农村物流末端共配联盟演化博弈及稳定性研究

针对农村物流小批量分散化特点，构建农村物流共同配送联盟演化博弈模型和基于系统动力学的联盟演化仿真模型，揭示农村物流共同配送联盟在自组织环境下系统内各方决策行为特征及其稳定状态。结果表明：农村物流共同配送联盟运行受到联盟超额收益、联盟罚金、声誉损失、建设运营成本等多种因素的综合影响，联盟收益分配机制及成本分担机制直接关系企业在联盟内的决策行为。联盟超额收益大小是农村物流共同配送联盟成功运行的关键因素，超额收益的分配机制会对企业参与联盟决策行为产生直接影响，联盟运行维护成本是促使物流企业偏离联盟的重要因素，而联盟罚金及声誉损失对企业偏离联盟有很好的约束作用。优惠的财税支持、合理的联盟激励约束机制是促进农村物流共同配送联盟快速发展和稳定运行的有效举措。

Evolutionary Game and its Stability for Joint Distribution Alliance of Rural Logistics

Under the decentralized and insufficient demand in rural logistics, an evolutionary game of a joint distribution alliance for rural logistics under self-organized was constructed, and a system dynamics simulation model was built to simulate how the different factors affect the stability of the alliance. The result shows that the operation of a rural logistics joint distribution alliance is influenced by many factors such as excess profit, default fine, reputation loss, construction, and operation cost. The excess profits of the alliance are the key factor of the foundation for the alliance, the cost-sharing mechanism and the interest's distribution mechanism of the alliance will be directly related to the enterprises' decisions, the maintenance cost of the alliance is an important factor for the logistics enterprises to deviate from the alliance, while the penalty and reputation loss have very good incentive restraint effect for the alliance. Preferential fiscal and tax support and reasonable alliance incentive and restraint mechanism are effective measures to promote the rapid development and stable operation of rural joint distribution alliance.