| Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication |
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| 作者姓名： | 张新立 杨德礼 |
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| 作者单位： | School of Management Dalian University of Techology，Dalian 116024 China School of Mathematics Liaoning Normal University，Dalian 116021 China，School of Management Dalian University of Techology，Dalian 116024 China |
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| 摘 要： | IntroductionThe uncertainty in venture capital market and in-formation asymmetry during venture capital investingprocess make syndication in the second and later sta-ges a hot issue.The syndication is important for re-ducing the risk effectively,increasin…
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| 关 键 词： | 风险资本 企业联合组织 激励机制 财务管理 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2429（2007）01-0049-06 |
| 收稿时间： | 2006-03-17 |
Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication |
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| ZHANG Xin-li,YANG De-li.Incentive Contracts for Venture Capital Syndication[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2007,15(1):49-54. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xin-li YANG De-li |
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| Abstract: | Aiming at the incentive problems of venture capital syndication at the second and later stages, an game model is set up by principal agent and incentive theory, given that the lead venture capitalist has already some knowledge of the project quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information, the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts induce venture capitalists to truthfully reveal their information to each other, and vary with the level of venture capitalists' expertise and information in evaluating projects. |
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| Keywords: | Venture capital Syndication Asymmetric information Incentive contract |
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