Tradable credit schemes on networks with mixed equilibrium behaviors

This paper analyzes and designs tradable credit schemes on networks with two types of players, namely, a finite number of Cournot–Nash (CN) players and an infinite number of (infinitesimal) Wardrop-equilibrium (WE) players. We first show that there are nonnegative anonymous credit schemes that yield system optimum, when transaction costs are not considered. We then analyze how transaction costs would affect the trading and route-choice behaviors of both CN and WE players, and discuss the equilibrium conditions on the coupled credit market and transportation network in the presence of transaction costs. A variational inequality is formulated to describe the equilibrium and is subsequently applied to a numerical example to assess the impacts of transaction costs on a tradable credit system. As expected, transaction costs reduce the trading volume of credits and change their market price. They also change the way how players respond to credit charges in their route choices and cause efficiency losses to the credit schemes that are previously designed without considering transaction costs. With transaction costs, travel costs of WE players will likely increase while those of CN players may decrease due to their higher adaptability in routing strategies.     

Trading mechanisms for bottleneck permits with multiple purchase opportunities

This paper extends the theory of tradable bottleneck permits system to cases with multiple period markets and designs its implementation mechanism. The multiple period markets can achieve more efficient resource allocation than a single period market when users’ valuations of tradable permits change over time. To implement the multiple period trading markets, we propose an evolutionary mechanism that combines a dynamic auction with a capacity control rule that adjusts a number of permits issued for each market. Then, we prove that the proposed mechanism has the following desirable properties: (i) the dynamic auction is strategy-proof within each period and guarantees that the market choice of each user is optimal under a perfect information assumption of users and (ii) the mechanism maximizes the social surplus in a finite number of iterations. Finally, we show that the proposed mechanism may work well even for an incomplete information case.     

The transaction cost approach to modeling the demand for automobiles

The purchase of an automobile involves significant transaction costs in addition to the purchase price. Therefore, the assumptions implied by static car holding models are invalid. This paper describes a dynamic approach to the modeling of level-of-ownership and auto-type choice, based on a transaction choice model which utilizes information on past car ownership. The cost or disutility of a transaction depends on the attributes of the household and the purchased car, as well as on past car-ownership characteristics. A set of assumptions underlying the incorporation of transaction costs in the model is presented. The paper discusses the econometric implications of omitting the dynamic attributes (i.e., past ownership characteristics). A disaggregate model was estimated, using a choice-based sample consisting of a random sample of households enriched with a sample of households which transacted in the car market during the study period. This sampling method combined with a random choice of a subset of the car alternatives provides for a cost-effective method to estimate a transaction model.     

How to restrain participants opt out in shared parking market? A fair recurrent double auction approach

We propose a fair recurrent double VCG (FRD-VCG) auction mechanism to approach the emerging shared parking management problem. In a given shared parking environment with a parking management platform and a double-side perspective, the proposed mechanism considers how to restrain the potential participants (parking slot demanders and slot suppliers) opt out, which is based on the participants’ priority attributes and are calculated with respect to historic auction records provided by the parking platform. Participants’ fairness bids are then generated combining their priority attributes and their submitted bids (bid price and parking time) with the support of a novel evaluation function, which integrates priority attributes, bid price and parking time into an output value. The parking slot allocation rule and transaction payment rule are further designed to dealing with these issues include winner determination and price setting, respectively. Simulations show advantages of the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism, i.e., comparing with the double VCG (D-VCG) mechanism for the shared parking management problem where priority attributes and evaluation function are not considered, the proposed FRD-VCG mechanism has the potential to persuade participants to remain in the market whilst it improves the market’s retention rate, the parking slot’s utilization rate and the participants’ utilities.     

Market dynamics and indirect network effects in electric vehicle diffusion

The diffusion of electric vehicles (EVs) is studied in a two-sided market framework consisting of EVs on the one side and EV charging stations (EVCSs) on the other. A sequential game is introduced as a model for the interactions between an EVCS investor and EV consumers. A consumer chooses to purchase an EV or a conventional gasoline alternative based on the upfront costs of purchase, the future operating costs, and the availability of charging stations. The investor, on the other hand, maximizes his profit by deciding whether to build charging facilities at a set of potential EVCS sites or to defer his investments.The solution of the sequential game characterizes the EV-EVCS market equilibrium. The market solution is compared with that of a social planner who invests in EVCSs with the goal of maximizing the social welfare. It is shown that the market solution underinvests EVCSs, leading to slower EV diffusion. The effects of subsidies for EV purchase and EVCSs are also considered.     

Serial private infrastructures

This paper investigates private supply of two congestible infrastructures that are serial, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume. Four market structures are analysed: a monopoly and 3 duopolies that differ in how firms interact. It is well known that private supply leads too high usage fees, and that a serial duopoly leads to even higher fees than a monopoly, as firms are monopolists on their sections. But, as this paper finds, a duopoly can also lead to a different capacity rule than the first-best one, and this distortion differs from with two parallel facilities. Finally, four auction formats for the right to build and operate facilities are investigated. With a bid auction, the competition is on how much to pay the government. This auction leads to the same outcome as no auction. An auction on the facility’s capacity leads to an even lower welfare than no auction, as firms set overly large high capacities. Conversely, an auction on the generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome, which they do when the facilities go to one or two winners and both with serial as with parallel facilities.     

Managing network mobility with tradable credits

A system of tradable travel credits is explored in a general network with homogeneous travelers. A social planner is assumed to initially distribute a certain number of travel credits to all eligible travelers, and then there are link-specific charges to travelers using that link. Free trading of credits among travelers is assumed. For a given credit distribution and credit charging scheme, the existence of a unique equilibrium link flow pattern is demonstrated with either fixed or elastic demand. It can be obtained by solving a standard traffic equilibrium model subject to a total credit consumption constraint. The credit price at equilibrium in the trading market is also conditionally unique. The appropriate distribution of credits among travelers and correct selection of link-specific rates is shown to lead to the most desirable network flow patterns in a revenue-neutral manner. Social optimum, Pareto-improving and revenue-neutral, and side-constrained traffic flow patterns are investigated.     

Modeling user adoption of advanced traveler information systems: dynamic evolution and stationary equilibrium

This paper models the growth rate and the saturation market penetration level for advanced traveler information system (ATIS) products/services with heterogeneous drivers. The price of using and the benefit gained from ATIS services are considered two key factors in explaining the growth of adoption of ATIS products. The information benefit is measured as the travel time saving between equipped and unequipped drivers and evaluated by a mixed stochastic and deterministic network equilibrium model. A modified logistic type growth model is adopted to describe the cumulative adoption of ATIS products over years. The final stationary equilibrium level of ATIS market penetration is so determined that the value of the information provided will decline to the point at which no new users will find it advantageous to purchase that service. The endogenous growth and stationary equilibrium model of market penetration of ATIS services is useful for forecasting the growth process and the impacts on the system performance of ATIS.     

The impact of advance purchase deadlines on airline consumers’ search and purchase behaviors

Airlines frequently use advance purchase ticket deadlines to segment consumers. Few empirical studies have investigated how individuals respond to advance purchase deadlines and price uncertainties induced by these deadlines. We model the number of searches (and purchases) for specific search and departure dates using an instrumental variable approach that corrects for price endogeneity. Results show that search and purchase behaviors vary by search day of week, days from departure, lowest offered fares, variation in lowest offered fares across competitors, and market distance. After controlling for the presence of web bots, we find that the number of consumer searches increases just prior to an advance purchase deadline. This increase can be explained by consumers switching their desired departure dates by one or two days to avoid higher fares that occur immediately after an advance purchase deadline has passed. This reallocation of demand has significant practical implications for the airline industry because the majority of revenue management and scheduling decision support systems currently do not incorporate these behaviors.     

Auction-based highway reservation system an agent-based simulation study

Based on previous studies of a highway reservation system, this paper proposed an auction-based implementation, in which the users can bid for the right to use a route during a certain period of time. This paper models the auction system with MATSim using an agent-based simulation technique. The agents adopt their own bidding logic in the auction, and the price converges after around 130 iterations, when the number of users using the reserved highway and the total collected revenue become stable. When the overall demand changes, the collected revenue ranges from 5 to 11 dollars per user, and from 0.7 to 1.5 dollars per mile. The auction system can transfer more consumer surplus to the toll road operators, since it is a personalized tolling mechanism. The users are using the reservation system as insurance of a guaranteed congestion-free travel. The auction-based highway reservation shows great potential as a new traffic management system.     

Managing rush hour travel choices with tradable credit scheme

This paper Analyzes a new tradable credit scheme (TCS) for managing commuters’ travel choices, which seeks to persuade commuters to spread evenly within the rush hour and between primary and alternative routes so that excessive traffic congestion can be alleviated. The scheme defines a peak time window and charges those who use the primary route within that window in the form of mobility credits. Those who avoid the peak-time window, by either traveling outside the peak time window or switching to the alternative route, may be rewarded credits. A market is created such that those who need to pay credits can purchase them from those who acquire them from their rewarding travel choices. A general analytical framework is proposed for a system of two parallel routes. The framework (1) considers a variety of assumptions about commuters’ behavior in response to the discontinuous credit charge introduced at the boundary of the peak-time window, (2) allows modeling congestion effects (or demand elasticity) on the alternative route, and (3) enables both the design of system optimal TCS and the analysis of the efficiency of any given TCS. Our analyses indicate that the proposed TCS not only achieves up to 33% efficiency gains in the base scenario, but also distributes the benefits among all the commuters directly through the credit trading. The results also suggest that very simple TCS schemes could provide substantial efficiency gains for a wide range of scenarios. Such simplicity and robustness are important to practicability of the proposed scheme. Numerical experiments are conducted to examine the sensitivity of TCS designs to various system parameters.     

Collective public-transport tickets and anticipated majority choice: A model of student tickets

In Germany, many universities have student tickets that are bargained for between student representatives and public transport companies, approved by referendum, and mandatory for all students. They allow the use of public transport at no additional cost. I analyze such a scenario in a theoretical model as an example of a flat-rate ticket for public transport which is implemented by majority decision. The mandatory character of the ticket reduces transaction costs like marketing and ticket inspection, reducing the ticket price and thus the students’ commuting expenses. However, there is a countervailing effect. Students face and rationally expect zero marginal monetary commuting costs, so that new students choose a place of residence which is relatively far from the university. This in turn raises the equilibrium ticket price. It may even be the case that students would be better off if such a ticket had never existed. Nonetheless, they always vote for it in referenda, because accepting the high price is optimal given their place of residence. After laying out the model, I analyze an optimal policy, which consists, for example, of subsidizing student dorms at an efficient distance to the city center.     

Geometric matching and spatial pricing in ride-sourcing markets

This paper develops a model to investigate the effects of spatial pricing on ride-sourcing markets. The model is built upon a discrete time geometric matching framework that matches customers with drivers nearby. We demonstrate that a customer may be matched to a distant vehicle when demand surges, yielding an inefficient supply state. We further investigate market equilibrium under spatial pricing assuming a revenue maximizing platform, and find that the platform may resort to relatively higher price to avoid the inefficient supply state if spatial price differentiation is not allowed. Although spatial pricing facilitates market clearing, the platform may still set price more than the efficient level, which compromises the public interest. We then propose a commission rate cap regulation that reaps the flexibility of spatial pricing and can achieve the second best under some homogeneity assumptions.     

The effect of the oil crisis on the growth in the ownership and use of cars

Since the oil crisis of 1973, a number of studies have been made in various countries of the effects of the rise in petrol prices on the level of traffic flow, but rather fewer have attempted to delineate the complex chain of reactions within the car market set off by this impulse. We attempt to do this, using data from the UK.Since 1966 during the prediction stage of the first London Transportation Study it became obvious that low income and high income households had different rates of growth of car ownership, mainly because low income households bought cheap, old cars which vary in quantity and price differently from expensive, new cars. The Greater London Council therefore sponsored a study of car prices by age and size, starting from 1957 annually, and since the oil crisis, evaluated monthly. This has enabled us to examine the strong change in trend that had occurred, with large cars depreciating 15% per annum more than the smallest. The quantities of cars of each size registered each month are available from national statistics and this enables us to say that the previous 1% per annum increase in car size was arrested, with new cars becoming substantially smaller.A model of the car market has been developed which relates on the one hand the price distribution of cars by age, and on the other hand the price. distribution of the stock of cars owned at each household income level. Via the expenditure on car purchase at each household income level and the distribution of the length of time between purchase and resale of cars, a fully dynamic model has been developed to relate expenditure flow and stock. This enables us to test the effect of different trends on the dynamic equilibrium in the car market.The implications of the two trends noted above on the prediction of future car ownership growth are discussed, with the standstill since the oil crisis attributed to petrol prices via the split in household expenditure between purchase and use.     

PPPs — True Financial Costs and Hidden Returns

The cost of using private finance is at the centre of the public private partnerships (PPPs) debate, but until now most works considered only the direct financial costs such as the loan interest rate and the shareholders return on equity and were based on various secondary sources. This paper focuses on seven shadow toll deals closed in Portugal between 1999 and 2002 and reports the financial costs of the PPP model considering also the associated transaction costs and is based on detailed information included in each concession's financial base case. The transaction costs include financial costs such as banking fees, due diligence costs and the impact of all cash distribution traps, such as reserve accounts or minimum-level of debt ratios. The PPP financial costs were then compared with the costs arising from raising public debt through a government or a public agency bond. Our analysis shows that the PPP ‘true' financing costs are, on average, 370 basis points above the cost of raising public debt and that the ‘transaction costs' account for around 40% of that financial premium.     

Projected prevalence of car-sharing in four Asian-Pacific countries in 2030: What the experts think

This paper presents a “big-picture view” for policymakers and related stakeholders regarding the future development of car-sharing services. Car-sharing has the potential to significantly disrupt the personal mobility market. Thus, understanding their market penetration and implications is urgently needed. Previous studies in this domain have predominantly focused on the views, opinions, and preferences of consumers. In this study, we complement the current demand modelling research on car-sharing by applying an expert elicitation and aggregation technique that relies on transport experts’ opinions to investigate the role of car-sharing in the future. Specifically, based on the opinions of mobility suppliers, this research elicits experts’ judgment from across government, industry, and academia to gain insights into the future of car-sharing markets in four countries – Australia, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand. The analysis reveals that, from a mobility supplier’s perspective, energy and vehicle prices will not have a statistically significant impact on the future adoption of car-sharing. The results also show that the more knowledgeable an expert is, the more pessimistic they are about the market penetration of car-sharing in 2016, and the more optimistic they are about the prevalence of car-sharing in 2030.     

Tradable credits scheme and transit investment optimization for a two‐mode traffic network

This paper proposes an optimization model to minimize the “system costs” and guide travelers' behavior by exploring the optimal bus investment and tradable credits scheme design in a bimodal transportation system. Travelers' transport mode choice behavior (car or bus) and the modal equilibrium conditions between these two forms of transport are studied in the tradable credits scheme. Public transport priority is highlighted by charging car travelers credits only. The economies of scale presented by the transit system under the tradable credit scheme are analyzed by comparing the marginal cost and average cost. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the model. Furthermore, the effects of tradable credits schemes on bus investment and travelers' modal choice behavior are explored based on scenario discussions. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Trial and error method for optimal tradable credit schemes: The network case

Recent studies on the new congestion reduction method―tradable credit scheme rely on the full information of speed‐flow relationship, demand function, and generalized cost. As analytical travel demand, functions are difficult to establish in practice. This paper develops a trial and error method for selecting optimal credit schemes for general networks in the absence of demand functions. After each trial of tradable credit scheme, the credit charging scheme and total amount of credits to be distributed are updated by both observed link flows at traffic equilibrium and revealed credit price at market equilibrium. The updating strategy is based on the method of successive averages and its convergence is established theoretically. Our numerical experiments demonstrate that the method of successive averages based trial and error method for tradable credit schemes has a lower convergence speed in comparison with its counterpart for congestion pricing and could be enhanced by exploring more efficient methods that make full use of credit price information. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal tradable carbon permits for road transport: Why, why not and who wins?

Personal road transport sector poses a significant challenge in reducing carbon emissions. This paper evaluates a policy approach known as personal tradable carbon permits to reduce carbon emissions from personal vehicles. The policy is a downstream tradable permit where individuals are allocated carbon emission caps. The policy is qualitatively evaluated in the context of carbon taxes and some upstream tradable permit options. The biggest disadvantage of such a policy is the initial set up costs. Personal tradable permits, however, are more effective than carbon taxes and are also capable of stabilizing the gasoline prices faced by the consumers when the underlying oil prices fluctuate. Since equity effects are often a concern to policy makers, the effect of such personal carbon permits on the distribution of burden is quantified in a partial equilibrium framework for the US population. Different permit allocation strategies are investigated in this regard. Using US consumer expenditure survey data, and incorporating a differentiated price response for different households, we find that all three allocation strategies considered are progressive: a per adult based allocation is the most progressive, a per vehicle allocation nearer to proportional, and a per capita allocation in between the two. Personal tradable permits therefore take care of equity concerns directly through the design of the policy.     

Roads in transition: Integrated modeling of a manufacturer-traveler-infrastructure system in a mixed autonomous/human driving environment

This paper develops an integrated model to characterize the market penetration of autonomous vehicles (AVs) in urban transportation networks. The model explicitly accounts for the interplay among the AV manufacturer, travelers with heterogeneous values of travel time (VOTT), and road infrastructure capacity. By making in-vehicle time use more leisurely or productive, AVs reduce travelers’ VOTT. In addition, AVs can move closer together than human-driven vehicles because of shorter safe reaction time, which leads to increased road capacity. On the other hand, the use of AV technologies means added manufacturing cost and higher price. Thus, traveler adoption of AVs will trade VOTT savings with additional out-of-pocket cost. The model is structured as a leader (AV manufacturer)-follower (traveler) game. Given the cost of producing AVs, the AV manufacturer sets AV price to maximize profit while anticipating AV market penetration. Given an AV price, the vehicle and routing choice of heterogeneous travelers are modeled by combining a multinomial logit model with multi-modal multi-class user equilibrium (UE). The overall problem is formulated as a mathematical program with complementarity constraints (MPCC), which is challenging to solve. We propose a solution approach based on piecewise linearization of the MPCC as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP) and solving the MILP to global optimality. Non-uniform distribution of breakpoints that delimit piecewise intervals and feasibility-based domain reduction are further employed to reduce the approximation error brought by linearization. The model is implemented in a simplified Singapore network with extensive sensitivity analyses and the Sioux Falls network. Computational results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of the solution approach and yield valuable insights about transportation system performance in a mixed autonomous/human driving environment.