Competition in multi-modal transport networks: A dynamic approach

We analyze the behavior of market participants in a multi-modal commuter network, where roads are not priced, but public transport has a usage fee, which is set while taking the effects on the roads into account. In particular, we analyze the difference between markets with a monopolistic public transport operator, which operates all public transport links, and markets in which separate operators own each public transport link. To do so, we consider a simple dynamic transport network consisting of two serial segments and two parallel congestible modes of transport. We obtain a reduced form of the public transport operator’s optimal fare setting problem and show that, even if the total travel demand is inelastic, serial Bertrand–Nash competition on the public transport links leads to different fares than a serial monopoly; a result not observed in a static model. This results from the fact that trip timing decisions, and therefore the generalized prices of all commuters, are influenced by all fares in the network. We then use numerical simulations to show that, contrary to the results obtained in classic studies on vertical competition, monopolistic fares are not always lower than duopolistic fares; the opposite can also occur. We also explore how different parameters influence the price differential, and how this affects welfare.     

Private road competition and equilibrium with traffic equilibrium constraints

Toll road competition is one of the important issues under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme, which is being encountered nowadays in many cities. When there are two or more competing firms and each firm operates a competitive toll road, their profits are interrelated due to the competitors' choices and demand inter-dependence in the network. In this paper we develop game-theoretic approaches to the study of the road network, on which multiple toll roads are operated by competitive private firms. The strategic interactions and market equilibria among the private firms are analyzed both in determining their supply (road capacity) and price (toll level) over the network. The toll road competition problems in general traffic equilibrium networks are formulated as an equilibrium program with equilibrium constraints or bi-level variational inequalities. Heuristic solution methods are proposed and their convergences are demonstrated with simple network examples. It is shown that private pricing and competition can be both profitable and welfare-improving.     

Autonomous cars and dynamic bottleneck congestion: The effects on capacity,value of time and preference heterogeneity

‘Autonomous cars’ are cars that can drive themselves without human control. Autonomous cars can safely drive closer together than cars driven by humans, thereby possibly increasing road capacity. By allowing drivers to perform other activities in the vehicle, they may reduce the value of travel time losses (VOT). We investigate the effects of autonomous cars using a dynamic equilibrium model of congestion that captures three main elements: the resulting increase in capacity, the decrease in the VOT for those who acquire one and the implications of the resulting changes in the heterogeneity of VOTs. We do so for three market organizations: private monopoly, perfect competition and public supply. Even though an increased share of autonomous cars raises average capacity, it may hurt existing autonomous car users as those who switch to an autonomous car will impose increased congestion externalities due to their altered departure time behaviour. Depending on which effect dominates, switching to an autonomous vehicle may impose a net negative or positive externality. Often public supply leads to 100% autonomous cars, but it may be optimal to have a mix of car types, especially when there is a net negative externality. With a positive (negative) externality, perfect competition leads to an undersupply (oversupply) of autonomous cars, and a public supplier needs to subsidise (tax) autonomous cars to maximise welfare. A monopolist supplier ignores the capacity effect and adds a mark-up to its price.     

A subadditivity test for the cost function of the principal European railways

The objective of this paper is the comparison of the efficiency levels for a set of European rail companies in monopoly situations with respect to hypothetical duopoly situations. More specifically, the aim is to test whether the operating costs function of such companies is subadditive. A cost function is subadditive when a single firm can produce all relevant output vectors cheaper than two or more firms. In order to do so the test developed by Evans and Heckman (1984) will be used. It was applied for the American phone company Bell System to assess the convenience of separating the management of local and long-distance services. The results indicate that at least for the companies of a greater size, an efficiency increase (as measured by lower costs), would be obtained from the separation of the current companies in two different companies of a lower size. Besides, these efficiency gains are greater when the two new companies specialize their production, either on passenger or on freight traffic.     

Post-entry container port capacity expansion

Port capacity development is a critical strategy for the growth of a new port, as well as for the development of existing ones, when both new and existing ports serve the same hinterland but have different competitive conditions. To study this strategy, we develop a two-stage duopoly model that comprises the pricing and capacity decisions of two heterogeneous players serving an increasing market. We identify the necessary condition for a port to increase its profit through capacity expansion, and characterize the condition when preemptive pricing by the dominant player is neither credible nor effective in preventing the smaller player from gaining market share. We also find the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the capacity expansion game for two ports that have different price sensitivities, as well as different operation and capacity investment costs. We apply the model results to the container port competition between Hong Kong and Shenzhen after Shenzhen port started its container operation in 1991. Our analysis explains the transition of market power from monopoly to duopoly, the fast development of Shenzhen Port, and the possible market structure changes with the continuing increase in demand.     

Impact of congestion charging on the transit market: An inter-modal equilibrium model

An inter-modal equilibrium model links an urban road network subject to a congestion charge to a parallel urban transit market, with a view to finding the optimum congestion charge consistent with the commercial decisions of the transit operator(s). A congestion charge is set to maximise social surplus. Travel behaviour is assumed to conform to elastic-demand user equilibrium traffic assignment. The transit market is assumed to be either a profit maximising monopoly or a profit maximising duopoly competing non-cooperatively. The operator(s) set the fares to maximise profits and the supply of transit services are determined by the resulting demand. The problem has been formulated as a bi-level programme with the determination of the congestion charge on the upper level and the setting of transit fares on the lower level. In the case of non-cooperating operators, the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium fares are sought. The results of the model are analysed for a small example based loosely on Edinburgh. This reveals the importance of competition in the transit market for the trade off between the government, the transit provider(s) and the travellers.     

Pricing and competition in a shipping market with waste shipments and empty container repositioning

In this paper, we study a shipping market with carriers providing services between two locations. Shipments are classified into two categories: goods and waste. Trade imbalance allows low-valued waste to be shipped at bargain rates. If imbalance persists, empty containers must be repositioned from a surplus location to a shortage location. Carriers decide prices, which will affect the demand. We build a monopoly and a duopoly model to find the optimal pricing strategy for carriers. We also analyze how the profit of a carrier is affected by price sensitivity, cost structure and competition intensity.     

Economic analysis of collecting parking fees by a private firm

The purpose of this paper is to show the possibility of a co-existence of public and private parking management systems even when all the parking spaces are owned by the government. This study focuses on the issue of collecting parking fees by a private firm that has been used by some local governments in Taiwan. We assume that the government behaves as a leader and a private firm as a follower in a Stackelberg three-stage game. At stage 1, the government selects its parking space. At stage 2, the government and the firm set their parking fees simultaneously. At the final stage, consumers (drivers) choose the parking lot between the space of the government and that of the firm by considering the full costs, consisting of the parking fee and the searching (with congestion) time cost. The objective of the government is to maximize welfare and that of the firm is to maximize profit. The model is constructed at first and a simulation analysis is then made. The result supports the strategy of adopting the franchise of collecting parking fees if the private firm is more efficient than the government. Moreover, the government may keep fewer parking spaces and release more parking spaces to the firm under the goal of maximizing welfare.     

The effects of non-optimal pricing and investment policies for transportation facilities

A simulation model was used to show the impacts of non-optimal pricing and investment timing policies for a major airport and an urban expressway. It was found that: the losses of economic surplus due to non-optimal pricing and investment policies were relatively small (less than 1% of the net present value of economic surplus for optimal pricing and investment), that marginal cost pricing covers the capital cost of all but the first increment of capacity, that higher user fees will permit the facilities to break even with relatively small losses of economic surplus, that marginal cost pricing has some effect relative to existing pricing policies in delaying the dates new capacity is required and achieving better capacity utilization, and that the shape of the cost function has a substantial impact on the amount of capacity required.     

External costs of intercity truck freight transportation

From a societal perspective, it is desirable for all transportation users to pay their full social (private and external) costs. We estimate four general types of external costs for intercity freight trucking and compare them with the private costs incurred by carriers. Estimated external costs include: accidents (fatalities, injuries, and property damage); emissions (air pollution and greenhouse gases); noise; and unrecovered costs associated with the provision, operation, and maintenance of public facilities. The analysis reveals that external costs are equal to 13.2% of private costs and user fees would need to be increased about threefold to internalize these external costs.     

Private Provision of Highways: Economic Issues

Abstract

This paper reviews issues raised by the use of private firms to finance, build, and/or operate highways—issues including cost of capital, level and structure of tolls, and adaptability to unforeseen changes. The public sector’s apparent advantage in cost of capital is at least partly illusory due to differences in tax liability and constraints on the supply of public capital. The evidence for lower costs of construction or operation by private firms is slim. Private firms are likely to promote more efficient pricing. Effective private road provision depends on well‐structured franchise agreements that allow pricing flexibility, restrain market power, enforce a sound debt structure, promote transparency, and foster other social goals.     

Modeling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge,road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects

Government guarantees are frequently used to attract private investors’ participation into Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) road projects. In this paper, we investigate the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and road capacity by taking perspective of the private investor. The main results are: (1) Minimum traffic guarantee increases toll charge while decreasing road quality. Under a low guarantee level, minimum traffic guarantee has no impact on road capacity. However, it improves road capacity when a high guarantee level is performed. (2) Under minimum revenue guarantee, if the guarantee level is sufficiently high, the optimal toll charge will be sufficiently large, but road quality and road capacity will approach zero. (3) Price compensation guarantee decreases toll charge and increases both road quality and road capacity. This paper further investigates the impact of government guarantees when the contract is auctioned. We find that auction reduces the impact of government guarantees on toll charge while failing to affect the impact of government guarantees on road quality and capacity. Some policy implications are also derived from our model results.     

The economics of parking provision for the morning commute

In this paper, we study the economics of parking provision for the morning commute, where all the parking lots are owned and operated by private operators. The parking capacity allocations, parking fees and access times are considered in a parking market. First we solve the parking market equilibrium without regulatory intervention, revealing four types of competitive equilibrium. Only one of the four types of equilibrium, however, is found to be stable and realistic, and under it each parking area is preferred by the commuters during certain time periods. Compared to the case without parking choice, provision of parking through a competitive market is able to reduce commuters’ travel cost and queuing delay, but it does not necessarily lead to the most desirable market outcome that minimizes social cost or commuter cost. This issue can be addressed through market regulations, such as price-ceiling, capacity-floor or capacity-ceiling, and a quantity tax/subsidy regulation. It is found that both price-ceiling and quantity tax/subsidy regulations can efficiently reduce both the system cost and commuter cost under certain conditions, and help ensure the stability of the parking market. Numerical examples are also provided to illustrate these findings and furthermore, how a price ceiling or a quantity tax/subsidy should be set in a parking market under realistic model parameters.     

Modelling emission control taxes in port areas and port privatization levels in port competition and co-operation sub-games

Using a game theory approach, this paper analyses a situation in which the government imposes a certain emission tax on vessels and port operations for emission control in port areas. Two ports are considered: a purely private port and a landlord (partial public) port. These two ports are in Cournot or Bertrand competition or cooperation with differentiated service. Our model outcomes lead to the following conclusions. First, the optimal private level of port 2 under Cournot and Bertrand competitions varies between fully private and highly public concerned port, while government will prefer a highly public concerned or close to highly public concerned port in the cooperation scenario. Second, government will have to make more and stricter efforts to enhance environmental protection in the situation of port cooperation (monopoly) than in the case of inter-port competition, and all the optimal emission tax should be always lower than the marginal emission damage. Third, port privatization has a non-monotonous effect on ports’ environmental damage in the inter-port competition scenarios and a monotonous decreasing effect in the cooperation scenario. Fourth, the total emission tax revenue is always higher than the overall environmental damage in the cooperative scenario, and it may or may not be able to cover the whole environment damage in Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Finally, the government may face a trade-off among environmental protection, maximizing social welfare, satisfying individual motivation, when considering port cooperation (monopoly).     

E-commerce and traffic congestion: An economic and policy analysis

E-commerce, due to its ability to re-direct consumers from physical stores to online, can potentially alleviate traffic congestion. In this paper, we set up a theoretic model to analyze interactions between a firm’s distribution strategy and traffic congestion. In an unregulated economy, we first characterize the private firm’s optimal strategy concerning e-commerce under the influence of traffic congestion. We then examine a centralized economy where the firm is publicly owned and derive the distribution strategy that maximizes social welfare. Comparing the two cases, we show that the private firm’s incentives may deviate from the socially optimal decisions, which leads to inefficiency. We identify two effects, i.e., monopoly effect and congestion externality effect, which drive the private firm to deviate from the social optimum. Based on our analysis, we propose a differentiated tolls/rebates policy to achieve maximum social welfare. Under such a policy, the firm will not only adopt the socially optimal distribution strategy but offer the socially optimal quantities.     

Relationship between logistics infrastructure and trade: Evidence from Spanish regional exports

Geographical factors and transport infrastructure are two of the key determinants that influence international competitiveness. In this sense, the quality of such infrastructure and how widespread it is, the distribution and capacity of logistics facilities in a country, as well as the number of private operators and their degree of specialisation, all play an increasingly important role in the design of business strategies aimed at increasing a country’s share of the international market. Until recently, however, availability and access to logistics services have been considered secondary factors when defining business competitiveness. This paper estimates an augmented gravity model of trade that specifically includes logistics and transport infrastructure indicators as explanatory variables. The model is estimated by using bilateral exports from 19 Spanish regions to 64 destinations (45 countries and 19 Spanish regions) with data for the period 2003–2007. The findings show that logistics is indeed important for the analysis of trade flows in goods and they highlight the importance of logistics measures at the regional level. In particular, the number, size and quality of logistics facilities positively influence export flows.     

The strategic transportation research study — Its origins and purposes

The highway industry in the United States spends about $35 to $40 billion annually. Management of the industry is almost wholly decentralized. This decentralization plus diminishing fuel tax revenues used to finance road improvements have caused road research efforts to decline to a very low level. Comparisons between funds for highway research and those spent by private firms in similar industries show that private firms spend from 5 to 12 times the rate of highway agencies. The problem of how much to spend on research is difficult both for private-sector and for public-sector enterprises. The level of research spending is shown to correlate well with both profitability and growth in U.S. firms. Four methods used for making research decisions in the private sector are discussed. The goals of the Strategic Transportation Research Study (STRS), which is being conducted by the Transportation Research Board to examine highway and transportation needs, are described.     

Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

Policy analysis of third party electronic coupons for public transit fares

Mobile technologies are generating new business models for urban transport systems, as is evident from recent startups cropping up from the private sector. Public transport systems can make more use of mobile technologies than just for measuring system performance, improving boarding times, or for analyzing travel patterns. A new transaction model is proposed for public transport systems where travelers are allowed to pre-book their fares and trade that demand information to private firms. In this public-private partnership model, fare revenue management is outsourced to third party private firms such as big box retail or large planned events (such as sports stadiums and theme parks), who can issue electronic coupons to travelers to subsidize their fares. This e-coupon pricing model is analyzed using marginal cost theory for the transit service and shown to be quite effective for monopolistic coupon rights, particularly for demand responsive transit systems that feature high cost fares, non-commute travel purposes, and a closed access system with existing pre-booking requirements. However, oligopolistic scenarios analyzed using game theory and network economics suggest that public transport agencies need to take extreme care in planning and implementing such a policy. Otherwise, they risk pushing an equivalent tax on private firms or disrupting the urban economy and real estate values while increasing ridership.     

Evaluating parking reservation policy in urban areas: An environmental perspective

This paper investigates a parking reservation mechanism to reduce car cruising to find parking. To consider the benefits for drivers and parking facility providers, we charge drivers for making reservations in addition to parking fees, by introducing a reservation pricing model that makes reservation prices equivalent to the value of saved search time. By modeling the number of vacant spaces as a stochastic variable, and applying binomial pricing methods, parking reservation prices are obtained. Numerical examples based on the data for two parking facilities in Taiwan are given.