共享停车泊位的分配-定价-收益分配机制

为科学管理共享停车资源,构建一种共享停车泊位的分配-定价-收益分配机制。首先,以存在多个地块的区域为对象,根据出行者对不同地块及停车时间模式的选择偏好构建停车许可证的最优分配-定价模型,其中,最优分配模型为组合拍卖竞胜标确定问题(NP困难问题)。其次,利用Benders分解原理、对偶理论及新型升价拍卖代理系统构建调优法对停车许可证进行拍卖。最后,为调动共享泊位提供者的积极性,利用沙普利值法构建基于对社会福利贡献程度的停车收益分配模型。由理论分析及数值试验可知,运用上述机制可精确实现社会福利最优状态,最小竞争均衡价格与公平的收益分配。结果表明:①相较VCG机制与Leonard机制,调优法不仅可精确求解停车许可证的最优分配-定价,而且在算法最坏时间复杂度方面拥有更高效率;②在调优法的每个步骤中,即使停车许可证的分配并非最优,通过机制所实现的收费定价依然具有防止策略性操作的重要性质;③调优法可在较少的步骤之内实现较高的社会福利;④新型升价拍卖代理系统拥有多项式型的最坏时间复杂度;⑤通过最优分配-定价机制可获得每位出行者的选择偏好,进而可计算不同泊位提供者组合条件下的社会福利,实现沙普利值法在现实应用中的可计算性。

Mechanisms of Allocation/Pricing/Revenue Distribution for Shared Parking Lots

A mechanism that consists of allocation/pricing/revenue distribution was established to manage shared parking resources. First, an optimal allocation/pricing model of parking permits for shared parking lots from multiple lands and based on the users' preferences for different areas and parking time periods was established; especially, the optimal allocation model was determined to be a winner determination problem in a combinatorial auction (NP-hard problem). Next, using the Benders decomposition principle, duality theory, and new ascending proxy agent system, an evolutionary method to conduct the auction of parking permits was proposed. Finally, to arouse the enthusiasm of shared parking lot owners, a revenue distribution model based on the contributions for social surplus was determined using the Shapley value method. Through theoretical analysis and a numerical experiment, it was found that the proposed mechanisms can achieve the exact maximal social surplus, minimal competitive equilibrium price, and fair revenue distribution. The results show the following:①Compared to a Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism and a Leonard mechanism, the proposed evolutionary method not only solves the optimal allocation/pricing of parking permits exactly but also has a high computational efficiency in algorithm time complexity in the worst-case scenario; ②For each step of the proposed evolutionary method, the permits prices also have the strategy-proofness, although under the non-optimal allocation of parking permits, which lets the users report their preferences truthfully; ③The evolutionary method can achieve a high social surplus within a number of iterations; ④The proposed new ascending proxy agent system has polynomial-type time complexity in the worst-case scenario; ⑤Through the proposed allocation/pricing mechanism, the manager obtains the users' preferences and the social surplus under any combination of shared parking lot owners can be calculated, thus achieving the calculability of Shapley value method in practical applications.