高铁运营安全多委托方监督演化博弈的SD分析

针对我国高铁委托运输管理模式下，高铁运营安全监督系统存在高铁公司对多个委托方的监督策略难以合理制定的问题，本文通过分析某高铁公司及其 2个委托方策略的动态选择在安全监督方面存在的复杂博弈现象，建立了三方组成的系统演化博弈模型.通过演化博弈理论证明，结合系统动力学(SD)仿真，可以揭示多委托方条件下，系统各方进行决策的行为特征及其稳定状态.结果表明：采用静态策略时，博弈过程出现了长期波动，并不存在演化稳定策略均衡(ESS)；而采用动态策略可以有效抑制博弈过程中的波动，但在奖惩系数相同的情况下，静态策略对于委托路局安全投入率的提升优于动态策略.说明高铁公司在制定监督政策时，应灵活运用静态和动态策略，以使高铁运营安全水平得到有效控制和提升.

Evolutionary Game for High-speed Railway Operation Safety Supervision System with Multiple Agent Based on SD Analysis

In view of the entrusted transportation management model of high-speed railway(HSR) in China, the supervision strategy for multiple agents are difficult to formulate. The HSR safety supervision system evolutionary game model that composed of HSR company and it’s multiple agents has been established. The behavioral characteristics and the steady state of decision-making of all parties is proved by evolutionary game theory and System Dynamics(SD) simulation. The results indicated that there will be a long-term fluctuations in the game process when the static strategy(SS) is adopted, there have no Evolutionary Stable Strategy(ESS) exists in the system. The fluctuations can be effectively suppressed by adopted the dynamic strategy(DS), but in case of the same coefficient, the SS is better than the DS in increasing the safety investment rate of the mutiple agents. Illustrating that the HSR company should flexibly apply these two strategies when formulating the supervision policy in order to control the safety level of HSR operations.