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以博弈论为工具，分析了存在公务车的情况下，交通拥挤形成的微观机理以及交通拥挤收费的实施效果。分析表明，拥挤收费并不影响公务车的出行，受到影响的只可能是私家车。在存在大量公务车的情况下，拥挤收费的总体效果取决于私家车出行者的时间价值分布和公务车出行者所占的比重。当公务车出行者的时间价值大于或等于私家车出行者的时间价值时，拥挤收费能有效地化解交通拥挤；当公务车出行者的时间价值小于私家车出行者的时间价值时，拥挤收费很可能只是增加出行者的出行成本，而无法起到缓解交通拥挤的作用。一般地说，高时间价值的私家车出行者所占的比例越高，拥挤收费的效果就越差；公务车出行者占总出行人数的比例越高，拥挤收费的效果越差。

Game Analysis of Private Cars and Government-owned Vehicles under Road Pricing Regulation

Based on the game theory, this paper explains the micro mechanism of traffic congestion and evaluates the performance of road-pricing regulations considering the composition of government-owned vehicles (GOVs) in the traffic flow. The research shows the GOVs suffer less than the private cars due to the fact that the toll of GOVs would be transferred to the administrative expenditure of the government. Under the circumstance of a great number of GOVs occupying the road, the performance of the road pricing regulations relies on the ratio of GOVs to the whole traffic flow and the time-value distribution of private cars. If the time value of GOVs is greater than or equal to the time value of private cars, road pricing could reduce traffic congestion effectively; but if the time value of GOVs is less than that of the private cars, road pricing might just add to the cost of travelers without reducing the congestion. Generally speaking, the higher the ratio of private cars with high time value and the ratio of GOVs to the whole traffic flow, the worse the regulation performance.