Traffic congestion pricing methodologies and technologies

This paper reviews the methods and technologies for congestion pricing of roads. Congestion tolls can be implemented at scales ranging from individual lanes on single links to national road networks. Tolls can be differentiated by time of day, road type and vehicle characteristics, and even set in real time according to current traffic conditions. Conventional toll booths have largely given way to electronic toll collection technologies. The main technology categories are roadside-only systems employing digital photography, tag & beacon systems that use short-range microwave technology, and in-vehicle-only systems based on either satellite or cellular network communications. The best technology choice depends on the application. The rate at which congestion pricing is implemented, and its ultimate scope, will depend on what technology is used and on what other functions and services it can perform.     

Labour market effects in assessing the costs and benefits of road pricing

Traffic congestion and the policies used to combat it have been studied extensively. One area which has received less attention is the secondary impacts of such policies. This paper uses a micro-simulation framework to study the effect on labour markets of road pricing. The key benefit of our chosen methodology is that it allows a simultaneous consideration of both commuting and migration decisions. We show that while welfare gains can be achieved through optimal charging, this may come at the price of decreased integration. This may manifest through either greater centralisation tendencies in population, or through unemployment disparities between regions.     

Can Hong Kong price-manage its cross-harbor-tunnel congestion?

Hong Kong drivers face daily congestion, especially at the Cross Harbor Tunnel (CHT) whose tolls are substantially lower than those of the drivers’ other two tunnel options: the Eastern Harbor Crossing (EHC) and the Western Harbor Crossing (WHC). In 2013, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government issued a consultation paper, seeking public comments on three toll-change proposals that would raise the CHT’s tolls and lower the EHC’s tolls. The WHC’s tolls would remain unchanged due to its congested connecting roads. Using monthly crossing data available from the HKSAR’s Transport Department for 2000–2012, this paper uses a Generalized Leontief demand system to document that the usage patterns of the three tunnels is price-responsive. Hence, we conclude that the proposed toll changes are likely to be effective in transportation demand management, by shifting a portion of the CHT’s usage to the EHC and WHC, thereby relieving the CHT’s congestion.     

Rewarding rush-hour avoidance: A study of commuters’ travel behavior

Spitsmijden, peak avoidance in Dutch, is the largest systematic effort to date to study, in the field, the potential of rewards as a policy mean for changing commuter behavior. A 13 week field study was organized in The Netherlands with the purpose of longitudinally investigating the impacts of rewards on commuter behavior. Different levels and types of rewards were applied and behavior was tracked with state-of-the art detection equipment. Based on the collected data, which included also pre and post-test measurements, a mixed discrete choice model was estimated. The results suggest that rewards can be effective tools in changing commuting behavior. Specifically rewards reduce the shares of rush-hour driving, shift driving to off-peak times and increase the shares of public transport, cycling and working from home. Mediating factors include socio-demographic characteristics, scheduling constraints and work time flexibility, habitual behavior, attitudes to commuting alternatives, the availability of travel information and even the weather. The success of this study has encouraged adoption of rewards, as additional policy tools, to alleviate congestion, especially during temporary road closures.     

State-dependent congestion pricing with reference-dependent preferences

Demand and capacity fluctuations are common for roads and other congestible facilities. With ongoing advances in pricing technology and ways of communicating information to prospective users, state-dependent congestion pricing is becoming practical. But it is still rare or nonexistent in many potential applications. One explanation is that people dislike uncertainty about how much they will pay. To explore this idea, a model of reference-dependent preferences is developed based on Köszegi and Rabin (2006). Using a facility yields an “intrinsic” utility and a “gain-loss” utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of utility outcomes. Two types of preferences are analyzed: bundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived for overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived separately for the toll and other determinants of utility.Tolls are chosen to maximize total expected utility plus revenues. With bundled preferences the toll is set above the Pigouvian level when usage conditions are good, and below it when conditions are bad, in order to reduce fluctuations in utility. With unbundled preferences the direction of toll adjustment is less clear and depends on whether supply or demand is variable. For both types of preferences tolls are sensitive to the strength of gain-loss utility. If gain-loss utility is moderately strong, a state-independent toll can be optimal.     

Transaction costs and tradable mobility credits

Artificial markets for mobility credits have been proposed as an alternative to conventional congestion pricing schemes. This paper examines the effects of transaction costs on two types of markets: an auction market and a negotiated market. In an auction market, users purchase all of the needed mobility credits through a competitive bidding process. In a negotiated market, the users initially receive certain amount of mobility credits from the government and trade with each other through negotiation to fulfill their needs. We assume that a brokerage service is built in both markets to facilitate transactions and accordingly, the users have to pay a commission fee proportional to the value of trade. The users are also given the option to purchase credits from the government if for some reasons they cannot use or wish to avoid the markets. Our analyses suggest that the auction market can achieve the desired equilibrium allocation of mobility credits as long as the government sets its price properly and the unit transaction cost is lower than the price that the market would reach in absence of transaction costs. However, in the negotiated market, transaction costs could divert the system from the desired equilibrium regardless of their magnitude. More importantly, the initial allocation of mobility credits may affect the final equilibrium even when marginal transaction costs are constant.     

A novel peer-to-peer congestion pricing marketplace enabled by vehicle-automation

This paper proposes a novel concept of congestion pricing based on voluntary peer-to-peer exchange of money between motorists in exchange for one ceding priority to another in a traffic stream. While in the classical congestion charging paradigm payments are compulsory and flow only towards the system operator, in the proposed marketplace participation is voluntary and motorists directly compensate each other. A particular motorist may find that he/she is a ‘payer’ at certain points in a given journey and a ‘payee’ at others.Humans would not be expected to successfully seek, negotiate and execute a continuous series of peer-to-peer trades involving micro-payments while also handling the cognitively-demanding task of driving; real-world implementation will therefore require vehicles operating under fully-automated control in both the longitudinal and lateral dimensions during the time periods that they seek and engage in trades. The automated vehicle control algorithms must be sufficiently intelligent and adaptable to enable alternative maneuvers on short timescales, given the inherent uncertainty of whether or not a potential trade will in fact be executed. The peer-to-peer trading would be executed algorithmically, subject to strategic-level guidance given by a vehicle’s occupant(s) regarding the occupant’s relative valuation of money and priority in the traffic stream.In this paper we detail the prospective marketplace and present a simple simulation model to expose its properties. We show that the proposed peer-to-peer marketplace could lead to both desirable and undesirable outcomes; which of these would be predominant is a matter requiring empirical study. The paper concludes with a discussion of further research needs to refine and develop these concepts into practice.     

The role of attitude structures,direct experience and reframing for the success of congestion pricing

Congestion pricing was introduced in Stockholm in 2006, first as a trial followed by a referendum, and permanently from 2007. Public attitudes to the charges became more negative during the period from the decision to the start of the system. Once the trial started, public attitudes became dramatically more positive over the following years, going from 2/3 against the charges to more than 2/3 in favor of the charges. Self-reported changes in behavior and attitudes considerably underestimate actual changes: about 3/4 of the decrease in car trips and more than half of the change in attitudes seem to have gone unnoticed by respondents, ex post. Self-interest and belief in the charges’ effectiveness strongly affect attitudes at any given point in time, but can only explain a minor part of the change in attitudes. I suggest that the debate and the shift in attitudes can be understood as a public and political reframing of the congestion charges over time.     

Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs

Nonlinear pricing (a form of second-degree price discrimination) is widely used in transportation and other industries but it has been largely overlooked in the road-pricing literature. This paper explores the incentives for a profit-maximizing toll-road operator to adopt some simple nonlinear pricing schemes when there is congestion and collecting tolls is costly. Users are assumed to differ in their demands to use the road. Regardless of the severity of congestion, an access fee is always profitable to implement either as part of a two-part tariff or as an alternative to paying a toll. Use of access fees for profit maximization can increase or decrease welfare relative to usage-only pricing for profit maximization. Hence a ban on access fees could reduce welfare.     

Why experience changes attitudes to congestion pricing: The case of Gothenburg

Many cities have seen public support for congestion charges increase substantially after charges have been introduced. Several alternative explanations of this phenomenon have been suggested, but so far little evidence has been available to assess the relative importance of these explanations. We study attitudes to congestion pricing in Gothenburg before and after congestion charges were introduced in January 2013. Attitudes to the charges did indeed become more positive after the introduction, just as in previous cities. Using a two-wave postal survey, we separate contributions to the attitude change from a number of sources: benefits and costs being different than anticipated, use of hypothecated revenues, reframing processes, and changes in related attitudes such as attitudes to environment, equity, taxation and pricing measures in general. We conclude that the dominant reason for the attitude change is status quo bias, rather than any substantial changes in beliefs or related attitudes, although some of these factors also contribute. Contrary to a common belief, nothing of the attitude change is due to benefits being larger than anticipated.     

An advanced traveler general information system for Fresno,California

This study estimates the effects of an advanced traveler general information system (ATGIS), which includes fuel consumption and health-related emissions cost information on transportation network users’ travel choice behavior for recurrent congestion conditions. The effects are estimated using four different formulations based on four different behavioral assumptions. Incorporating stochastic features in link cost estimation rather than in route choice, we provide a novel modeling approach that enables us to use transportation planning models of major metropolitan areas without a need for major computationally-expensive changes in the existing models. We examined the effects of an ATGIS on the Fresno, CA, road network and found several interesting results. First, the ATGIS impact is closely related to pre-system (prior to the implementation of an ATGIS) perceived fuel and emissions costs. Total travel time in the city can be reduced by 17% (no pre-system perceived costs) to 1% (accurate pre-system perceived costs), and even increased by 1% (higher-than-actual pre-system perceived costs). Second, the addition of emissions costs, although negligible relative to fuel and time costs, can effectively reduce total system-wide travel time by up to 1% and fuel consumption by up to 0.6% during peak hours. Third, the ATGIS can reduce annual social costs by as much as $1053 million (high gas price, no pre-system perception) to $48 million (medium gas price, accurate pre-system perception), which are comparable to social cost savings by a congestion pricing (CP) scheme in the study area.     

Understanding public response to a congestion charge: A random-effects ordered logit approach

Public acceptance is consistently listed as having an enormous impact on the implementation and success of a congestion charge scheme. This paper investigates public acceptance of such a scheme in Australia. Surveys were conducted in Brisbane and Melbourne, the two fastest growing Australian cities. Using an ordered logit modeling approach, the survey data including stated preferences were analyzed to pinpoint the important factors influencing people’s attitudes to a congestion charge and, in turn, to their transport mode choices. To accommodate the nature of, and to account for the resulting heterogeneity of the panel data, random effects were considered in the models. As expected, this study found that the amount of the congestion charge and the financial benefits of implementing it have a significant influence on respondents’ support for the charge and on the likelihood of their taking a bus to city areas. However, respondents’ current primary transport mode for travelling to the city areas has a more pronounced impact. Meanwhile, respondents’ perceptions of the congestion charge’s role in protecting the environment by reducing vehicle emissions, and of the extent to which the charge would mean that they travelled less frequently to the city for shopping or entertainment, also have a significant impact on their level of support for its implementation. We also found and explained notable differences across two cities. Finally, findings from this study have been fully discussed in relation to the literature.     

Just pricing: the distributional effects of congestion pricing and sales taxes

Those who oppose tolls and other forms of road pricing argue that low-income, urban residents will suffer if they must pay to use congested freeways. This contention, however, fails to consider (1) how much low-income residents already pay for transportation in taxes and fees, or (2) how much residents would pay for highway infrastructure under an alternative revenue-generating scheme, such as a sales tax. This paper compares the cost burden of a value-priced road, State Route 91 (SR91) in Orange County, California with the cost burden under Orange County’s local option transportation sales tax, Measure M. We find that although the sales tax spreads the costs of transportation facilities across a large number of people inside and outside Orange County, it redistributes about $3 million (USD) in revenues from less affluent residents to those with higher incomes. The entire Measure M program redistributes an estimated $26 million from low-income residents to the more affluent. Low-income drivers as individuals save substantially if they do not have to pay tolls, but as a group low-income residents, on average, pay more out-of-pocket with sales taxes.

Urban delivery industry response to cordon pricing, time-distance pricing, and carrier-receiver policies in competitive markets

The paper develops a set of analytical formulations to study the behavior of the urban delivery industry in response to cordon time-of-day pricing, time-distance pricing, and comprehensive financial policies targeting carriers and receivers. This is accomplished by modeling the behavior of receivers in response to financial incentives, and the ensuing behavior of the carrier in response to both pricing and the receivers’ decisions concerning off-hour deliveries. The analytical formulations consider both the base case condition, and a mixed operation with both regular hour and off-hour deliveries; two pricing schemes: cordon time of day, and time-distance pricing; two types of operations: single-tour, and multi-tour carriers; and three different scenarios in terms of profitability of the carrier operation, which include an approximation to the best case, the expected value, and the worst case. The analyses, both theoretical and numerical, highlight the limitations of pricing-only approaches. In the case of cordon time of day pricing, the chief conclusion is that it is of limited use as a freight demand management tool because: (1) in a competitive market the cordon toll cannot be transferred to the receivers as it is a fixed cost and (2) the structure of the cost function, that only provides an incentive to the carrier to switch to the off-hours when all the receivers in the tour switch to the off-hours. The analyses of time-distance pricing clearly indicate that, though its tolls could be transferred to the receivers and provide an incentive for behavior change, the magnitude of the expected toll transfers under real life conditions are too small to have any meaningful impact on receivers choice of delivery times. In essence, the key policy implication is that in order to change the joint behavior of carrier and receivers, financial incentives—or programs that foster unassisted off-hour deliveries—should be made available to receivers in exchange for their commitment to do off-hour deliveries. As the paper proves, if a meaningful number of receivers switch to the off-hours, the carriers are likely to follow suit.