高铁环境下基于QoS用户业务的公平性功率分配算法

鉴于高速铁路(HSRs)通信业务的多样性,侧重于单一类型业务的传输优化方案,已无法满足用户业务服务质量(QoS)差异性显著提升的需求。针对HSRs通信环境,将用户业务分为时延敏感业务和时延非敏感业务,以满足用户QoS需求且同时兼顾占用无线信道的公平性为优化目标,研究了基站(eNB)平均发射功率约束条件下的功率分配问题。根据eNB能否预先获知用户的期望速率,分别采用了基于用户期望和基于预分配的功率分配策略。仿真结果表明,ε-Optimal比例公平算法的eNB发射功率较高且用户满意度较低;信道反演算法只针对时延敏感用户能较好地满足其QoS(最大耐受时延映射的期望速率),并且固定功率分配算法仅能够满足时延非敏感用户的QoS,两种算法均无法保证用户间的公平性;所提算法既具有较高的用户满足度,又较好地保证了用户间的公平性。     

Fair dynamic resource allocation in transit-based evacuation planning

Resource allocation in transit-based emergency evacuation is studied in this paper. The goal is to find a method for allocation of resources to communities in an evacuation process which is (1) fair, (2) reasonably efficient, and (3) able to dynamically adapt to the changes to the emergency situation. Four variations of the resource allocation problem, namely maximum rate, minimum clearance time, maximum social welfare, and proportional fair resource allocation, are modeled and compared. It is shown that the optimal answer to each problem can be found efficiently. Additionally, a distributed and dynamic algorithm based on the Lagrangian dual approach, called PFD²A, is developed to find the proportional fair allocation of resources and update the evacuation process in real time whenever new information becomes available. Numerical results for a sample scenario are presented.     

How to restrain participants opt out in shared parking market? A fair recurrent double auction approach

We propose a fair recurrent double VCG (FRD-VCG) auction mechanism to approach the emerging shared parking management problem. In a given shared parking environment with a parking management platform and a double-side perspective, the proposed mechanism considers how to restrain the potential participants (parking slot demanders and slot suppliers) opt out, which is based on the participants’ priority attributes and are calculated with respect to historic auction records provided by the parking platform. Participants’ fairness bids are then generated combining their priority attributes and their submitted bids (bid price and parking time) with the support of a novel evaluation function, which integrates priority attributes, bid price and parking time into an output value. The parking slot allocation rule and transaction payment rule are further designed to dealing with these issues include winner determination and price setting, respectively. Simulations show advantages of the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism, i.e., comparing with the double VCG (D-VCG) mechanism for the shared parking management problem where priority attributes and evaluation function are not considered, the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism has the potential to persuade participants to remain in the market whilst it improves the market’s retention rate, the parking slot’s utilization rate and the participants’ utilities.