Pareto-improving transportation network design and ownership regimes |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Management, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 1037 Luoyu Road, Wuhan, PR China;2. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Kowloon, Hong Kong, PR China;1. Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, University at Buffalo, SUNY, United States;2. Department of Industrial and Management Systems Engineering, University of South Florida, United States;1. School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China;2. Key Lab of Complex System Analysis and Management Decision, Ministry of Education, China;3. Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong;1. Jiangsu Key Laboratory of Urban ITS, Southeast University, Nanjing 210000, China;2. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822, United States;3. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Davis, CA 95616, United States |
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| Abstract: | Private provision of public roads signifies co-existence of free, public-tolled and private-tolled roads. This paper investigates the Pareto-improving transportation network design problem under various ownership regimes by allowing joint choice of road pricing and capacity enhancement on free links. The problem of interest is formulated as a bi-objective mathematical programming model that considers the travel cost of road users in each origin-destination pair and the investment return of the whole network. The non-dominated Pareto-improving solutions of toll and/or capacity enhancement schemes are sought for achieving a win-win situation. A sufficient condition is provided for the existence of the non-dominated Pareto-improving schemes and then the properties of those schemes are analyzed. It is found that, under some mild assumptions, the optimal capacity enhancement is uniquely determined by the link flow under any non-dominated Pareto-improving scheme. As a result, the joint road pricing and capacity enhancement problem reduces to a bi-objective second-best road pricing problem. A revenue distribution mechanism with return rate guarantee is proposed to implement the non-dominated Pareto-improving schemes. |
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