首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究
引用本文:张弓亮,张成科,曹铭,肖继辉.基于演化博弈的高速路收费通道选择研究[J].交通运输系统工程与信息,2015,15(2):29-35.
作者姓名:张弓亮  张成科  曹铭  肖继辉
作者单位:1. 广东工业大学管理学院,广州510520;2. 广东工业大学经济与贸易学院,广州510520; 3. 东莞市道路桥梁开发建设总公司,广东,东莞511700
基金项目:国家自然基金(71171061);广东省交通运输厅科技项目(502140002).
摘    要:收费广场拥堵严重影响了高速路的通行效率和安全畅通.为找到驾驶员路径选择博弈的稳定策略,以更好地诱导驾驶员合理选择收费通道,提高收费站通行效率,缓解高速路收费广场拥堵问题,本文以驾驶员为研究对象,运用演化博弈的方法,通过"鹰鸽博弈"模型分析,建立收益矩阵,得到在不同成本条件下的两个演化稳定策略,并借助MATLAB软件和仿真演化的路径分析,验证了驾驶员在选择收费通道博弈中存在均衡点的分析结果.研究表明,存在混合策略是博弈的均衡点,诱导驾驶员的策略选择向均衡点靠近,能均衡各收费通道的车流量,有效减少收费广场的拥堵现象.

关 键 词:交通运输经济  收费通道选择  演化博弈  驾驶员选择  演化稳定策略  
收稿时间:2014-11-25

Selection of Highway Toll Channels Based on Evolutionary Game
ZHANG Gong-liang , ZHANG Cheng-ke , CAO Ming , XIAO Ji-hui.Selection of Highway Toll Channels Based on Evolutionary Game[J].Transportation Systems Engineering and Information,2015,15(2):29-35.
Authors:ZHANG Gong-liang  ZHANG Cheng-ke  CAO Ming  XIAO Ji-hui
Institution:1. School of Management, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China; 2. School of Economics & Commerce, Guangdong University of Technology, Guangzhou 510520, China; 3. Dongguan Roads and Bridges Development & Construction Corporation, Dongguan 511700, Guangdong, China
Abstract:The congestion of toll plaza reduces the efficiency of transportation, and poses negative effects on the safety and smoothness of highway. In order to find out the stable strategy of game theory for better guiding drivers to select toll channel legitimately, and improve the efficiency of transportation and the situation of toll plaza congestion. Drivers is considered as the object of study, and the approach of evolutionary game and the analysis of "Hawk and Dove game" model are applied to obtain two evolutionary stable strategies that are under different cost conditions. By using the simulation of MATLAB software and the analysis of evolutionary path, it can be verified that there is equilibrium existing in the game when drivers choose toll channel. The result shows that mixed strategy is equilibrium of game, and to induce the strategic choices of drivers closing to the equilibrium can balance flow of each toll channel, which can efficiently relieve the congestion of the toll plazas.
Keywords:transportation economy  selection of highway toll channels  evolutionary game  drivers&rsquo  choices  evolutionary stable strategy
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《交通运输系统工程与信息》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《交通运输系统工程与信息》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号