基于市场进入博弈的高速铁路与航空竞争分析

提出了一个市场进入博弈模型来研究高铁和航空在中等运输距离上的竞争,重点考虑了票价、服务频率和乘客在不同交通方式之间因价格变动产生的转移等因素. 作为市场在位者,航空有允许和阻止两种策略,而高铁可以选择进入或者不进入市场,运用逆向归纳法求解出各种策略组合下航空和高铁的最佳策略,通过京沪高铁的实例展示了航空和高铁博弈的结果,给出了博弈双方的利润、票价、服务频率,以及在市场需求变动、机型变动和沉没成本变动条件下三者的变动情况. 结果表明,如果高铁的沉没成本不高并且市场需求充足,其最佳策略是进入市场,而航空的最佳策略是允许.

High Speed Rail and Air Transport Competition: A Market-entry Game Approach

This paper develops a market-entry game model to investigate the competitions between air transport and high-speed rail transport (HSR) over medium distance journeys. Ticket price, service frequency and passenger behavior for transport mode switch under the price fluctuation is taken into consideration. A combined set of accommodation strategies and deterrence strategies for the market-entry game model is analyzed under a variety of scenarios. A case study in China is proposed to illustrate the competitions between air and HSR in order to identify the optimal operating strategies for both transport operators. A backward induction method is introduced to solve this problem. Results show that the optimal strategy for HSR is to enter the market with low sunk cost and abundant demand while the optimal strategy for airlines is accommodation.