Managing with declining resources

Urban public transport has had broad political appeal and escalating financial support since the late 1960s. The preference has been for public ownership and operation of services with only limited private sector involvement in the provision of services in a highly regulated environment. The financial standing of public transport coupled with the likelihood of a sustained period of fiscal restraint, perhaps even a decline in available resources, has created an imperative for change. This paper argues that broad‐based acknowledgment of the financial realities, clear definition of quantifiable objectives and increased authority and control for public transport management is required if public transport agencies are to meet the challenge. A new balance between service, ridership and revenue is required. Managing with declining resources will require a financial planning approach, separation of policy and planning from operations, removal of restrictions on user choice and operator competition and increased involvement of the private sector. Substantial changes in internal organization, procedures and structures and a cost‐effectiveness orientation will be necessary.     

Bottleneck congestion pricing and modal split: Redistribution of toll revenue

The paper examines the question of the redistribution of toll revenue as seen in a bottleneck congestion model. Our objective is to analyse the impact of this redistribution on total cost and on modal split between railroad and road. Following Tabuchi’s two-mode model (Tabuchi, T., 1993. Bottleneck congestion and modal split. Journal of Urban Economics 34, 414-431.), we integrate a redistribution of toll revenue towards public transport into our study. In this context, we investigate two kinds of road toll regimes: a fine toll and a uniform toll. We will consider two types of railroad fare: when it is set equal to the marginal cost and when it is set equal to average cost. These models allow us to show that toll policy to be more efficient as long as toll revenue is directed towards public transport when the railroad fare is equal to average cost.     

Measuring production and consumption efficiencies using the slack‐based measure network data envelopment analysis approach: the case of low‐cost carriers

One of the most important outcomes of the deregulation of air transportation policy is the emergence of low‐cost carriers (LCCs) around the world. Although LCC airlines have been in operation for more than 30 years, not every LCC is successful. In order to reduce the inefficiencies of LCCs, this paper measures the performance of LCCs by using slack‐based measure network data envelopment analysis. This model combines both the production process with input orientation and the consumption process with output orientation into a unified model. Furthermore, envelopment map analysis LCCs are performed to determine the reasons for the LCCs' inefficiency and how improvements can be made. A sample of 16 low‐cost airlines from Europe, the USA, and Asia were selected for operational performance analysis. The results show that the main reason for easyJet's, US Airways', and Virgin Blue's inefficiency is production inefficiency, so these LCCs should reduce their input quantities to increase efficiency. Jet2, Aer Lingus, and JetBlue were, by contrast, found to be consumption inefficient; these LCCs should increase their output quantities in order to enhance performance. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Path-differentiated pricing in congestion mitigation

Instead of charging tolls on individual links, this paper considers doing the same on paths. Path and link tolls are “valid” if they encourage motorists to use routes that collectively lead to a target distribution, e.g., one that minimizes travel delay. Because the numbers of valid link and path tolls are typically infinite, an objective in pricing tolls is to find a set of valid tolls that yields the least revenue to lessen the financial burden on motorists.Path tolls are generally more flexible than link tolls and this paper shows that this flexibility can substantially reduce the financial burden on motorists. Additionally, valid path tolls yielding the least revenue possess characteristics with interesting policy implications. To determine these path tolls, it is natural to formulate the problem as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints. However, this paper also investigates alternative formulations that highlight the problem’s complexity and suggest ways to solve the problem efficiently.     

Road Pricing models with maintenance cost

According to the Federal Highway Administration of the United States, maintenance expenditure takes up more than 25% of road revenue disbursement and this percentage has been increasing gradually. The reason for the increment in maintenance cost is that there lacks incentives for road users to take this cost component into their driving behavior. That is, different classes of vehicles should be levied different levels of congestion tax due to the different degrees of damage on the highway if a road pricing policy is implemented. This paper intends to incorporate this concept into road pricing literature by introducing two types of vehicles. After the analysis of the problem, we find that different types of vehicles should be charged different tolls. The toll includes not only the travel delay cost of one's own vehicle and the other types of vehicles, but also the marginal maintenance cost that is dependent on the traffic flow. A set of numerical examples is provided to demonstrate the theoretical analyses. The result shows that both the welfare and cost coverage rate will increase when the road pricing mechanism takes the maintenance cost factor into account.     

The Channel Tunnel—an ex post economic evaluation

The forecasts underpinning the construction of the Channel Tunnel largely and systematically overestimated the total size and growth of the cross-Channel passenger and freight markets. The share of the cross-Channel markets captured by the Tunnel was accurately predicted. However, this was only achieved through a competitive battle with ferry operators, which resulted in reduced tariffs. The combination of these two factors resulted in revenues much lower than predicted. For completely separate reasons, the construction costs of the Tunnel doubled.The cost benefit appraisal of the Channel Tunnel reveals that overall the British economy would have been better off had the Tunnel never been constructed, as the total resource cost outweighs the benefits generated. Users have gained significantly at the expense of owners (producers). The latter—both ferry operators and the Tunnel operator have incurred substantial losses. The single biggest component of user’s gain has not, as originally expected, been in terms of travel time savings, but due to the transfer from producers. The longer-term evaluation of the project confirms the poor viability of the investment both in financial and cost benefit terms.Eurotunnel has in recent months been the focus of much media attention. In the Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) of April 2004 the shareholders voted to replace the management with a new French-dominated Executive. Project DARE was launched in October 2004, with the aim to address the company’s difficult situation. The developments over the next few months will be critical for Eurotunnel, given the approaching end of the Minimum Usage Charge (MUC) period in November 2006 and the start of the repayment of junior debt from 2007.     

Accelerating the transformation to a low carbon passenger transport system: The role of car purchase taxes,feebates, road taxes and scrappage incentives in the UK

The transition to a low carbon transport world requires a host of demand and supply policies to be developed and deployed. Pricing and taxation of vehicle ownership plays a major role, as it affects purchasing behavior, overall ownership and use of vehicles. There is a lack in robust assessments of the life cycle energy and environmental effects of a number of key car pricing and taxation instruments, including graded purchase taxes, vehicle excise duties and vehicle scrappage incentives. This paper aims to fill this gap by exploring which type of vehicle taxation accelerates fuel, technology and purchasing behavioral transitions the fastest with (i) most tailpipe and life cycle greenhouse gas emissions savings, (ii) potential revenue neutrality for the Treasury and (iii) no adverse effects on car ownership and use.The UK Transport Carbon Model was developed further and used to assess long term scenarios of low carbon fiscal policies and their effects on transport demand, vehicle stock evolution, life cycle greenhouse gas emissions in the UK. The modeling results suggest that policy choice, design and timing can play crucial roles in meeting multiple policy goals. Both CO₂ grading and tightening of CO₂ limits over time are crucial in achieving the transition to low carbon mobility. Of the policy scenarios investigated here the more ambitious and complex car purchase tax and feebate policies are most effective in accelerating low carbon technology uptake, reducing life cycle greenhouse gas emissions and, if designed carefully, can avoid overburdening consumers with ever more taxation whilst ensuring revenue neutrality. Highly graduated road taxes (or VED) can also be successful in reducing emissions; but while they can provide handy revenue streams to governments that could be recycled in accompanying low carbon measures they are likely to face opposition by the driving population and car lobby groups. Scrappage schemes are found to save little carbon and may even increase emissions on a life cycle basis.The main policy implication of this work is that in order to reduce both direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions from transport governments should focus on designing incentive schemes with strong up-front price signals that reward ‘low carbon’ and penalize ‘high carbon’. Policy instruments should also be subject to early scrutiny of the longer term impacts on government revenue and pay attention to the need for flanking policies to boost these revenues and maintain the marginal cost of driving.     

Transit pricing research

Several decades of research on transit pricing have provided clear insights into how riders respond to price changes in both the transit and automobile sectors. For the most part, riders are insensitive to changes in either fare levels, structures, or forms of payments, though this varies considerably among user groups and operating environments. Since riders are approximately twice as sensitive to changes in travel time as they are to changes in fares, a compelling argument can be made for operating more premium quality transit services at higher prices. Such programs could be supplemented by vouchers and concessionary programs to reduce the burden of higher fares on low-income users. Also, cross-elasticity research suggests that higher automobile prices would have a significantly greater affect on ridership than lower fares. Most research on transit fare structures shows that the common practice of flat fares is highly inequitable, penalizing short-distance and off-peak users. Free fare programs have proven quite costly for each new transit user attracted and have rarely lured motorists to transit. Free fares limited to downtowns have been more successful than systemwide free fare programs. While prepayment schemes have met with success in the U.S. and Europe, honor fares have suffered from excessive revenue losses in at least one case in the U.S. Some of the more noteworthy fare policy successes in North America have been Bridgeport's combined pass-fare program, Allentown's deep discounts, Ottawa's major fare reduction and differentiation, and Columbus's substantial midday discount. As paratransit and other new transit alternatives to conventional bus continue to emerge, new, more differentiated fare practices can be expected in the future.     

Managing public transport: Commercial profitability and social service

In the past 20 years emphasis on the social role of public transport has grown as transit has become more subject to the direct intervention and financial support of external authorities. It is rare for the social objectives to be specified in a way which translates clearly into quantifiable targets, and the transit operator is left to tread an ill-defined path between commercial objectives and the wider social requirements. This paper examines the range of objectives of public transport policy, and the difficulties of ensuring maximum efficiency and effectiveness when much of the revenue comes from subsidies and when the goals are poorly specified. It discusses management information and operating strategies in relation both to commercial considerations and to satisfying social objectives. Particular reference is made to the changes which will follow deregulation of stage bus services in the UK.     

Low cost carrier competition and route entry in an emerging but regulated aviation market – The case of China

Although China lags behind other liberalized aviation markets in low cost carrier (LCC) development, its largest LCC, Spring Airlines, has achieved rapid growth in traffic volume and revenue, as well as consistent profitability, since its inauguration in 2005. Our empirical study on the Chinese domestic market suggests that Spring adopts a “cream skimming” strategy to enter high-priced routes, allowing the carrier to achieve both a very high load factor and considerable profitability. Spring’s capacity and market share on individual routes are constrained to low levels, likely due to government regulation and/or a “puppy dog” strategy adopted by the carrier. As a result, Spring is able to achieve fast growth without triggering price wars. To incumbent full service carriers, high speed rail (HSR) services impose much more significant competitive pressure than low cost carriers. Similar to LCCs in developed markets, Spring prefers to serve markets with high traffic volumes out of its operational base in Shanghai. Overall, Spring’s entry decision is not significantly affected by competition, either from full service airlines or HSR services. Our investigation suggests that LCCs have potential to introduce more competition but are yet to be a “game changer” in China. Further deregulation of the domestic market is needed.     

Agent based model for dynamic ridesharing

Dynamic ridesharing involves a service provider that matches potential drivers and passengers with similar itineraries allowing them to travel together and share the costs. Centralized (binary integer programming) and decentralized (dynamic auction-based multi-agent) optimization algorithms are formulated to match passengers and drivers. Numerical experiments on the decentralized approach provides near optimal solutions for single-driver, single-passenger cases with lower computational burden. The decentralized approach is then extended to accommodate both multi-passenger and multi-driver matches. The results indicate higher user cost savings and vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT) savings when allowing multi-passenger rides. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to test the impact of the service provider commission rate on revenue and system reliability. While short term revenue can be maximized at a commission rate of roughly 50% of each trip’s cost, the resulting drop in system reliability would be expected to reduce patronage and revenues in the longer term.     

Policy analysis of third party electronic coupons for public transit fares

Mobile technologies are generating new business models for urban transport systems, as is evident from recent startups cropping up from the private sector. Public transport systems can make more use of mobile technologies than just for measuring system performance, improving boarding times, or for analyzing travel patterns. A new transaction model is proposed for public transport systems where travelers are allowed to pre-book their fares and trade that demand information to private firms. In this public-private partnership model, fare revenue management is outsourced to third party private firms such as big box retail or large planned events (such as sports stadiums and theme parks), who can issue electronic coupons to travelers to subsidize their fares. This e-coupon pricing model is analyzed using marginal cost theory for the transit service and shown to be quite effective for monopolistic coupon rights, particularly for demand responsive transit systems that feature high cost fares, non-commute travel purposes, and a closed access system with existing pre-booking requirements. However, oligopolistic scenarios analyzed using game theory and network economics suggest that public transport agencies need to take extreme care in planning and implementing such a policy. Otherwise, they risk pushing an equivalent tax on private firms or disrupting the urban economy and real estate values while increasing ridership.     

Road pricing with complications

The rationale for congestion charges is that by internalising the marginal external congestion cost, they restore efficiency in the transport market. In the canonical model underlying this view, congestion is a static phenomenon, users are taken to be homogenous, there is no travel time risk, and a highly stylised model of congestion is used. The simple analysis also ignores that real pricing schemes are only rough approximations to ideal systems and that inefficiencies in related markets potentially affect the case for congestion charges. The canonical model tends to understate the marginal external congestion cost because it ignores user heterogeneity and trip timing inefficiencies. With respect to the relevance of interactions between congestion and congestion charges and tax distortions and distributional concerns, recent insights point out that there is no general case for modifying charges for such interactions. Therefore the simple Pigouvian rule remains a good first approximation for the design of road charging systems.     

A note on the distortionary effects of revenue-neutral tolls in a bottleneck congestion game

This note demonstrates how the redistribution of revenue from a Pigouvian policy can distort incentives and handicap the social objectives of the policy by creating a moral hazard problem. Based on the Levinson (2005) game theory model, I develop a three-player bottleneck congestion game that emulates a repeated prisoner’s dilemma and derive efficient tolls. This conceptual game demonstrates the distortionary effects from a revenue-neutral toll policy with lump-sum revenue redistribution and the equity-efficiency tradeoff.     

Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

This paper identifies some implications of the cost of public funds (CF) in public transit subsidization and regulation. Regulation is considered because a monopolistic operator is assumed. A social welfare maximization model is proposed, subject to individual rationality and vehicle capacity constraints. Optimality conditions are provided and a key formula is derived about CF’s role in balancing the need to cover the fixed operation cost through fares on the operator’s side and the effort to maintain the user surplus on the passengers’ side. Major findings from this model’s formulation include: (1) CF determines the extent to which the passengers’ surplus is compromised in order to cover the fixed part of the operating cost, and (2) subsidy is unjustified when CF exceeds the critical shadow price of the financial constraint. Analytical relations are illustrated through numerical examples.     

On a pathway to de-carbonization – A comparison of new passenger car CO2 emission standards and taxation measures in the G20 countries

Considering the role of transport for a 1.5 Degree stabilization pathway and the importance of light-duty vehicle fuel efficiency within that, it is important to understand the key elements of a policy package to shape the energy efficiency of the vehicle fleet. This paper presents an analysis focusing on three types of policy measures: (1) CO₂ emission standards for new vehicles, (2) vehicle taxation directly and indirectly based on CO₂ emission levels, and (3) fuel taxation. The paper compares the policies in the G20 economies and estimates the financial impact of those policies using the example of a Ford Focus vehicle model. This analysis is a contribution to the assessment of the role of the transport sector in global decarbonisation efforts. The findings of this paper show that only an integrated approach of regulatory and fiscal policy measures can yield substantial efficiency gains in the vehicle fleet and can curb vehicle kilometres travelled by individual motorised transport. Using the illustrative example of one vehicle model, the case study analysis shows that isolated measures, e.g. fuel efficiency regulation without corresponding fuel and vehicle taxes only have minor CO₂ emission reduction effects and that policy measures need to be combined in order to achieve substantial emission reduction gains over time. The analysis shows that the highest level of impact is achieved by a combination regulatory and fiscal policies rather than only one policy even if this policy is more aggressive. When estimating the quantitative effect of fuel efficiency standards, vehicle and fuel tax, the analysis shows that substantial gains with regard to CO₂ emission are only achieved at a financial impact level above 500 Euros over a four year period.     

An analytic investigation of optimal bus size

The use of smaller buses offers passengers a better service frequency for a given service capacity, but costs more to operate per seat provided. Within this trade-off there is an optimal bus size which maximises social benefit. A mathematical model is described which can be solved analytically to provide an explicit relationship between optimal bus size and factors such as operating cost, level of demand, and demand elasticities. The model includes: passenger demand varying with the generalised cost of travel according to a constant elasticity; the effect of changes in bus occupancy on average waiting times and on operating speed; the financial constraint that farebox revenue must equal operating cost less subsidy; an allowance for external benefits associated with generated demand, and for the effect of the flow of buses on traffic congestion; and an operating cost increasing linearly with bus size. The optimal size varies with the square root of demand, and with the unit cost to the power of 0.1 to 0.2. It also increases slowly with the proportion of cost covered by subsidy. For typical urban operating conditions in the United Kingdom the optimal size for a monopoly service lies between 55 and 65 seats assuming the observed relationship between cost and size; it is possible that changes in working practices could make smaller buses relatively cheaper to operate, so reducing the optimal size, but it seems unlikely to fall below 40 seats.     

Application of path analysis methodology to transit system maintenance performance

This paper develops a conceptual framework for bus maintenance based on path analysis and applies it to forty-eight bus transit systems. The application determines the total, direct, and indirect effects of the variables identified as having significant causal links with maintenance cost per mile. These variables are identified using the stepwise regression method. The findings are that the wage rate and fleet size increase maintenance cost directly and indirectly. In terms of the standardized regression coefficients, fleet size has been found to be the most important factor affecting maintenance cost per mile, followed by the proportion of articulated buses, the wage rate and local subsidy in that order. The proportion of articulated buses has been found to reduce maintenance cost per mile directly and to increase it indirectly. The indirect path coefficient of the proportion of articulated buses is 0.1794 whereas the direct path coefficient is –0.351. Similarly local subsidy as a proportion of revenue increases maintenance cost per mile directly and reduces it indirectly. The corresponding path coefficients for the direct and indirect effects of local subsidy are 0.2553 and –0.1073. In addition population density and the peak-base ratio are positively and significantly associated with miles between roadcalls. The implications of these findings are briefly examined in this paper. Because the path analysis methodology allows the direct and indirect effects of a causal variable to be determined, it is recommended for policy analysis.     

Efficiency of the public and private bus transport sectors in Sri Lanka

The public and private bus sectors are in direct competition in most bus routes in Sri Lanka. Consequently, Sri Lanka is an ideal location to study their relative efficiencies. Five dimensions of transit performance are analyzed for comparing the relative efficiencies of the two sectors: cost efficiency, labour efficiency, input efficiency, revenue generation and safety. Productivity ratios are utilized for measuring the dimensions of transit performance. The productivity ratios for cost efficiency, labour efficiency in terms of total staff, input efficiency, revenue generation and safety in terms of accidents per bus showed the private bus transport sector to be more efficient than the public bus transport sector.     

Time‐of‐day transit pricing: comparative US and international experiences

Experiences with time‐of‐day transit pricing in the U.S. are reviewed in this article and compared to those in other countries. Emphasis is placed on examining ridership, financial and efficiency impacts associated with time‐of‐day pricing, along with highlighting innovative approaches to implementing fare differentials. American time‐of‐day fare structures have been about evenly split between off‐peak discounts, peak‐period surcharges, and programmes involving differential rates of fare increases between peak and off‐peak hours. Although most American operators introduced time‐of‐day differentials to encourage ridership shifts to the off‐peak period, available evidence suggests that they have been only marginally successful in doing so. Off‐peak users were generally found to be far more fare‐sensitive to discounts than peak passengers were to surcharges. Only in a handful of American cities were significant efficiency and financial benefits from time‐of‐day pricing recorded, though in those few places, they tended to be substantial. The most successful American programmes have been those which collect fares on the basis of bus runs and direction of trips (rather than the exact time) and which aggressively market their programmes under the aegis of ‘bargain fares’. It is concluded that useful lessons can be gained by sharing policy insights from experiments with differential transit pricing in both the US and elsewhere.