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交通拥挤的进化动态分析
引用本文:吴兵,李林波.交通拥挤的进化动态分析[J].中国公路学报,2006,19(3):106-110.
作者姓名:吴兵  李林波
作者单位:同济大学,交通运输工程学院,上海,200092
摘    要:在对交通拥挤本质进行分析的基础上,认为交通出行是一种衍生需求的博弈过程,并根据进化动态博弈理论,对弹性和非弹性需求条件下的交通出行分别进行了分析,指出在相对于拥挤博弈的可容许动态下,博弈可以收敛于惟一的纳什均衡,并表明在此基础上引入合理的可变价格方案可使这一均衡成为真正有效的纳什均衡,从而实现交通出行的社会最优,相对于基于边际成本的定价方案,这一可变价格方案才真正体现了交通拥挤收费的本来意义。

关 键 词:公路运输经济  交通拥挤  博弈论  进化动态  弹性需求  纳什均衡
文章编号:1001-7372(2006)03-0106-05
收稿时间:2005-08-18
修稿时间:2005年8月18日

Evolutionary Dynamic Analysis of Traffic Congestion
WU Bing,LI Lin-bo.Evolutionary Dynamic Analysis of Traffic Congestion[J].China Journal of Highway and Transport,2006,19(3):106-110.
Authors:WU Bing  LI Lin-bo
Institution:School of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
Abstract:Based on the analysis of the traffic congestion essential,authors considered that the trip was a kind of gaming process of demand that derived from other activities,and according to the game theory of evolutionary dynamic,authors analyzed the trip under non-elastic demand and elastic demand conditions respectively.Analysis shows that the game can converge to a unique Nash equilibrium under an admissible dynamic with respect to congestion game and if reasonable variable price scheme based on the evolutionary dynamic was introduced so that the unique Nash equilibrium could reach an efficient statement and optimization of society choice behavior of driving was realized.This variable price scheme really incarnates the quality of traffic congestion pricing in contrast to the price scheme based on marginal cost.
Keywords:highway transportation economy  traffic congestion  game theory  evolutionary dynamic  elastic demand  Nash equilibrium
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