| 航空货运公司动态博弈下的即期舱位差别定价决策 |
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| 引用本文： | 于述南,杨忠振,陈康,张薇,姚媛媛.航空货运公司动态博弈下的即期舱位差别定价决策[J].交通运输工程学报,2019,19(5):162-169. |
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| 作者姓名： | 于述南 杨忠振 陈康 张薇 姚媛媛 |
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| 作者单位： | 大连海事大学 交通运输工程学院,辽宁 大连 116026;大连海事大学 物流研究院,辽宁 大连 116026;宁波大学 海运学院,浙江 宁波,315211;大连海事大学 航运经济与管理学院,辽宁 大连,116026;塔斯马尼亚大学 澳大利亚海事学院,塔斯马尼亚 朗塞斯顿 7250;大连海事大学 交通运输工程学院,辽宁 大连,116026 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目71402013国家自然科学基金项目71431001中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目3132019030中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目3132019302中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金项目3132019301教育部人文社会科学研究项目14YJC630010 |
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| 摘 要： | 为研究同一航线上2家航空货运公司舱位的差别定价决策问题, 建立了动态博弈定价模型, 确定2家公司在各销售阶段的舱位定价; 以大连-广州航段上大连机场货运公司和中国南方航空公司为例, 分析了2家公司在即期市场的舱位定价和收益情况。分析结果表明: 当2家公司采用差别定价模式时, 第1~4、5~6、7~10、11阶段的定价分别为9.7、12.6、13.6、15.2元·kg-1, 当2家公司采用单一定价模式时, 各阶段的定价均为12.1元·kg-1, 即在动态博弈定价下, 无论采用差别定价模式或是单一定价模式, 2家公司各销售阶段的舱位定价完全相同; 当2家公司分别采用差别定价模式与单一定价模式时, 所有阶段的总收益分别为50 928和49 519元, 说明在即期市场上采用差别定价模式销售舱位比采用单一定价模式能获得更大的收益; 当订舱需求受自身定价与对手定价的影响程度的比值分别为1.5、2.0、2.5时, 2家公司在各阶段的舱位定价均逐渐降低, 说明订舱需求受双方定价的影响程度越接近, 双方舱位定价的提升空间越大, 收益也越大。
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| 关 键 词： | 航空运输 收益管理 差别定价 动态定价 即期市场 销售阶段 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-05-17 |
Differential pricing decision-making on spot space under dynamic game of air freight transport companies |
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| YU Shu-nan,YANG Zhong-zhen,CHEN Kang,ZHANG Wei,YAO Yuan-yuan.Differential pricing decision-making on spot space under dynamic game of air freight transport companies[J].Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering,2019,19(5):162-169. |
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| Authors: | YU Shu-nan YANG Zhong-zhen CHEN Kang ZHANG Wei YAO Yuan-yuan |
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| Institution: | 1.College of Transportation Engineering, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, China2.Logistics Research Institute, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, China3.Faculty of Maritime and Transportation, Ningbo University, Ningbo 315211, Zhejiang, China4.School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, Liaoning, China5.Australian Maritime College, University of Tasmania, Tasmania, Australia |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the differential pricing decision-making problem of two air freight transport companies on the same air route, the space pricings of two companies at each sale stage were determined by building a dynamic game pricing model. Dalian Airport and China Southern Airlines on the Dalian-Guangzhou air route were selected to analyze the space pricing and revenue in spot market. Analysis result shows that when the two companies adopt the differential pricing mode, the prices at stages 1-4, 5-6, 7-10, and 11 are 9.7, 12.6, 13.6 and 15.2 yuan·kg-1, respectively. When the two companies adopt the single pricing mode, the prices at each stage are 12.1 yuan·kg-1. Therefore, under the dynamic game pricing mode, no matter the differential pricing mode or single pricing mode is adopted, the prices of the two companies at each sale period are completely the same. When the two companies adopt the differential pricing mode and single pricing mode, respectively, the revenues at all stages are 50 928 and 49 519 yuan, respectively, which indicates that in the spot market, adopting the differential pricing mode to sell spaces will make more revenue than adopting the single pricing mode. When the ratio between the levels of the booking demands influenced by own pricing and opponent's pricing is 1.5, 2.0 and 2.5, respectively, the space prices of the two companies in each period decrease gradually, which indicates that the closer the impact of the pricing of the two companies on the booking demands is, the more the room for increasing space prices for the two companies is, and the more the revenues are. |
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