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Braess悖论及其对偶形式的博弈论分析
引用本文:姚婷,刘亮.Braess悖论及其对偶形式的博弈论分析[J].长沙交通学院学报,2007,23(3):56-59.
作者姓名:姚婷  刘亮
作者单位:上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
摘    要:用博弈论的基本原理来分析Braess悖论及其对偶形式,提出了一种更直接更简洁的建模方法.首次提出了Braess悖论的对偶形式,通过建立Braess悖论的非合作博弈模型,可以得知:在车流量一定的情况下,增加路段有可能使路网中通行时间增加.同样,通过建立Braess悖论对偶形式的非合作博弈模型可知:在路网不变的情况下,增加车流量有可能使路网中通行时间减少,并详细分析了这种现象的特征及原因,提出了解决措施.

关 键 词:城市交通  博弈论  Braess悖论
文章编号:1000-9779(2007)03-0056-04
收稿时间:2007-07-02

The analysis of game theory for Braess paradox and the dual model
YAO Ting,LIU Liang.The analysis of game theory for Braess paradox and the dual model[J].Journal of Changsha Communications University,2007,23(3):56-59.
Authors:YAO Ting  LIU Liang
Institution:Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China
Abstract:This paper is focused on analyzing Braess paradox and its dual model based on principles of Game Theory.The modeling method is much more direct and concise.The conclusion of uncooperative game model of Braess paradox is that the road situation would be worse after adding new road in a given number of vehicles.Moreover,the conclusion of uncooperative game model-the dual model is that road situation would be better even though there are more vehicles on the fixed road net.This paper analyzes the characteristics,the causes and solutions of this phenomenon.
Keywords:urban transportation  game theory  Braess paradox
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