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基于博弈的政府采购寻租监管问题研究
引用本文:田剑,徐鑫鑫.基于博弈的政府采购寻租监管问题研究[J].江苏科技大学学报(社会科学版),2013(6):608-612.
作者姓名:田剑  徐鑫鑫
作者单位:江苏科技大学经济管理学院,江苏镇江212003
基金项目:基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71371088)
摘    要:如何有效监督和防范寻租行为是政府采购领域中的热点话题。从政府和采购人员成本收益角度分析,分别构建完全信息下政府与采购人员的单阶段和重复博弈模型,探讨了政府采购监督效率的影响因素和最优决策方案。结果表明:除稽查成本和效益外,租金额度、采购人员风险偏好以及采购人员素质等因素也会影响政府决策;政府惩罚力度、采购人员寻租成本以及社会环境则会影响采购人员的寻租行为。

关 键 词:政府采购  寻租  收益矩阵  博弈分析

Study on regulation of rent-seeking in government procurement based on game theory
Tian Jian,Xu Xinxin.Study on regulation of rent-seeking in government procurement based on game theory[J].Journal of Jiangsu University of Science and Technology:Natural Science Edition,2013(6):608-612.
Authors:Tian Jian  Xu Xinxin
Institution:(School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhenjiang Jiangsu 212003, China)
Abstract:How to supervise and prevent rent-seeking effectively is a hot issue in the field of government procure-ment .The complete information game models of one stage and repeated stage are built in this article and the fac-tors of efficiency in government procurement and the optimal decisions are given .The result shows that rent quo-ta, risk preference and quality of buyers also influence the quality of government decision -making besides audi-ting costs and efficiency;the government penalties , opportunity cost of rent-seeking and social environment have an important impact on buyers′behavior of rent-seeking .
Keywords:government procurement  rent-seeking  payment matrix  game analysis
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