| 基于收购报价的市场操纵博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 邱沛光,张永鹏.基于收购报价的市场操纵博弈分析[J].西南交通大学学报,2005,40(3):385-389. |
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| 作者姓名： | 邱沛光 张永鹏 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆,400067
2. 重庆工商大学财政金融学院,重庆,400067;西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川,成都,610031 |
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| 摘 要： | 用不完全信息博弈模型分析在收购者作出要约收购报价前后噪声交易量的增加以及收购活动量水平对操纵可能性的影响．在此基础上考察在收购者报价以后是否允许其放弃该报价．当收购活动量水平较高时，唯一的均衡形式是操纵者没有利润，若允许收购者放弃报价则增加了社会盈余。当收购活动量水平较低时，唯一的均衡形式是操纵者获得利润，此时，若允许收购者放弃报价则降低了社会盈余。
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| 关 键 词： | 股价 市场操纵 博弈模型 收购报价 收购活动量 噪声交易量 |
| 文章编号： | 0258-2724（2005）03-0385-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-10-12 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-10-12 |
Game Analysis of Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids |
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| QIU Pei-guang,ZHANG Yong-peng.Game Analysis of Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids[J].Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University,2005,40(3):385-389. |
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| Authors: | QIU Pei-guang ZHANG Yong-peng |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Finance and Fiscal Affairs, Chongqin Tech. and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China; 2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China |
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| Abstract: | The influences of an increase in noise trading before and after bidding and the level of takeover activities on the possibility of market manipulation were analyzed with an incomplete game model to explore if dropping bid should be allowed after a buyer has bid. The conclusion is that the unique equilibrium leads to a non-profitable manipulation, and social surplus is increased by the possibility of dropping bids, if the level of takeover activity is high; on the contrary, the unique equilibrium resuhs in a profitable manipulation, and social surplus is decreased by the possibility of dropping bids, ff the level of takeover activity is low. |
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| Keywords: | stock prise market manipulation game model takeover bids takeover activity noise trading |
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