Applying SMC pricing in PPPs for the maritime sector

This paper investigates whether Short-run Marginal Cost (SMC) pricing is feasible to implement in seaports and with what type of consequences, e.g. concerning cost coverage. Answering these questions requires an analysis of the cost structure of seaports and especially of seaport calls, as well as of how the division of these costs over the different actors runs. As from the moment that this information becomes available, it can be analysed to what extent SMC pricing can be applied in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) within the seaport sector. Till now, mainly seaport infrastructure is involved, including the seaport entry from the open sea.     

Critical issues in the design of contractual relations for transport infrastructure development

The increasing use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) arrangements in the provision of transport infrastructure seems to be a trend all over the world with a very particular incidence in Europe. The arguments supporting these public decisions are several and their validity varies with the different realities where these instruments are applied. The paper highlights the critical issues around the design and implementation of PPPs in the transportation sector and makes a brief presentation of the rational behind the structure of papers presented in this special issue.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public-private partnerships

The construction and provision of infrastructure services such as transport nowadays is often based on a partnership between three main actors: public sector, private sector and multilateral lenders, under a framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). This type of partnership has been employed in a wide range of projects in the transport sector and in various contexts in developing and developed countries. Given this observation, the objective of this paper is to examine how countries’ economic and political characteristics contribute to the success of PPPs in transport investments. Special focus in the analysis is given to how the perception of corruption and democratic accountability may influence the success of a PPP project in different transport sectors. We examine a database with 856 transport PPP projects using a generalized linear model in the form of a logit model in order to evaluate the transport database covering data from 72 countries, classified in six regions. The study highlights the importance of national experience. Not only does national macroeconomic experience appear to have a relevant role, but so also does its past experience (either positive or negative) of transport PPP projects. An interesting finding from the analysis is the importance of the rest of the world’s perception of a country’s level of corruption and democratic accountability for the final outcome of a PPP project.     

The Indian dry ports sector, pricing policies and opportunities for public-private partnerships

At the time of writing (2010), the world is witnessing the aftermath of the most severe financial sector meltdown in modern economic history caused by the real estate bubble in the United States. Its consequences on the real economy, especially in Europe, are yet to be fathomed, and this of course includes the longer-term impacts on international ocean transportation, ports and the distribution of global production.The economic recession has left the international shipping and port sectors with substantial overcapacity. This has resulted in drastic cost cutting measures on the one hand, and voluntary, often consensual, and coordinated reduction of supply on the other. These measures, together with a noticeable recovery in demand, are gradually leading again to improvement in prices charged by carriers and other transport service providers.In view of the country’s expanse; size of population; and regional inequalities, India’s dry ports (inland cargo consolidation and distribution centres) are seen by the government as a pivot of export-led growth and economic development (Haralambides & Gujar, 2011). Moreover, public and private sectors alike see the coordinated development of dry ports as the only way forward in terms of easing pressures at congested coastal ports, thus improving supply chain efficiency. In spite of this, dry port development and operations are still dominated by the public sector, under prices, capacity, land acquisition policies and other conditions that make private sector participation risky and comparatively unattractive. In order to rationalize dry port capacity and prices, this paper argues in favour of greater devolution through competition-enhancing Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). The paper puts forward recommendations for the necessary legal, regulatory and general economic policy interventions based on international best practice, while keeping Indian specificities in the right perspective.     

Alternative financing for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): The case of Porto Alegre, Brazil

In the 1970s, Brazil was leading the implementation of high-flow bus priority schemes, but now cities are less capable of financing public infrastructures. This paper explores the private sector participation in the provision of transit infrastructure based on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The Porto Alegre BRT contemplates interchange terminals planned to accommodate retail and service activities. It is expected that these areas shall generate enough revenues to remunerate private investors, under a PPP scheme, for the construction of terminals and part of the infrastructure required to upgrade some sections of the existing busways to BRT standards.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

How much can public private partnership really do for urban transport in developing countries?

A few cities in some of the larger developing countries in Latin America and Asia have made increasing use of multi-year concessions or franchises, competitively awarded to private companies, for construction and operation of urban transport infrastructure and for provision of public transport services. In view of the strong prospective growth of developing-country cities with large transport needs, and the rise in the emerging economies of potential new sources of private capital, it is important to see how effective PPP has so far been in this area. The experience is analyzed principally by thorough comparative review of what has actually happened for some of the main users to date: Bogotá, Santiago, São Paulo, Seoul, and several cities in both China and India. Despite delays and mistakes that have been made in development of most of the projects, the overall results, already delivered and in prospect, are very positive and urban public transport is benefiting substantially, with significant side effects on poorer people's access to work and to services, air pollution levels and road accident rates. The widest and most important advantage of the PPP arrangements, as compared with more conventional short-term contracting, is found to be the innovations, technical and managerial, developed, and, in particular, the mutual capacity building of the countries' private and public sectors and their more effective interaction. The experience in the six countries covered suggests that other developing-country cities may be best assisted to develop sound urban transport PPPs more rapidly through provision of help on chosen items among 7 elements that have proved particularly crucial but sometimes weak in the projects reviewed: Civic consultation systems, Land-use/Transport strategic planning, Land/property market management, Monitoring systems, Progressive policies, Economic regulation, and Public institutional framework for PPPs.     

Workshop 3A: Governance,contracting, ownership and competition issues in public transport: Looking up not down

Workshop 3A focussed on matters of institutional design that seem likely to improve public transport outcomes. It started by defining high level outcome goals, as measures of ultimate public transport success, and then identified the major societal issues that public transport systems can help to resolve. These issues were separately defined for Southern African and western settings. The importance of taking an integrated approach to transport, particularly land use/transport integration, was seen as fundamental to goal achievement. Workshop papers provided many and varied examples of this importance, ranging from PPPs for major public transport projects to system design issues and contracting out of services. The Workshop included detailed discussion on paratransit development in Southern Africa, where relationship management is proving to be critical, in-line with much previous Thredbo discussion about the important role of trusting partnerships. Parallels and contrasts were drawn with paratransit in western settings. Competition in passenger rail was also a focus, with some questioning of the benefits of franchising. Discussion concluded by proposing recommendations for policy and research and suggesting agenda items for future Thredbo Conferences.     

The use of PPP's and the profitability rate paradox

Over the past twenty years growth in the use of PPPs for new infrastructures has signalled a significant change which completely redefines the issues of public economics in the field of transport policy. This paper concerns the optimal casting between public sphere and private operators. The analysis is based on relationships linking for each project the subsidy rate, the internal rate of return (IRR) and the additional IRR provided to the operator by subsidies. The need for subsidy appears as an increasing function of this additional IRR. Nevertheless, the gradient of the curve decreases in a marked manner. This concavity has some policy oriented consequences.     

Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs

The development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price.We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce.One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll.In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue.In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project:

−

when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll;

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when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately;

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when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government.

Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing.

Preamble

Most of the theoretical studies devoted to optimising public investment programming and infrastructure pricing have, since the work of Jules Dupuit (1844), focused on the salient issues of the transport sector, even though this work was relevant to all sorts of public infrastructure. The analysis presented in this paper deals with transport economics, but in line with this tradition, is also applicable to any field in which public-funding is combined with commercial revenue. For example, the question of determining how the financing of an opera should be shared between taxpayers and opera-goers raises the same type of issues as the optimal combination of tolls and subsidies for financing a motorway project. This report will be focused on these issues. We shall see that certain precautions are called for in investment programming together with some new thinking on pricing principles.     

Social exclusion: What can public transport offer?

A new workshop on ‘Social exclusion: What can public transport offer?’ was introduced in the Thredbo 10 program. The workshop examined the concept of social exclusion in a transport context, looking briefly at the history and comprehensiveness of the term for social policy in transport. Other concepts, such as well-being and social capital, were determined to be also needed. While important research was reported to the workshop, it was clear that social exclusion was at an early stage of empirical development. Gaps were highlighted, particularly in evaluation and cost-benefit analysis. Examples of service systems designed to address social exclusion were presented at the workshop, revealing the need to better understand governance arrangements. The workshop developed recommendations for future research and policy, particularly emphasising the need to integrate social outcomes with economic and environmental transport policy at the strategic, tactical and operational levels. Finally, ideas for further exploration of social exclusion in Thredbo 11, were outlined.     

The impact of the application of new technology on public transport service provision and the passenger experience: A focus on implementation in Australia

The emergence of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) has been recognised with many initiatives during the last 20 years. In Europe, the “ITS Action Plan” identifies a number of applications as key elements contributing to the efficient co-ordination of the overall transport chain. The context and experience surrounding the recent widespread development of technological tools and ICT platforms to support the emergence of ITS are notable for the way in which they permeate the transport and logistics chain. But a key question remains: to what extent is the public transport sector able to exploit the wider benefits of ITS?     

Transport infrastructure provision and operations: Why should governments choose private–public partnership?

Recent transport sector liberalisation, as well as global economic crisis, is favouring the implementation of transport infrastructure projects through Public–Private Partnerships (PPP). However, there is a debate as to whether PPP schemes are a better option than conventional procurement. To this end, an evaluation framework is proposed, to assess which of these two alternative schemes for transport projects financing is preferable for the public. The proposed framework is complimentary to the Value for Money (VfM) approach and is based on a Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). The first step is the estimation of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) for the case of conventional procurement, dealing with construction, maintenance and operation costs revenues, as well as any costs associated with risks undertaken by the public. As for the PPP case, it includes any payments by the public sector and related risks costs. The MCA is then applied only if the PPP is found preferable for the public sector. The latter considers additional impacts, including among others the social attributes of a particular scheme, job creation, environmental impacts and safety and security aspects. The proposed framework was applied to a pilot Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor infrastructure project in the city of Indore, India, in order to demonstrate its validity. The framework and its application could provide useful guidance when considering PPP for a transport project, since it demonstrates in a transparent way the society's attitude towards this project, something that is critical to its acceptance.     

Comment Some reflections on port competition in the United States and western Europe

'Port competition' is a rather puzzling expression. This paper approaches it literally, searching for precise meanings. In seaports that contain complex and changeable mixtures of public and private enterprise, who competes and why? The answers to these questions are not conclusive but suggestive indications are found in the US, UK and northwestern Europe. Finally, we discuss what seem to be the key influential factors which may impact on the competitiveness of a port.     

OPA 90

The Donaldson Report has been published and we are entitled to ask 'where do we go from here?' The majority of the shipping world, recognizing the international nature of the business moves by consensus such that rules applicable in Europe are also applicable in, say, Asia or South America. By its very nature this method takes time to bring rules into effect. By contrast the United Stated of America takes the unilateral approach to transport regulations and because it is such an important trading nation, particularly with regard to shipping, those wishing to participate in the trade must comply with the U.S. rules. One such example is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) passed just four year ago. The shipping industry in general and the tanker industry in particular has had to adapt if it wishes to trade within the United States' navigable waters, adjoining shorelines, or the exclusive economic zone (200 miles). This paper looks at those sections of the Act that, from the standpoint of the tanker industry, have had the biggest impact when trading to the United States. We therefore look at how OPA 90 addresses the issues of prevention, clean up and who will pay?     

“蜜蜂式”开发边际油田方案及技术

中海油对边际油田开发一直非常重视，尤其近几年在依托开发方面取得了很大进展；目前高油价推动了无依托边际油田的开发，中海油有关单位都积极参与独立开发边际油田的方案和技术研究，推动边际油田的开发。针对上述有关方面的研究进行介绍。     

Port and terminal selection by deep-sea container operators

This paper deals with the importance of port choice and container terminal selection for deep-sea container carriers. The paper focuses on the research question: on what basis do deep-sea container operators select container ports (strategy) and container terminals (financial reasons) in the Hamburg–Le Havre range over others? In answering this research question, three dimensions are addressed in detail: the buying decision characteristics; port choice strategy; and terminal selection. The results show that strategic considerations at company level are important. For port choice the most important criteria from a carrier's perspective are: availability of hinterland connections; reasonable tariffs; and immediacy of consumers (large hinterland). In addition to these criteria, shipping lines attach great value to often neglected factors, such as feeder connectivity, environmental issues and the total portfolio of the port. The study reveals that port selection and terminal selection are not the same with terminal selection criteria mainly depending on: handling speed; handling costs; reliability; and hinterland connections. The analysis also brought forward that the decision making is different per container carrier, per trade and per port type, implying that a one size fits all approach is not relevant.     

Wave and sea level monitoring and prediction in the service module of the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS)

The need for a Global Ocean Observing System Global (GOOS) is now widely appreciated. Parts of GOOS are currently being implemented already. In this paper, written on the request of the joint Scientific and Technical Committee of GOOS, we present some of the scientific issues that need to be addressed for the further development of the Ocean and Marine Meteorology Service module of GOOS. This module is concerned with monitoring and prediction of sea level (both tsunamis and storm surges) and wind driven waves (wind–sea and swell), among other things. For each of these we discuss the current state-of-the-art, indicate what observations are needed and make suggestions for future modelling development.     

Multimodal transport in the new millennium

Consignors of goods in international trade want their containers to move door to door whether by land, sea or air — smoothly, seamlessly and at predictable cost. What they actually get from the law is at best a jerky roller coaster: a series of contracts, one for each mode or stage of the journey, contracts with various people and with liability that varies too. All agree that the law should change but attempts to agree on an entirely new multimodal regime have failed. Recently attempts have been not to start again but to expand an existing and established regime. The latest of these, the UNCITRAL draft, is essentially maritime: it applies to the sea phase but and goes further to apply door to door except when its path is blocked by compulsory unimodal law. Has Venus at last arisen from the waves? And what will happen when Beauty meets the Beast in the form of CMR? This article addresses the problems that will be encountered by an ambitious amphibious instrument of this kind. — problems of integration, of compatibility with local legal culture, and of methodology.