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市场竞争下考虑发车间隔的中欧班列定价与补贴决策研究
引用本文:谢雨蓉,高咏玲,陈永东,王庆云.市场竞争下考虑发车间隔的中欧班列定价与补贴决策研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2020,20(4):7-13.
作者姓名:谢雨蓉  高咏玲  陈永东  王庆云
作者单位:1. 北京交通大学 经济管理学院,北京 100044;2. 中央财经大学 商学院,北京100081
基金项目:国家社会科学基金/National Social Science Fund of China (18BGL217);教育部人文社科研究青年基金/Humanities and Social Science Research Project of Ministry of Education of China (17YJC630027).
摘    要:中欧班列与海运班轮的市场竞争受运价、时效性与政府补贴的影响.本文从班列运营企业视角,研究定价与发车间隔选择.通过分析发车间隔对班列需求和成本的影响,利用两阶段博弈研究班列和班轮的运价竞争,以及政府分别根据发送量和社会福利最大目标对班列运营企业的补贴决策,提出班列发车间隔选择策略,并进行数值分析.结果表明:当政府根据发送量目标确定补贴时,班列企业倾向选择较长的发车间隔;当根据社会福利最大确定补贴时,若每列班列支付给铁路的固定费用较大(较小)时,班列企业倾向选择较长(较短)的发车间隔.

关 键 词:铁路运输  补贴  博弈论  中欧班列  竞争  定价  
收稿时间:2020-04-19

Pricing and Subsidy Decisions of China Railway Express Considering its Departure Interval under Market Competition
XIE Yu-rong,GAO Yong-ling,CHEN Yong-dong,WANG Qing-yun.Pricing and Subsidy Decisions of China Railway Express Considering its Departure Interval under Market Competition[J].Transportation Systems Engineering and Information,2020,20(4):7-13.
Authors:XIE Yu-rong  GAO Yong-ling  CHEN Yong-dong  WANG Qing-yun
Institution:1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China; 2. Business School, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing 100081, China
Abstract:The competition between China Railway (CR) Express and liner shipping is affected by price, lead time, and government subsidies. Accounting for the impact of the departure interval on the cost and demand of CR Express, this paper uses a two- stage game-theoretic model to analyze the price competition decisions of the CR Express platform company and a liner shipping company and the optimal subsidies to the CR Express platform company aiming at achieving the dispatched volume goal and maximizing social welfare. This paper also proposes the optimal departure interval selection strategy of CR Express and conducts numerical analysis. Results show the CR Express is inclined to select the relatively long departure interval if subsidies are determined by the dispatched volume goal. When the fixed fee per train paid to the railway company is relatively high (low), the CR Express platform tends to choose the relatively long (short) departure interval in the presence of subsidies determined by maximizing social welfare.
Keywords:railway transportation  subsidy  game theory  China Railway Express  competition  price  
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