首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

造船供应链合作利益分配协商机制研究
引用本文:马红燕,张光明.造船供应链合作利益分配协商机制研究[J].船舶工程,2007,29(2):69-72.
作者姓名:马红燕  张光明
作者单位:江苏科技大学,经济管理学院,镇江,212003;江苏科技大学,经济管理学院,镇江,212003
基金项目:江苏省高校自然科学基金,江苏省软科学基金
摘    要:造船供应链合作利益分配过程是个群体协商过程.文章基于供应链节点企业间风险共担、利益共享的合作特点,分析了利益分配应遵循的原则.并充分考虑各节点企业的投资额、承担的风险及分配方案满意度,应用不对称Nash谈判模型设计了造船供应链合作利益分配的协商机制.

关 键 词:企业管理  造船供应链  协商  Nash谈判模型  利益分配
文章编号:1000-6982(2007)02-0069-04
修稿时间:2006-06-29

Study on bargain mechanism of cooperative benefit allocation of shipbuilding supply chain
MA Hong-yan,ZHANG Guang-ming.Study on bargain mechanism of cooperative benefit allocation of shipbuilding supply chain[J].Ship Engineering,2007,29(2):69-72.
Authors:MA Hong-yan  ZHANG Guang-ming
Institution:School of Economics and Management, Jiangsu University of Science and Technology, Zhengjiang 212003, Chian
Abstract:The cooperative benefit allocation of shipbuilding supply chain is a process of group bargaining. The paper analyses the principles that should be followed in benefit allocation on the basis of cooperative characteristics of shared risks and benefits among node enterprises. After fully consideration of the investment, undertaken risks and satisfaction with allocation decisions of node enterprises in shipbuilding supply chain, the paper applies the asymmetric Nash negotiation model to design a bargain mechanism for cooperation benefit allocation of shipbuilding supply chain.
Keywords:business administration  shipbuilding supply chain  bargain  Nash negotiation model  benefit allocation
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《船舶工程》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《船舶工程》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号