对我国水路基础设施投融资政策的分析与调整

随着社会经济的快速发展，水路交通基础设施相对落后的状况与水路交通运输大发展需求之间的矛盾仍然存在。根据实际发展情况变化，分析研究现行水路交通基础设施投融资政策，明确政策凋整的依据和条件，并对国家相关政策提出调整建议和具体的实施措施，对于充分发挥水路交通在国民经济发展中的作用很有必要。通过凋研提出了增加国家财政投资、鼓励多渠道投资、创新融资方式和发挥地方政府投资的积极性等政策建议。     

构建和完善港口基础设施系统投融资体制

在分析当前我国港口基础设施系统投融资体制现状的基础上,根据公共经济学理论对港口设施系统要素按投资来源、投资方式进行了合理划分,并充分借鉴国外港口建设的投融资体制,提出应根据不同类型项目分类融资的思想,最后给出了建立与完善市场经济条件下港口投融资体制的具体建议。     

Transport infrastructure provision and operations: Why should governments choose private–public partnership?

Recent transport sector liberalisation, as well as global economic crisis, is favouring the implementation of transport infrastructure projects through Public–Private Partnerships (PPP). However, there is a debate as to whether PPP schemes are a better option than conventional procurement. To this end, an evaluation framework is proposed, to assess which of these two alternative schemes for transport projects financing is preferable for the public. The proposed framework is complimentary to the Value for Money (VfM) approach and is based on a Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). The first step is the estimation of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) for the case of conventional procurement, dealing with construction, maintenance and operation costs revenues, as well as any costs associated with risks undertaken by the public. As for the PPP case, it includes any payments by the public sector and related risks costs. The MCA is then applied only if the PPP is found preferable for the public sector. The latter considers additional impacts, including among others the social attributes of a particular scheme, job creation, environmental impacts and safety and security aspects. The proposed framework was applied to a pilot Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor infrastructure project in the city of Indore, India, in order to demonstrate its validity. The framework and its application could provide useful guidance when considering PPP for a transport project, since it demonstrates in a transparent way the society's attitude towards this project, something that is critical to its acceptance.     

采用"地主港"模式突破港口基础设施融资瓶颈

针对浙江省港口基础设施建设融资所面临的难题,论述“地主港”模式的优点及其在港口融资中所发挥的作用,介绍国外著名港口“地主港”模式的运行情况和国内港口的尝试情况,阐明浙江沿海港口实施该模式所具备的条件,并对实施过程中应做好的工作提出见解。     

Rail infrastructure charging EU-directive,Swedish concerns and theory

The first railway package is being recast by the legislative bodies of the European Union. One point of departure in this paper is how Swedish agencies treat issues concerning marginal cost based charges, financing charges and allocation of scarce capacity and it discusses these issues from a welfare point of view, partly by use of theoretical modelling. It is seen here that the Swedish infrastructure manager (the Swedish Transport Administration) so far has no method for calculation of marginal costs as a base for charging, especially for costs of scarce capacity, and that the infrastructure manager is applying or discussing various methods for allocations of scarce track capacity. The EU-recast gives no guidance on principles for calculation of charges for scarce capacity, so we recommend the Swedish Transport Administration to develop such charges. The Administration seems to ignore important externalities that should be taken into consideration from a welfare point of view, with respect both to efficient charging and to allocation of scarce capacity. The analytical modelling part of the paper aims to derive these charges in principle, taking these externalities into account. If financing charges exceeding social marginal costs are applied, the model shows how to minimise the welfare loss of these increases. It also shows that financing charges should primarily be applied to market segments that cause large external costs from the operation of the train, where its customers have low valuation of wait time and delay time, where customers of other segments have high valuations of delay and where increased profits for other operators are induced.     

The funding of hierarchical railway development in China

Transport networks are hierarchal in essence. In this paper, we explore the relationship between the financing structure and the hierarchal evolution of railway network development, using the case of China. Although privatization and corporatization in transport provision have been trends in some parts of the world, the national government is still the main body responsible for railway development in many countries. Among these countries, China and India are the only two that include the Ministry of Railways (MOR). In India, the entire country's railways are clearly defined as public services provided and managed by the MOR. In China, railways have been corporatized; yet, the MOR and the National Railway Corporation are still widely regarded as a single body that has monopolistic power over almost all railway systems at the national and regional levels in both infrastructure development and operation.     

Short-sea shipping potentials in Central America to bridge infrastructural gaps

This paper addresses the situation of transport infrastructure in Central America, which poses issues of insufficiency, high-costs and lack of an integrated vision in a geographic region that is exposed to vulnerabilities due to its geological, geomorphologic and climatic conditions. The major efforts for regional integration with joint infrastructure in place seem to meet the criteria of high prioritization on ground transport and non-diversification of risk. This paper features the characteristics of the area and the potentiality of short-sea shipping to cover infrastructure deficits and the need for a more integrated planning of transport infrastructure services with better conditions to improve the regional economy competitiveness and the economic growth.     

Short-sea shipping potentials in Central America to bridge infrastructural gaps

This paper addresses the situation of transport infrastructure in Central America, which poses issues of insufficiency, high-costs and lack of an integrated vision in a geographic region that is exposed to vulnerabilities due to its geological, geomorphologic and climatic conditions. The major efforts for regional integration with joint infrastructure in place seem to meet the criteria of high prioritization on ground transport and non-diversification of risk. This paper features the characteristics of the area and the potentiality of short-sea shipping to cover infrastructure deficits and the need for a more integrated planning of transport infrastructure services with better conditions to improve the regional economy competitiveness and the economic growth.     

基于IFC的水运基础设施信息模型

根据水运基础设施领域数据交换需求,引入了国际数据描述交换标准——工业基础类(IFC),基于其开放、共享、可扩展的特点,提出了一条适用于水运基础设施IFC标准的实施技术路线图。根据该路线,对水运基础设施领域的数据交换需求、数据分类、数据编码进行了验证和实践。该体系方法,能够满足水运工程领域IFC技术的研究要求,保障了水运基础设施IFC标准研究的顺利实施,也可为基础设施其它领域IFC研究和实践工作提供技术支撑。     

Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs

The development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price.We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce.One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll.In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue.In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project:

−

when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll;

−

when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately;

−

when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government.

Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing.

Preamble

Most of the theoretical studies devoted to optimising public investment programming and infrastructure pricing have, since the work of Jules Dupuit (1844), focused on the salient issues of the transport sector, even though this work was relevant to all sorts of public infrastructure. The analysis presented in this paper deals with transport economics, but in line with this tradition, is also applicable to any field in which public-funding is combined with commercial revenue. For example, the question of determining how the financing of an opera should be shared between taxpayers and opera-goers raises the same type of issues as the optimal combination of tolls and subsidies for financing a motorway project. This report will be focused on these issues. We shall see that certain precautions are called for in investment programming together with some new thinking on pricing principles.     

Workshop 6: The public agenda: What is working and what is missing

Workshop 6 topics covered social inclusion, the informal transport sector, transport in developing countries and sustainability. The strong connections and complimentary goals were noted, where solutions to social exclusion and greenhouse gas reduction can both be realised with good transport and urban planning. There is an opportunity for developing countries to avoid the transport mistakes in many developed countries, such as car dependence. This will involve the development of infrastructure that offers accessible public transport to the majority of people, providing resources to the informal transport system and integrating this with public transport. The workshop considered specific issues such as rural transport, new technology, car tolls to subsidise public transport, safety issues with informal transport and the failure to evaluate the longer-term impacts of many major transport infrastructure developments. Recommendations were made in relation to research and policy and future Thredbo topics.     

Impacts of increased rail infrastructure charges in Sweden

The impacts of the already decided increase in rail infrastructure charges in Sweden are described for various market segments within the rail transport system and on the aggregate level for society as a whole. The need for complementary measures in the road transport system is also discussed. Likewise, the paper also mentions the impact of increased rail infrastructure charges on certain significant industrial sectors. An increase in rail charges may reduce social welfare even though the reduction in rail transport mileage is small. This is mainly due to large non-internalised absolute externalities for road freight. For commuter trains, the infrastructure charges' share of the costs of rail transport is expected to rise to 13 percent, which in an international perspective still will be small.     

Alternative financing for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): The case of Porto Alegre, Brazil

In the 1970s, Brazil was leading the implementation of high-flow bus priority schemes, but now cities are less capable of financing public infrastructures. This paper explores the private sector participation in the provision of transit infrastructure based on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The Porto Alegre BRT contemplates interchange terminals planned to accommodate retail and service activities. It is expected that these areas shall generate enough revenues to remunerate private investors, under a PPP scheme, for the construction of terminals and part of the infrastructure required to upgrade some sections of the existing busways to BRT standards.     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Applications of transport economics and imperfect competition

The great majority of analyses made in transport economics use, explicitly or, more often, implicitly, the common assumption of perfect competition. This is the case, for instance, when infrastructure projects are evaluated using the mere sum of the surpluses of transport users and providers. Even when putting aside the question of externalities such as noise, safety or environmental quality, the real chain of economic interactions that takes place in transport provision or downstream of transport provision is not taken into account. Surely enough, describing and simulating this chain could be quite complex. Nevertheless, it is not uninteresting to try to estimate if it does make a big difference or not to make this approximation. The paper makes such an attempt for two broad kinds of applications of transport economics:     

Workshop 5: Network and system planning

A renewed interest in public transport analysis and development has triggered a debate among policy makers, practitioners and stakeholders regarding technologies, design, pricing, subsidies and contract forms for optimal policy, including social well-being and the financing of public transport reform. Here we present contents and conclusions of workshop 5 of the Thredbo 12 Conference held in Durban, South Africa, where we analysed a series of recent theoretical developments on the links among demand, technology and the design of public transport systems, which we coupled with the examination of several case studies in order to feed the discussion regarding the relations among the strategic, tactical and operational elements that should be considered when designing a public transport policy.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

Future challenges for transport infrastructure pricing in PPP arrangements

In this paper we report the conclusion of a research project dedicated to pricing regimes in public-private partnership contracts for the provision of transport infrastructure (Macário et al., 2009). Several elements have been brought to the bulk of knowledge that supports the design and implementation of public-private partnership in the transport sector. These developments have been achieved in the following domain:

•

Understand difficulties of price setting within the PPP environment, given the potential conflict of interest among the different parties engaged, go beyond the discussion of first best versus second-best price setting mechanisms.

•

Understand the role of government and regulators in the performance of a PPP.

•

Translate the issue of asymmetries of information between parties into a risk taking language.

•

Devise alternative contractual designs that will enable competitive price setting.

•

Understand that a structural element is missing to conciliate the views of the different stakeholders over a PPP: a bridge between infrastructure costs and charges.

The objective of this paper is to overview the main challenges ahead of transport infrastructure pricing, considering the current and likely future policies as well as the field constraints. Moreover, a proposal is formulated to overcome some of the current pitfalls associated to transport infrastructure pricing.     

Environmental innovation and the role of stakeholder collaboration in West Coast port gateways

The paper explores the role of stakeholder collaboration in the adoption of innovations as part of the environmental and sustainability agenda of port gateways. We do this through a comparative assessment of the port of Vancouver, British Columbia, and the twin ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, California. An inductive research approach is used to identify and assess the initiation and implementation process behind exemplary innovations. Innovation includes new technologies and processes for handling and moving cargo, mechanisms for planning and policy making, as well as financing, implementing, upgrading, managing and operating infrastructure systems. A relatively new arena for competition on the basis of innovation concerns environmental performance. The conceptual framework and empirical evidence suggest that while there may be intense demand for and supply of innovation in port gateways, the complex dynamics of the logistics chain are such that successful innovation requires conscious involvement and collaboration of stakeholders.