首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

两岸直航经济博弈分析
引用本文:杨靳,黄建设.两岸直航经济博弈分析[J].中国航海,2007(4):68-72.
作者姓名:杨靳  黄建设
作者单位:集美大学,福建,厦门,361021
基金项目:国家软科学基金;福建省科技厅软科学基金
摘    要:通过采用子博弈精练纳什均衡理论分析的方法,分析两岸迟迟不能实现海上直航的原因。贸易是两岸直航的主要动力;只有当两岸贸易发展到较高程度时,航运业者才会赞成两岸实现直航。此外,有一种实现海上直航的特殊情况存在:两岸贸易的受损集团力量较强却赞成直航,即使两岸贸易发展较弱,也可能实现海上两岸直航。

关 键 词:水路运输  两岸直航  经济博弈  贸易依存度  动态博弈
文章编号:1000-4653(2007)04-0068-05
收稿时间:2007-09-19
修稿时间:2007年9月19日

Economic Game Analysis of Direct Navigation between Mainland and Taiwan
YANG Jin,HUANG Jian-she.Economic Game Analysis of Direct Navigation between Mainland and Taiwan[J].Navigation of China,2007(4):68-72.
Authors:YANG Jin  HUANG Jian-she
Abstract:The method of game theory is adopted to analyze the reasons that the direct navigations between Mainland and Taiwan can not be realized so far.Trade should be the main force driving the direct navigations,shipping operators will approve of realization of the direct navigation only when the trade between Mainland and Taiwan is developed at a higher level.But there exists a special case for realizing the direct navigation when the groups having losses in the trade between two sides are strong and they approve of the direct navigation,even if the development of the trade is weak.
Keywords:Waterway transportation  Direct Navigation between Mainland and Taiwan  Economic game theory  Trade adhering extent  Dynamic game  
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号