Hub location in the South-Atlantic airline market: A spatial competition game

The paper analyzes the airlines’ hub location problem through a spatial competition game played in two stages. First, airlines sequentially choose the location of their hub and second, they compete offering direct or connecting services between each city-pair. Different outcomes in the first stage will affect competition in the second, and as a consequence, the market share that airlines can obtain.Given actual demand patterns, results of the model are applied to the South-Atlantic airline market. We study the subgame perfect equilibriums obtained as a result of competition in each city-pair to anticipate where airlines will probably locate their hubs once an “open skies” policy is adopted in this market.     

The future relations between air and rail transport in an island country

This paper proposes a bi-level passenger transport market model taking into account competition between air and high-speed rail (HSR) in a domestic market. The paper discusses the characteristics of the relationship between market share and connectivity in domestic and international markets. The result suggests that because of the dominance of HSR in the domestic market, when connectivity between air and HSR is good, international passenger’s welfare can be improved. Finally, when considering profitability of the players, there is an incentive for airlines to cooperate with HSR, but there is no incentive for HSR to cooperate with airlines.     

One price for all? Price discrimination and market captivity: Evidence from the Italian city-pair markets

This paper tests whether, and to what extent, airlines exploit market captivity by using price discrimination strategies. The Italian passenger market is particularly fit for this purpose, given the high differentials in the degree of the inter-modal competition amongst domestic connections. Results show that, ceteris paribus, airlines adopt a different pricing behaviour depending on the degree of inter-modal market captivity. First, in highly concentrated markets with respect to air competitors, airlines price higher when the inter-modal competition is limited. This proves that inter-modal market captivity strengthens the effect of market power. Second, the inter-temporal price discrimination leads to a J-shaped distribution of fares over time, which is more pronounced when the inter-modal competition is effective. This suggests that airlines need to adopt a pricing technique that allows for a greater market segmentation in order to compete successfully with high-speed rail transport and to extract a larger part of passengers’ surplus. These results are relevant in terms of transport-investment implications and competition policy. The indirect benefits that investments in rail infrastructure would yield through downward pressures on competing airline fares should be embedded in any cost-benefit analysis of high-speed networks investments and in any policy evaluation of measures that aim to reduce the territorial gaps in infrastructure endowment and accessibility.     

Airline network choice and market coverage under high-speed rail competition

While the existing literature has focused on the short-term impacts, this paper investigates the long-term impacts of high-speed rail (HSR) competition on airlines. An analytical model is developed to study how an airline may change its network and market coverage when facing HSR competition on trunk routes. We show that prior to HSR competition, an airline is more likely to adopt a fully-connected network and cover fewer fringe markets if the trunk market is large. Under HSR competition, the airline will, for a given network structure, have a greater incentive to cover more fringe (regional or foreign) markets if the trunk market is large, or the airline network is close to hub-and-spoke. Further, the airline will, for any given market coverage, move towards a hub-and-spoke network when the trunk market is large, or the number of fringe markets covered by the airline network is large. Both effects are more prominent when the decreasing rate of airline density economies is large. We further show that HSR competition can induce the airline to adopt network structure and market coverage that are closer to the socially optimal ones, thereby suggesting a new source of welfare gain from HSR based on its long-term impacts on airlines. Implications for operators, policy makers and specific countries (such as China) are also discussed.     

Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.     

Deregulating European aviation — A case study

European international scheduled aviation has been characterised by bans on market entry, price collusion, and capacity sharing. High fares were charged compared to world standards and the fares charged by European charter airlines.In May 1986 new entrants with pricing freedom were permitted on the London-Dublin route which was then the third largest in European scheduled international aviation. Prior to deregulation the route experienced high fare growth. The unrestricted fare ex-London increased 72.6 per cent compared to a Retail Price Index increase of 41.5 per cent. There was a growth in passenger numbers in the years 1980–85 of 2.8 per cent.Since deregulation passenger numbers have risen to 2.3 million compared to 994,000 before deregulation. Fares have declined by an estimated 37 per cent ex-Dublin and 42 per cent ex-London in real terms. There have been four cases of market entry and one of market exit. The estimated share of the new entrants in the second half of 1989 was 28 per cent. The preregulation earnings data of Aer Lingus, the market leader, indicated that protection allowed staff to earn economic rents. A two-tier structure was introduced in response to competition.Remaining barriers to contestability in UK/Ireland aviation include hub airport dominance, ground handling monopolies, and the ability of airlines with routes in both regulated and deregulated markets to engage in geographical price discrimination against airlines with routes in deregulated markets only. A pro-contestability aviation policy in Europe will require measures to prevent the abuse of dominant positions by established airlines over new market entrants and to prevent collusion between established airlines.     

Low cost carrier competition and route entry in an emerging but regulated aviation market – The case of China

Although China lags behind other liberalized aviation markets in low cost carrier (LCC) development, its largest LCC, Spring Airlines, has achieved rapid growth in traffic volume and revenue, as well as consistent profitability, since its inauguration in 2005. Our empirical study on the Chinese domestic market suggests that Spring adopts a “cream skimming” strategy to enter high-priced routes, allowing the carrier to achieve both a very high load factor and considerable profitability. Spring’s capacity and market share on individual routes are constrained to low levels, likely due to government regulation and/or a “puppy dog” strategy adopted by the carrier. As a result, Spring is able to achieve fast growth without triggering price wars. To incumbent full service carriers, high speed rail (HSR) services impose much more significant competitive pressure than low cost carriers. Similar to LCCs in developed markets, Spring prefers to serve markets with high traffic volumes out of its operational base in Shanghai. Overall, Spring’s entry decision is not significantly affected by competition, either from full service airlines or HSR services. Our investigation suggests that LCCs have potential to introduce more competition but are yet to be a “game changer” in China. Further deregulation of the domestic market is needed.     

Strategic considerations behind the network–regional airline tie ups – A theoretical and empirical study

The paper examines the strategic vertical relationship between network and regional airlines. We develop a model to illustrate how network airlines can use the contractual relationship with regional airlines as an efficient tool to simultaneously drive out inefficient network airlines and also accommodate other cost efficient network airlines in any specific market. The model is tested on U.S. data using simultaneous and sequential choice models. We find that market size, cost differences between network airlines, as well as cost differences between network and regional airlines, are the chief determinants of the network airlines’ decisions on whether or not to serve a market with their own fleet, as well as how many regional airlines to contract with.     

Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

On the relationship between airport pricing models

Airport pricing papers can be divided into two approaches. In the traditional approach the demand for airport services depends on airport charges and on congestion costs of both passengers and airlines; the airline market is not formally modeled. In the vertical-structure approach instead, airports provide an input for an airline oligopoly and it is the equilibrium of this downstream market which determines the airports’ demand. We prove, analytically, that the traditional approach to airport pricing is valid if air carriers have no market power, i.e. airlines are atomistic or they behave as price takers (perfect competition) and have constant marginal operational costs. When carriers have market power, this approach may result in a surplus measure that falls short of giving a true measure of social surplus. Furthermore, its use prescribes a traffic level that is, for given capacity, smaller than the socially optimal level. When carriers have market power and consequently both airports and airlines behave strategically, a vertical-structure approach appears a more reasonable approach to airport pricing issues.     

Market power and its determinants in the Chinese airline industry

This paper first measures the degree of Chinese airlines’ market power by using Lerner index, and then investigates its determinants. Our empirical results show that a certain degree of market power exists in the Chinese airline industry. Of the three dominant carriers, Air China exhibits the strongest market power whereas China Eastern Airlines the weakest, with China Southern Airlines being in the middle. Furthermore, the extent of market power varies significantly among regional markets, with China’s northeast region as the strongest, followed by the eastern and western regions, and the central area as the weakest. We also find a hub-premium effect similar to the result found in the US airline market. Our analysis shows that the existence of high-speed rail and low-cost carriers, income level, population size, seasonality, and number of competing airlines are the main determinants of competition in the Chinese airline market.     

Price effects of airlines frequent flyer programs: The case of the dominant firm in Chile

Frequent flyer programs create a switching cost for the consumer and allow firms to obtain rents, for example, by exploiting the principal agent problem existing between the employee who travel and purchases the ticket and the employer paying for that ticket. In Chile LAN is the dominant airline in domestic markets and the only one that has a frequent flyer program (FFP); it faces some competition from two small carriers. Using a unique dataset for Chile, collected by ourselves from airlines websites in 2011 and 2012, we estimate the impact of the dominant airline FFP. For this purpose, we compare for each route the fares between airlines and between weekday trips (that accumulate full miles and are mainly for business purposes) and weekend trips (that accumulate less than full miles and are mainly for leisure purposes). The results show that the differential premium LAN is able to charge for weekday trips due to the FFP is around 35%. Three particularities of the Chilean market help the econometric identification: there is only one hub for all airlines (the capital city of Santiago), there is no business class in domestic flights, and none of the airlines is a low-cost carrier.     

Competition and public service obligations in European aviation markets

This paper analyzes the effect of universal service policies on the airline markets of five European Union countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) in the period 2002–2010. Results show that airfare discount schemes for island residents raise demand and positively affect competition and the number of flights at the route level. These effects are evident in France and Italy, but are particularly marked in Spain. By contrast, public service obligations (PSOs) reduce competition on the protected routes, while their effect on the number of flights differs depending on national regulations. In Spain, routes protected with PSOs have greater flight frequencies than those on unprotected routes of similar characteristics, but in France, Italy and the UK the opposite result is found. The empirical model also finds that on routes with low-cost airlines market concentration is smaller and there is a larger number of flights. This result is relevant for the design of universal service policy, since in recent years low-cost airlines have entered a number of thin routes and have increased access to air transportation.     

Competition policy and the liberalisation of European aviation

The European aviation industry is undergoing a process of liberalisation. One of the important lessons of American deregulation was that the industry is not perfectly contestable. One implication of this is that actual competition on a route is important in order to be able to secure the benefits of deregulation or liberalisation. Another is that effective competition policy is important in order to prevent anti-competitive mergers or predatory behaviour. This paper reviews the merger investigations in European aviation which have accompanied the search by carriers to secure the benefits of market power, and considers the extent of route competition within the European Community and its relationship to the different route licensing policies of different national governments. The paper considers the extent of present competition on the busiest routes, and stresses the importance of cabotage rights in opening up the European market to effective competition.     

Using DEA models to jointly estimate service quality perception and profitability – Evidence from international airports

With increasing competition between airports and a growing share of non-aeronautical revenues, particularly at large international hubs, perceived quality and consumer satisfaction have not only become a key focus of management but potentially the most important tool to achieve or maintain a competitive advantage. However, in the long run stakeholders aim for profit maximisation and it has been shown for other parts of the aviation supply chain that quality does significantly impact on profitability. In this paper we aim to investigate whether perceived airport quality has an impact on airport profit margins. We further apply two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models to estimate a single efficiency measure that combines the potentially conflicting indicators of perceived service quality and profitability for the airport context. We also identify determinants of the jointly estimated single quality/profitability measure.     

Flying with climate liability? Economic valuation of voluntary carbon offsets using forced choices

This study aims to examine how key aspects of voluntary climate action influence economic values of aviation carbon offsets using an Australian case study, where voluntary carbon offset programs for the aviation sector were active under a carbon tax between July 01, 2012 and July 17, 2014. An online survey was administered during the period using choice experiments. This rare and short-lived Australian experience is useful to gain insights into how individuals respond to the new public policy in terms of the perceived economic value of voluntary offsets for air travel. According to the estimation results, supporters of the mandatory tax policy held a welfare value of voluntary carbon offsets for their domestic flights that is three times larger than non-supporters (i.e., $AU27.83 vs. $AU9.40). It is $AU12.27 on average per ton of carbon offsets per person for domestic flights and $AU0.92 for international long-haul flights. The findings endorse that individuals seem to attach personal responsibility for carbon emissions (i.e. climate liability or carbon conscience) to frequent domestic flights, but not so much to intercontinental flights. Furthermore, reported flight frequencies by respondents did not place any significant impact on economic values of voluntary carbon offsets in both domestic and international frameworks. A coupled approach between forced choices and certainty responses was adapted, where no-choice options were retrieved, potentially improving choice experiments. Results suggest that airlines should consider simplifying their carbon offset programs to fixed levels (e.g. £3, £10, and £20 as in the case of British Airways), regardless of geographical boundaries, while governments should promote both mandatory and voluntary climate measures in tandem.     

The federal republic of Germany: the federal ministry of transport

The continued liberalization of the airline market in the European Community offers the prospect of competition in terms of price, frequency of service and many other attributes. Understanding these factors that influence passenger demand and incorporating them into a demand function poses a substantial theoretical and empirical challenge. A basis for estimating demand functions is the logit model. This paper examines the value of a logit share model in explaining how the share of airlines between airports varies as a function of measured and unmeasured attributes. It shows how demand functions are necessary for understanding a competitive market and evaluates the progress to date in identifying accurate coefficients of the logit function.     

Environmental charges in airline markets

Over the last two decades many airline markets have been deregulated, resulting in increased competition and use of different types of networks. At the same time there has been an intense discussion on environmental taxation of airline traffic. It is likely that an optimal environmental charge and the effects of a charge differ between different types of aviation markets. In this paper, we derive optimal flight (environmental) charges for different types of airline markets. The first type of market is a multiproduct monopoly airline operating either a point-to-point network or a hub-and-spoke network. The optimal charge is shown to be similar in construction to an optimal charge for a monopolist. We also compare the environmental impact of the two types of networks. Given no differences in marginal damages between airports we find that an airline will always choose the network with the highest environmental damages. The second type of market we investigate is a multiproduct duopoly, where two airlines compete in both passengers and flights. The formulation of the optimal charge is similar to the optimal charge of a single product oligopoly. However, we also show that it is, because of strategic effects, difficult to determine the effects of the charge on the number of flights.     

Airline’s choice of aircraft size – Explanations and implications

When facing a growth in demand, airlines tend to respond more by means of increasing frequencies than by increasing aircraft size. At many of the world’s largest airports there are fewer than 100 passengers per air transport movement, although congestion and delays are growing. Furthermore, demand for air transport is predicted to continue growing but aircraft size is not. This paper aims to investigate and explain this phenomenon, the choice of relatively small aircraft. It seems that this choice is associated mainly with the benefits of high frequency service, the competitive environment in which airlines operate and the way airport capacity is allocated and priced. Regression analysis of over 500 routes in the US, Europe and Asia provides empirical evidence that the choice of aircraft size is mainly influenced by route characteristics (e.g. distance, level of demand and level of competition) and almost not at all by airport characteristics (e.g. number of runways and whether the airport is a hub or slot coordinated). We discuss the implications of this choice of aircraft size and suggest that some market imperfections exist in the airline industry leading airlines to offer excessive frequency on some routes and too low frequency on others.     

Airport congestion pricing and passenger types

We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.