基于委托-代理理论的城市轨道交通激励约束机制博弈分析

城市轨道交通属于准经营性项目,其投资规模大、盈利能力差,采用特许权方式进行项目建设、运营时,需要政府部门对项目公司进行相应的扶持补贴。这种扶持补贴必须建立在现代委托-代理关系上,即建立相应的激励约束机制,以利于城市轨道交通项目能够低成本、高效率地运营。介绍了激励约束机制的重要性,运用博弈论对政府与项目公司的委托-代理关系进行了分析,得出政府给予项目公司的补贴是建立激励约束机制的关键。针对如何选择合理的补贴方式提出了相应的政策建议。

Game Analysis of Incentive and Restraint Mechanism Based on Principal-agent Theory in Urban Rail Transit

Urban rail transit belongs to a quasi-operating project: featuring huge investment and poor profitability.In its construction and operation,the responsible government has to pay corresponding subsidy based on modern principal-agent relationship to the project company.An incentive and restraint mechanism shall be established for low cost and highly efficient operation of urban rail transit.The importance of the incentive and restraint mechanism is introduced,game theory is used to analyze the principal-agent relationship between government and rail transit companies.Then comes the conclusion that the key is how to decide a reasonable amount of subsidy provided by the government to the related project company,and corresponding policy and advices for selecting a reasonable subsidy method are proposed.