在施工条件相对简单的不存在交易成本的土木工程合同招标制度中应该采用最低投标价中标.而对于较为复杂的质量要求较高的施工合同招标,由于存在质量监督的困难以及合同变更等因素可能导致较高的交易成本,因此使工程总成本最小的最优招标制度应采用综合评分法评标.