Airport congestion pricing and passenger types

We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.     

Traffic congestion pricing methodologies and technologies

This paper reviews the methods and technologies for congestion pricing of roads. Congestion tolls can be implemented at scales ranging from individual lanes on single links to national road networks. Tolls can be differentiated by time of day, road type and vehicle characteristics, and even set in real time according to current traffic conditions. Conventional toll booths have largely given way to electronic toll collection technologies. The main technology categories are roadside-only systems employing digital photography, tag & beacon systems that use short-range microwave technology, and in-vehicle-only systems based on either satellite or cellular network communications. The best technology choice depends on the application. The rate at which congestion pricing is implemented, and its ultimate scope, will depend on what technology is used and on what other functions and services it can perform.     

Dynamic Stackelberg equilibrium congestion pricing

This paper considers the problem of dynamic congestion pricing that determines optimal time-varying tolls for a pre-specified subset of arcs with bottleneck on a congested general traffic network. A two-person nonzero-sum dynamic Stackelberg game model is formulated with the assumption that the underlying information structure is open loop. Characteristics of the Stackelberg equilibrium solution are analyzed. The Hooke–Jeeves algorithm that obviates an evaluation of the gradient vector of the objective function is presented with a numerical example. The paper concludes with its future extensions.     

State-dependent congestion pricing with reference-dependent preferences

Demand and capacity fluctuations are common for roads and other congestible facilities. With ongoing advances in pricing technology and ways of communicating information to prospective users, state-dependent congestion pricing is becoming practical. But it is still rare or nonexistent in many potential applications. One explanation is that people dislike uncertainty about how much they will pay. To explore this idea, a model of reference-dependent preferences is developed based on Köszegi and Rabin (2006). Using a facility yields an “intrinsic” utility and a “gain-loss” utility measured relative to the probability distribution over states of utility outcomes. Two types of preferences are analyzed: bundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived for overall utility, and unbundled preferences in which gains and losses are perceived separately for the toll and other determinants of utility.Tolls are chosen to maximize total expected utility plus revenues. With bundled preferences the toll is set above the Pigouvian level when usage conditions are good, and below it when conditions are bad, in order to reduce fluctuations in utility. With unbundled preferences the direction of toll adjustment is less clear and depends on whether supply or demand is variable. For both types of preferences tolls are sensitive to the strength of gain-loss utility. If gain-loss utility is moderately strong, a state-independent toll can be optimal.     

Using the revenues from congestion pricing

The economic theory behind congestion pricing relies on using the revenues to help compensate highway users. But can practical methods of using revenues come close to achieving this compensation, and still have salient appeal to important political groups? This paper investigates the possibilities for designing a package of revenue uses that can achieve these twin goals. The suggested approach returns two-thirds of the revenues to travelers through travel allowances and tax reductions, and uses the rest to improve transportation throughout the area, including affected business centers. By replacing regressive sales and fuel taxes, this approach offsets the tendency of the prices alone to have a regressive distributional impact. By lowering taxes, funding new highways, improving transit, and upgrading business centers, the package provides inducements for support from several key interest groups. The potential amounts of money involved are discussed using nationwide data, and in more detail using a case study of ubiquitous facility pricing throughout the Los Angeles region. Illustrative calculations of the effects on various individuals confirm that such a package can create net benefits for a wide spectrum of people and interest groups.     

Just pricing: the distributional effects of congestion pricing and sales taxes

Those who oppose tolls and other forms of road pricing argue that low-income, urban residents will suffer if they must pay to use congested freeways. This contention, however, fails to consider (1) how much low-income residents already pay for transportation in taxes and fees, or (2) how much residents would pay for highway infrastructure under an alternative revenue-generating scheme, such as a sales tax. This paper compares the cost burden of a value-priced road, State Route 91 (SR91) in Orange County, California with the cost burden under Orange County’s local option transportation sales tax, Measure M. We find that although the sales tax spreads the costs of transportation facilities across a large number of people inside and outside Orange County, it redistributes about $3 million (USD) in revenues from less affluent residents to those with higher incomes. The entire Measure M program redistributes an estimated $26 million from low-income residents to the more affluent. Low-income drivers as individuals save substantially if they do not have to pay tolls, but as a group low-income residents, on average, pay more out-of-pocket with sales taxes.

Integrating congestion pricing,transit subsidies and mode choice

We model and analyze optimal (welfare maximizing) prices and design of transport services in a bimodal context. Car congestion and transit design are simultaneously introduced and consumers choose based on the full price they perceive. The optimization variables are the congestion toll, the transit fare (and hence the level of subsidies) and transit frequency. We obtain six main results: (i) the optimal car-transit split is generally different from the total cost minimizing one; (ii) optimal congestion and transit price are interdependent and have an optimal frequency attached; (iii) the optimal money price difference together with the optimal frequency yield the optimal modal split; (iv) if this modal split is used in traditional stand-alone formulations – where each mode is priced independently–resulting congestion tolls and transit subsidies and fares are consistent with the optimal money price difference; (v) self-financing of the transport sector is feasible; and (vi) investment in car infrastructure induces an increase in generalized cost for all public transport users.     

Introducing congestion pricing on a new toll road

This paper proposes a demonstration project to test the effectiveness of congestion pricing in an urban area. It reviews the general theoretical case for such pricing and summarizes recent international interest in congestion pricing. Next, it sets forth the reasons why demonstration projects are needed, both to add to our knowledge about how effective congestion pricing may prove to be, and to address political and other public-acceptance barriers to implementation of the concept. The paper then defines a specific proposed test site for congestion pricing: a new toll road being planned for Orange County, California. It is proposed that instead of charging flat-rate tolls, the transportation agency could charge peak and off-peak tolls, increasing the level of the peak charge each year over a period of up to 10 years unless or until toll revenues decline below the levels forecast under the flat-rate toll alternative. Measurements of traffic flow and ride-sharing behavior would be made, as well as calculations of emission-reduction effects. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of marketing and political considerations involved in conducting such a demonstration.Abbreviations ARB Air Resources Board - AVI Automatic Vehicle Identification - CDMG Corridor Design Management Group - HOV High-occupancy vehicle - SJHTC San Joaquin Hills Transportation Corridor - TCA Transportation Corridor Agency - VMT Vehicle miles traveled     

Quantifying the benefit of responsive pricing and travel information in the stochastic congestion pricing problem

This paper is concerned with roadway pricing amidst the uncertainty which characterizes long-term transportation planning. Uncertainty is considered both on the supply-side (e.g., the effect of incidents on habitual route choice behavior) and on the demand-side (e.g., due to prediction errors in demand forecasting). The framework developed in this paper also allows the benefits of real-time travel information to be compared directly against the benefits of responsive pricing, allowing planning agencies to identify the value of these policy options or contract terms in publicly-operated toll roads. Specifically, six scenarios reflect different combinations of policy options, and correspond to different solution methods for optimal tolls. Demonstrations are provided on both the Sioux falls and Anaheim networks. Results indicate that providing information to drivers implemented alongside responsive tolling may reduce expected total system travel time by over 9%, though more than 8% of the improvement is due to providing information, with the remaining 1% improvement gained from responsive tolling.     

Pareto-improving congestion pricing and revenue refunding with multiple user classes

This study investigates Pareto-improving congestion pricing and revenue refunding schemes in general transportation networks, which make every road user better off as compared with the situation without congestion pricing. We consider user heterogeneity in value of time (VOT) by adopting a multiclass user model with fixed origin–destination (OD) demands. We first prove that an OD and class-based Pareto-improving refunding scheme exists if and only if the total system monetary travel disutility is reduced. In view of the practical difficulty in identifying individual user’s VOT, we further investigate class-anonymous refunding schemes that give the same amount of refund to all user classes traveling between the same OD pair regardless of their VOTs. We establish a sufficient condition for the existence of such OD-specific but class-anonymous Pareto-improving refunding schemes, which needs information only on the average toll paid and average travel time for trips between each OD pair.     

Evaluating commuter opinion of congestion pricing in metropolitan Seattle

Continued growth and development in the Puget Sound region combined with existing geographic limitations have resulted in a transportation network that is at or near capacity for many hours during every weekday. Single‐occupancy vehicles (SOVs) remain the predominant mode of travel, despite a network of high‐occupancy vehicle lanes and regional transit. Given this situation, considering alternative methods to regulate traffic flow is necessary, and the implementation of a regional congestion pricing system is one such option. Although widespread throughout the world, congestion pricing has only recently been implemented in the United States.     

A novel peer-to-peer congestion pricing marketplace enabled by vehicle-automation

This paper proposes a novel concept of congestion pricing based on voluntary peer-to-peer exchange of money between motorists in exchange for one ceding priority to another in a traffic stream. While in the classical congestion charging paradigm payments are compulsory and flow only towards the system operator, in the proposed marketplace participation is voluntary and motorists directly compensate each other. A particular motorist may find that he/she is a ‘payer’ at certain points in a given journey and a ‘payee’ at others.Humans would not be expected to successfully seek, negotiate and execute a continuous series of peer-to-peer trades involving micro-payments while also handling the cognitively-demanding task of driving; real-world implementation will therefore require vehicles operating under fully-automated control in both the longitudinal and lateral dimensions during the time periods that they seek and engage in trades. The automated vehicle control algorithms must be sufficiently intelligent and adaptable to enable alternative maneuvers on short timescales, given the inherent uncertainty of whether or not a potential trade will in fact be executed. The peer-to-peer trading would be executed algorithmically, subject to strategic-level guidance given by a vehicle’s occupant(s) regarding the occupant’s relative valuation of money and priority in the traffic stream.In this paper we detail the prospective marketplace and present a simple simulation model to expose its properties. We show that the proposed peer-to-peer marketplace could lead to both desirable and undesirable outcomes; which of these would be predominant is a matter requiring empirical study. The paper concludes with a discussion of further research needs to refine and develop these concepts into practice.     

An assessment of the political acceptability of congestion pricing

There is renewed interest in implementing congestion pricing in metropolitan areas throughout the US. This paper reviews changes in the transportation policy environment that have led to this renewed interest and identifies the major interest groups that support congestion pricing. A case study is used to demonstrate that significant barriers to congestion pricing implementation continue to exist. The paper concludes with some suggestions for developing politically acceptable pricing alternatives.     

Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs

Nonlinear pricing (a form of second-degree price discrimination) is widely used in transportation and other industries but it has been largely overlooked in the road-pricing literature. This paper explores the incentives for a profit-maximizing toll-road operator to adopt some simple nonlinear pricing schemes when there is congestion and collecting tolls is costly. Users are assumed to differ in their demands to use the road. Regardless of the severity of congestion, an access fee is always profitable to implement either as part of a two-part tariff or as an alternative to paying a toll. Use of access fees for profit maximization can increase or decrease welfare relative to usage-only pricing for profit maximization. Hence a ban on access fees could reduce welfare.     

Bottleneck congestion pricing and modal split: Redistribution of toll revenue

The paper examines the question of the redistribution of toll revenue as seen in a bottleneck congestion model. Our objective is to analyse the impact of this redistribution on total cost and on modal split between railroad and road. Following Tabuchi’s two-mode model (Tabuchi, T., 1993. Bottleneck congestion and modal split. Journal of Urban Economics 34, 414-431.), we integrate a redistribution of toll revenue towards public transport into our study. In this context, we investigate two kinds of road toll regimes: a fine toll and a uniform toll. We will consider two types of railroad fare: when it is set equal to the marginal cost and when it is set equal to average cost. These models allow us to show that toll policy to be more efficient as long as toll revenue is directed towards public transport when the railroad fare is equal to average cost.     

Anticipating new-highway impacts: Opportunities for welfare analysis and credit-based congestion pricing

Pricing of roadways opens doors for infrastructure financing, and congestion pricing seeks to address inefficiencies in roadway operations. This paper emphasizes the revenue-generation opportunities and welfare impacts of flat-tolling schemes, standard congestion pricing, and credit-based congestion pricing policies. While most roadway investment decisions focus on travel time savings for existing trips, this work turns to logsum differences (which quantify changes in consumer surplus) for nested logit specifications across two traveler types, two destinations, three modes and three times of day, in order to arrive at welfare- and revenue-maximizing solutions. This behavioral specification is quite flexible, and facilitates benefit-cost calculations (as well as equity analysis), as demonstrated in this paper.The various cases examined suggest significant opportunities for financing new roadway investment while addressing congestion and equity issues, with net gains for both traveler types. Application results illustrate how, even after roadway construction and maintenance costs are covered, receipts may remain to distribute to eligible travelers so that typical travelers can be made better off than if a new, non-tolled road had been constructed. Moreover, tolling both routes (new and old) results in substantially shorter payback periods (5 versus 20 years) and higher welfare outcomes (in the case of welfare-maximizing tolls with credit distributions to all travelers). The tools and techniques highlighted here illustrate practical methods for identifying welfare-enhancing and cost-recovering investment opportunities, while recognizing multiple user classes and appropriate demand elasticity across times of day, destinations, modes and routes.     

Why experience changes attitudes to congestion pricing: The case of Gothenburg

Many cities have seen public support for congestion charges increase substantially after charges have been introduced. Several alternative explanations of this phenomenon have been suggested, but so far little evidence has been available to assess the relative importance of these explanations. We study attitudes to congestion pricing in Gothenburg before and after congestion charges were introduced in January 2013. Attitudes to the charges did indeed become more positive after the introduction, just as in previous cities. Using a two-wave postal survey, we separate contributions to the attitude change from a number of sources: benefits and costs being different than anticipated, use of hypothecated revenues, reframing processes, and changes in related attitudes such as attitudes to environment, equity, taxation and pricing measures in general. We conclude that the dominant reason for the attitude change is status quo bias, rather than any substantial changes in beliefs or related attitudes, although some of these factors also contribute. Contrary to a common belief, nothing of the attitude change is due to benefits being larger than anticipated.     

Trial-and-error method for congestion pricing scheme under side-constrained probit-based stochastic user equilibrium conditions

A toll pattern that can restrict link flows on the tolled links to some predetermined thresholds is named as effective toll solution, which can be theoretically obtained by solving a side-constraint traffic assignment problem. Considering the practical implementation, this paper investigates availability of an engineering-oriented trial-and-error method for the effective toll pattern of cordon-based congestion pricing scheme, under side-constrained probit-based stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) conditions. The trial-and-error method merely requires the observed traffic counts on each entry of the cordon. A minimization model for the side-constrained probit-based SUE problem with elastic demand is first proposed and it is shown that the effective toll solution equals to the product of value of time and optimal Lagrangian multipliers with respect to the side constraints. Then, employing the Lagrangian dual formulation of the minimization method, this paper has built a convergent trial-and-error method. The trial-and-error method is finally tested by a numerical example developed from the cordon-based congestion pricing scheme in Singapore.     

Minimal-revenue congestion pricing Part II: An efficient algorithm for the general case

The second of a two-part series, this paper derives an efficient solution to the minimal-revenue tolls problem. As introduced in Part I, this problem can be defined as follows: Assuming each trip uses only a path whose generalized cost is smallest, find a set of arc tolls that simultaneously minimizes both average travel time and out-of-pocket cost. As a point of departure, this paper first re-solves the single-origin problem of Part I, modeling it as a linear program. Then with a change of variable, it transforms the LP's dual into a simple longest-path problem on an acyclic network. The multiple-origin problem – where one toll for each arc applies to all origins – solves analogously. In this case, however, the dual becomes an elementary linear multi-commodity max-cost flow problem with an easy bundling constraint and infinite arc capacities. After a minor reformulation that simplifies the model's input to better accommodate output from common traffic assignment software, a solution algorithm is exemplified with a numerical example.     

Impact analysis of cordon-based congestion pricing on mode-split for a bimodal transportation network

This paper investigates the impact of cordon-based congestion pricing scheme on the mode-split of a bimodal transportation network with auto and rail travel modes. For any given toll-charge pattern, its impact on the mode-split can be estimated by solving a combined mode-split and traffic-assignment problem. Using a binary logit model for the mode-split, the combined problem is converted into a traffic-assignment problem with elastic demand. Probit-based stochastic user equilibrium (SUE) principle is adopted for this traffic-assignment problem, and a continuously distributed value of time (VOT) is assumed to convert the toll charges and transit fares into time-units. This combined mode-split and traffic-assignment problem is then formulated as a fixed-point model, which can be solved by a convergent Cost Averaging method. The combined mode-split and traffic-assignment problem is then used to analyze a multimodal toll design problem for cordon-based congestion pricing scheme, with the aim of increasing the mode-share of public transport system to a targeted level. Taking the fixed-point model as a constraint, the multimodal toll design problem is thus formulated as a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) model. A genetic algorithm (GA) is employed to solve this MPEC model, which is then numerical validated by a network example.