An analysis of instability in a departure time choice problem

This study performs a theoretical analysis of instability in a departure time choice problem. Stability of equilibrium is an important factor for reliability of travel time. If equilibrium is not stable, travel time changes over a period of days even if demand and network performance are stable. This study examines the stability of a dynamic user equilibrium problem by using the departure time choice problem. The mechanism of day‐to‐day changes in a traveller's behaviour is determined first, and then a function that indicates dissimilarity to equilibrium is defined. The day‐to‐day changes in the dissimilarity function are mathematically examined using approximations. A numerical test is also carried out to verify the result. Results of these analyses show that there can be a case where the system does not converge to equilibrium. It is also indicated that this instability should be caused by the non‐monotonicity of the schedule cost.