| 基于博弈理论的弹性停车激励机制运营效益评估模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 季彦婕, 高良鹏, 陈丹丹, 汤斗南. 基于博弈理论的弹性停车激励机制运营效益评估模型[J]. 交通运输工程学报, 2019, 19(4): 161-170. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2019.04.015 |
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| 作者姓名： | 季彦婕 高良鹏 陈丹丹 汤斗南 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.东南大学 交通学院, 江苏 南京 211189;;2.福建工程学院 交通运输学院, 福建 福州 350118;;3.加州大学伯克利分校 市政环境工程系, 加利福尼亚 伯克利 94710 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家重点研发计划项目2018YFB1600900国家自然科学基金项目51561135003 |
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| 摘 要： | 分析了在停车机制作用下小汽车出行者与停车场管理方之间的动态博弈过程, 研究了出行者竞价行为与个体出行成本、停车激励强度之间的数量关系, 构建了面向弹性停车激励机制的运营效益评估模型; 应用敏感性分析方法探究多种影响因素对弹性停车激励机制运营效益的作用, 并以美国加州大学伯克利分校为例进行了实证研究。研究结果表明: 弹性停车激励机制不仅能保障停车场日常运营的可持续, 还可以促进停车泊位的共享; 在经济效益方面, 弹性停车激励机制能通过激励强度的变化调整泊位的回收数, 当最大激励强度从15美元增至30美元时, 回收泊位数将从17个减小到8个, 说明该机制能通过有选择地拒绝高价泊位来确保停车场的经济效益; 随着可接受最小激励强度人数比例的提升, 泊位回收的边际效益将增大, 当该比例从5%提升至55%时, 泊位回收边际效益将由每个14.4美元增至每个17.3美元, 说明随着参与竞价人数的增多, 停车场经济效益逐步提升; 在社会效益方面, 实施该机制将有利于释放停车场的泊位资源, 如其日周转率将会有约9%的降幅, 最小空置率会呈现出0~8%的不均衡涨幅, 说明该机制能有效促进出行者主动共享停车泊位。
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| 关 键 词： | 交通管理 弹性停车激励机制 博弈理论 效益评估 共享停车 经济补贴 |
| 收稿时间： | 2019-01-07 |
Operational benefit evaluation model of flexible parking incentive mechanism based on game theory |
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| JI Yan-jie, GAO Liang-peng, CHEN Dan-dan, TANG Dou-nan. Operational benefit evaluation model of flexible parking incentive mechanism based on game theory[J]. Journal of Traffic and Transportation Engineering, 2019, 19(4): 161-170. doi: 10.19818/j.cnki.1671-1637.2019.04.015 |
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| Authors: | JI Yan-jie GAO Liang-peng CHEN Dan-dan TANG Dou-nan |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Transportation, Southeast University, Nanjing 211189, Jiangsu, China;;2. School of Transportation, Fujian University of Technology, Fuzhou 350118, Fujian, China;;3. Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley 94710, California, USA |
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| Abstract: | The dynamic game process between car travelers and parking managers under the parking mechanism was analyzed. The quantitative relationships between the travelers' bidding behavior, individual travel cost and parking incentive intensity were studied. The operational benefit evaluation model for the flexible parking incentive mechanism was conducted. The sensitivity analysis method was used to explore the effects of various factors on the operational efficiency of flexible parking incentive mechanism, and an empirical study of the University of California, Berkeley was carried out. Analysis result shows that the flexible parking incentive mechanism can not only ensure the sustainability of daily operation of parking lot, but also promote the sharing of parking berths. In terms of economic benefit, the flexible parking incentive mechanism can adjust the number of reclaimed berths through the change of incentive intensity. When the maximum incentive intensity increases from $15 to $30, the number of reclaimed berths reduces from 17 to 8, showing that the mechanism can ensure the economic benefits of parking lot by selectively rejecting the high price berths. As the proportion of people who can accept the minimum incentive increases, the marginal benefit of reclaimed berth will increase. When the proportion increases from 5% to 55%, the marginal benefit increases from $14.4 per berth to $17.3 per berth, showing that with the increase of the number of bidders, the economic benefit of parking lot improves gradually. In terms of social efficiency, the implementation of flexible parking incentive mechanism can help to release the parking berth resources. For example, the daily velocity rate will decrease by about 9%, and the minimum vacancy rate will show an unbalanced increase of 0-8%, showing that the mechanism can effectively promote the travelers to share the parking berths actively. |
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| Keywords: | traffic management flexible parking incentive mechanism game theory benefit evaluation shared parking economic subsidy |
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