Technology Spillover and Licensing Strategy of Patentee

The optimal license proportions with and without technology spillover are analyzed with a game-theoretical approach when a patent-holding firm licensed non-drastic process innovation to his incumbent rivals by means of a first price sealed bid auction. The optimal strategy is obtained through solving the game by backward induction. It is found that the range of optimal license proportion is narrower when there is spillover compared to the no spillover case.     

Auction-based highway reservation system an agent-based simulation study

Based on previous studies of a highway reservation system, this paper proposed an auction-based implementation, in which the users can bid for the right to use a route during a certain period of time. This paper models the auction system with MATSim using an agent-based simulation technique. The agents adopt their own bidding logic in the auction, and the price converges after around 130 iterations, when the number of users using the reserved highway and the total collected revenue become stable. When the overall demand changes, the collected revenue ranges from 5 to 11 dollars per user, and from 0.7 to 1.5 dollars per mile. The auction system can transfer more consumer surplus to the toll road operators, since it is a personalized tolling mechanism. The users are using the reservation system as insurance of a guaranteed congestion-free travel. The auction-based highway reservation shows great potential as a new traffic management system.     

船舶拍卖的法律适用——以公告期为中心

船舶拍卖的法律适用十分复杂。文章认为，决定船舶拍卖所适用的法律，取决于船舶拍卖主持机构，而不取决于船舶拍卖的类型。并据此给出了各种拍卖情况下的法律适用。     

最短路径Auction算法及其在路径诱导中的应用

通过采用C#语言程序，对比传统路径算法，并在实际道路网络和随机网络中进行了试验，测试了算法在求解网络“一对一”最短路径问题时的运算性能．结果表明，Auction算法在求解此类问题时，体现算法自身原理的优势，虽然整体性能表现不及经典的路径算法，即迭代步骤略多，但仍有改进的余地．     

最短路拍卖算法在交通流分配中的应用

拍卖算法是由Bertsekas教授提出的一种求解有向网络图最短路径的新算法,并已经发展成为求解线性网络流问题的综合算法.本文首先介绍了拍卖算法,分析了其特点,并将其与常用的标号设定算法和标号修正算法进行了对比.深入分析了交通路网的特点和交通分配中最短路求解的特性.研究结果表明,最短路拍卖算法特别适合于并行计算和大规模稀疏网络的求解,符合现实路网的特点和交通分配的要求.最短路拍卖算法应用于交通分配能避免大量不必要的计算,大大节省计算时间,在交通领域具有广阔的应用前景.     

Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

This paper extends the theory of tradable bottleneck permits system to cases with multiple period markets and designs its implementation mechanism. The multiple period markets can achieve more efficient resource allocation than a single period market when users’ valuations of tradable permits change over time. To implement the multiple period trading markets, we propose an evolutionary mechanism that combines a dynamic auction with a capacity control rule that adjusts a number of permits issued for each market. Then, we prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) the dynamic auction is strategy-proof within each period and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal under a perfect information assumption of users and (ii) the mechanism maximizes the social surplus in a finite number of iterations. Finally, we show that the proposed mechanism may work well even for an incomplete information case.     

Transaction costs and tradable mobility credits

Artificial markets for mobility credits have been proposed as an alternative to conventional congestion pricing schemes. This paper examines the effects of transaction costs on two types of markets: an auction market and a negotiated market. In an auction market, users purchase all of the needed mobility credits through a competitive bidding process. In a negotiated market, the users initially receive certain amount of mobility credits from the government and trade with each other through negotiation to fulfill their needs. We assume that a brokerage service is built in both markets to facilitate transactions and accordingly, the users have to pay a commission fee proportional to the value of trade. The users are also given the option to purchase credits from the government if for some reasons they cannot use or wish to avoid the markets. Our analyses suggest that the auction market can achieve the desired equilibrium allocation of mobility credits as long as the government sets its price properly and the unit transaction cost is lower than the price that the market would reach in absence of transaction costs. However, in the negotiated market, transaction costs could divert the system from the desired equilibrium regardless of their magnitude. More importantly, the initial allocation of mobility credits may affect the final equilibrium even when marginal transaction costs are constant.