Critical issues in the design of contractual relations for transport infrastructure development

The increasing use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) arrangements in the provision of transport infrastructure seems to be a trend all over the world with a very particular incidence in Europe. The arguments supporting these public decisions are several and their validity varies with the different realities where these instruments are applied. The paper highlights the critical issues around the design and implementation of PPPs in the transportation sector and makes a brief presentation of the rational behind the structure of papers presented in this special issue.     

Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public-private partnerships

The construction and provision of infrastructure services such as transport nowadays is often based on a partnership between three main actors: public sector, private sector and multilateral lenders, under a framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). This type of partnership has been employed in a wide range of projects in the transport sector and in various contexts in developing and developed countries. Given this observation, the objective of this paper is to examine how countries’ economic and political characteristics contribute to the success of PPPs in transport investments. Special focus in the analysis is given to how the perception of corruption and democratic accountability may influence the success of a PPP project in different transport sectors. We examine a database with 856 transport PPP projects using a generalized linear model in the form of a logit model in order to evaluate the transport database covering data from 72 countries, classified in six regions. The study highlights the importance of national experience. Not only does national macroeconomic experience appear to have a relevant role, but so also does its past experience (either positive or negative) of transport PPP projects. An interesting finding from the analysis is the importance of the rest of the world’s perception of a country’s level of corruption and democratic accountability for the final outcome of a PPP project.     

How much can public private partnership really do for urban transport in developing countries?

A few cities in some of the larger developing countries in Latin America and Asia have made increasing use of multi-year concessions or franchises, competitively awarded to private companies, for construction and operation of urban transport infrastructure and for provision of public transport services. In view of the strong prospective growth of developing-country cities with large transport needs, and the rise in the emerging economies of potential new sources of private capital, it is important to see how effective PPP has so far been in this area. The experience is analyzed principally by thorough comparative review of what has actually happened for some of the main users to date: Bogotá, Santiago, São Paulo, Seoul, and several cities in both China and India. Despite delays and mistakes that have been made in development of most of the projects, the overall results, already delivered and in prospect, are very positive and urban public transport is benefiting substantially, with significant side effects on poorer people's access to work and to services, air pollution levels and road accident rates. The widest and most important advantage of the PPP arrangements, as compared with more conventional short-term contracting, is found to be the innovations, technical and managerial, developed, and, in particular, the mutual capacity building of the countries' private and public sectors and their more effective interaction. The experience in the six countries covered suggests that other developing-country cities may be best assisted to develop sound urban transport PPPs more rapidly through provision of help on chosen items among 7 elements that have proved particularly crucial but sometimes weak in the projects reviewed: Civic consultation systems, Land-use/Transport strategic planning, Land/property market management, Monitoring systems, Progressive policies, Economic regulation, and Public institutional framework for PPPs.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

Tips and Pitfalls in PPP design

The Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) procedure is a very appealing model, but as it becomes more and more used in practice, problems and failures have been observed in the management of many projects. Many of these unfortunate experiences are consequences of errors in the implementation of the procedure, but in other cases, clear errors of conception were the cause.Indeed, there are many ways to structure a PPP and PPP is not the only way to manage an infrastructure scheme. It is thus an important task to provide guidelines on whether to use PPP or other types of procurement and, in case a PPP is preferred, on how to design it. The aim of this chapter is to contribute to this task, trying to combine theoretical knowledge and practical experience.After a review of the variety of economic characteristics of transport infrastructure and their procurement conditions, we recall the reasons that may justify this association of public and private management which is the characteristic of PPP, outlining the limits of using pure private or pure public procurement. Then an analytic process is proposed, screening the parameters which matter most for choosing the PPP procedure among many possible ones, depending on the specificities of the various transport modes. This process gives also indications on key elements for implementing a PPP.Finally, the analytic process proposed is used for a generic analysis of, respectively, the motorways and port sectors, so as to test its practicability and customizing capability for the use of public authorities.     

Transport infrastructure provision and operations: Why should governments choose private–public partnership?

Recent transport sector liberalisation, as well as global economic crisis, is favouring the implementation of transport infrastructure projects through Public–Private Partnerships (PPP). However, there is a debate as to whether PPP schemes are a better option than conventional procurement. To this end, an evaluation framework is proposed, to assess which of these two alternative schemes for transport projects financing is preferable for the public. The proposed framework is complimentary to the Value for Money (VfM) approach and is based on a Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). The first step is the estimation of the Public Sector Comparator (PSC) for the case of conventional procurement, dealing with construction, maintenance and operation costs revenues, as well as any costs associated with risks undertaken by the public. As for the PPP case, it includes any payments by the public sector and related risks costs. The MCA is then applied only if the PPP is found preferable for the public sector. The latter considers additional impacts, including among others the social attributes of a particular scheme, job creation, environmental impacts and safety and security aspects. The proposed framework was applied to a pilot Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridor infrastructure project in the city of Indore, India, in order to demonstrate its validity. The framework and its application could provide useful guidance when considering PPP for a transport project, since it demonstrates in a transparent way the society's attitude towards this project, something that is critical to its acceptance.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Alternative financing for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT): The case of Porto Alegre, Brazil

In the 1970s, Brazil was leading the implementation of high-flow bus priority schemes, but now cities are less capable of financing public infrastructures. This paper explores the private sector participation in the provision of transit infrastructure based on Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) for Bus Rapid Transit (BRT). The Porto Alegre BRT contemplates interchange terminals planned to accommodate retail and service activities. It is expected that these areas shall generate enough revenues to remunerate private investors, under a PPP scheme, for the construction of terminals and part of the infrastructure required to upgrade some sections of the existing busways to BRT standards.     

The use of PPP's and the profitability rate paradox

Over the past twenty years growth in the use of PPPs for new infrastructures has signalled a significant change which completely redefines the issues of public economics in the field of transport policy. This paper concerns the optimal casting between public sphere and private operators. The analysis is based on relationships linking for each project the subsidy rate, the internal rate of return (IRR) and the additional IRR provided to the operator by subsidies. The need for subsidy appears as an increasing function of this additional IRR. Nevertheless, the gradient of the curve decreases in a marked manner. This concavity has some policy oriented consequences.     

A simulation approach for estimating value at risk in transportation infrastructure investment decisions

Traditional economic analysis techniques used in the assessment of Public Private Partnership (PPP) projects are based upon the assumption that future cash flows are fully deterministic in nature and are not designed to account for risks involved in the assessment of future returns. In reality, many of these infrastructure projects are associated with significant risks stemming from the lack of knowledge about future cost and benefit streams. The fundamental premise of the PPP concept is to efficiently allocate risks between the public and the private partner. The return based on deterministic analysis may not depict a true picture of future economic outcomes of a PPP project for the multiple agencies involved. This deficiency underscores the importance of risk-based economic analysis for such projects. In this paper, the authors present the concept of Value-at-Risk (VaR) as a measure of effectiveness (MOE) to assess the risk share for the public and private entity in a PPP project. Bootstrap simulation is used to generate the risk profile savings in vehicle operating cost, and in travel time resulting from demand-responsive traffic. The VaR for Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is determined for public and private entity. The methodology is applied to a case study involving such a joint venture in India, the Mumbai Pune Expressway/National Highway 4 (MPEW/NH4), and fiscal implications from the perspective of the public and the private entities are examined. A comparison between deterministic and risk based economic analysis for MPEW/NH4 is presented. Risk analysis provides insightful results on the economic and financial implications from each participant's viewpoint.     

Questioning the need for full amortization in PPP contracts for transport Infrastructure

PPP contracts most often have durations of between 20 and 35 years, but in some cases even longer. The main reason for this is the wish of the Public side to minimize its financial contribution, by including in the contract many years of revenue generation by the project to help cover the investment contribution of the private partner. Implicit however is the need to fully amortize the initial investment, which in many countries is even included in the relevant legislation.PPP contracts are normally framed around the delivery of a range of services during the lifetime of the contract, those services requiring the initial construction or recovery of an expensive infrastructure. The specification of the financial clauses of the contract requires the estimation of demand for those services over the period of the contract and this is usually taken as the major incidence of uncertainty in the contract. Indeed, experience shows that demand forecasts often fail substantially, in many cases by more than 20%, mostly by excess, as State side project promoters (and the bidding private partners) tend to be excessively optimistic about the development of such demand.But when we consider the nature of these contracts we should recognize the existence of at least two other very important types of uncertainty: first, the socially desirable scope and specification of the services to be offered as technology and social preferences evolve; and second, the policy guidelines relative to the total quantity and the social distribution of those services, as that quantity may be causing congestion in other parts of the system, or it may become important to (positively or negatively) discriminate some user segments.In both cases, it is almost impossible to foresee at the time of writing the initial contract if, when and in what direction such types of socially beneficial changes in the provision of the services would intervene, but this rigidness may bear a great loss of social welfare in relation to a more adjustable framework. This criticism affects not only PPPs but all kinds of concession contracts with long duration, so it is not the “partnership” element that must be questioned but rather the duration of the contract.An alternative way is relatively straightforward: abandon the assumption that these contracts must provide full amortization of the infrastructure, which allows adoption of contracts with a shorter life, and the use of multiple such contracts over the lifecycle of the infrastructure.The first generation contract would still have to face the full cost of the construction, but the private partner would receive the unamortized part at the end of that contract, to be paid by the State, directly from the public budget if no more private participation is wanted, or indirectly through the acquisition fee for the contract to be paid by the partner to the second life segment. But, crucially, the State recovers the right to re-specify the terms of the service to be provided without the need for any indemnity, and also the uncertainty associated with the evolution of demand in that period will be much smaller, as this will be my then a mature system in operation.This may seem to increase the transaction costs for the State as more contracts (although of a similar type, especially from the second onwards) may have to be negotiated and signed. But if we take into consideration the difficulties of the frequently needed renegotiations of long duration contracts and the conditions of asymmetry of information in which the State normally finds itself in such cases, we will conclude that, besides avoiding the loss of welfare due to the poor fit of the contract after 20 years or so, this solution after all may also reduce the transaction costs associated with negotiations over the duration of the traditional contracts.     

Future challenges for transport infrastructure pricing in PPP arrangements

In this paper we report the conclusion of a research project dedicated to pricing regimes in public-private partnership contracts for the provision of transport infrastructure (Macário et al., 2009). Several elements have been brought to the bulk of knowledge that supports the design and implementation of public-private partnership in the transport sector. These developments have been achieved in the following domain:

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Understand difficulties of price setting within the PPP environment, given the potential conflict of interest among the different parties engaged, go beyond the discussion of first best versus second-best price setting mechanisms.

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Understand the role of government and regulators in the performance of a PPP.

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Translate the issue of asymmetries of information between parties into a risk taking language.

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Devise alternative contractual designs that will enable competitive price setting.

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Understand that a structural element is missing to conciliate the views of the different stakeholders over a PPP: a bridge between infrastructure costs and charges.

The objective of this paper is to overview the main challenges ahead of transport infrastructure pricing, considering the current and likely future policies as well as the field constraints. Moreover, a proposal is formulated to overcome some of the current pitfalls associated to transport infrastructure pricing.     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

Applying SMC pricing in PPPs for the maritime sector

This paper investigates whether Short-run Marginal Cost (SMC) pricing is feasible to implement in seaports and with what type of consequences, e.g. concerning cost coverage. Answering these questions requires an analysis of the cost structure of seaports and especially of seaport calls, as well as of how the division of these costs over the different actors runs. As from the moment that this information becomes available, it can be analysed to what extent SMC pricing can be applied in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) within the seaport sector. Till now, mainly seaport infrastructure is involved, including the seaport entry from the open sea.     

Workshop 3A: Governance,contracting, ownership and competition issues in public transport: Looking up not down

Workshop 3A focussed on matters of institutional design that seem likely to improve public transport outcomes. It started by defining high level outcome goals, as measures of ultimate public transport success, and then identified the major societal issues that public transport systems can help to resolve. These issues were separately defined for Southern African and western settings. The importance of taking an integrated approach to transport, particularly land use/transport integration, was seen as fundamental to goal achievement. Workshop papers provided many and varied examples of this importance, ranging from PPPs for major public transport projects to system design issues and contracting out of services. The Workshop included detailed discussion on paratransit development in Southern Africa, where relationship management is proving to be critical, in-line with much previous Thredbo discussion about the important role of trusting partnerships. Parallels and contrasts were drawn with paratransit in western settings. Competition in passenger rail was also a focus, with some questioning of the benefits of franchising. Discussion concluded by proposing recommendations for policy and research and suggesting agenda items for future Thredbo Conferences.     

Altruism,selfishness and coastal resources

Abstract

The basis for coastal zone management in the United States is established in legislation. In comparison, Canadian federal and provincial governments have adopted a piecemeal approach for managing a variety of concerns examined here: water quality, ecological protection, public access, aesthetics, natural hazards, and water dependency. As a result of this approach, which is characterized by a minimum of federal, provincial, and interjurisdictional coordination, the British Columbia coastal zone is showing signs of stress. For example, major shellfish harvesting areas are being lost to water pollution; ecologically sensitive habitats are being consumed by urban, commercial, and industrial expansion; recreation and tourism opportunities are being impaired by clear cutting and other inappropriate developments; and infrastructure is allowed in flood and erosion‐prone areas. Recommendations to improve the approach to coastal management in British Columbia include a variety of innovations. New federal and provincial policies, legislation, institutions, and experimentation with local and regional integrated resource planning are required to better govern the coastal zone. Increased support for existing agencies, public involvement, and access to information as well as more common use of environmental impact studies are needed to justify proposed coastal developments.     

临港区域开发中公共基础设施的资产管理模式

基于天津滨海新区临港经济区南部区域的开发建设实践,以项目区分理论为基础研究区域开发过程中公共基础设施资产管理的相关问题,通过对各类公共基础设施的对比分析,针对不同类型公共基础设施资产管理的模式提出初步建议,为创新区域开发管理模式提供建议和参考。     

The Combined Naval Commercial Port (CNCP) in a Latin American setting

Inadequate ports are a major problem in many less developed countries (LDCS). In an era in which international trade involving developing countries is growing rapidly, decisions must be made to provide the necessary infrastructure and superstructure to facilitate the movement of cargo from ship to shore and vice versa. In LDCS, the phenonmenon of the Combined Naval-Commercial Port (CNCP) has not undergone scrutiny. This paper is concerned with describing the nature of the Latin American CNCP. The hypothesis is that commercial port interests have been adversely affected by coexistence. The results of an unquiry comprise the main body of this research.     

加强政府职能转变 提高海上搜救水平

海上搜救作为一种国家组织实施的公益性事业．是国家应急管理体系的重要组成部分，体现政府的应急处理能力，我国正在积极构建社会主义和谐社会，对海上搜救工作提出了更高的要求。目前我国海上搜救工作在取得明显成效的同时，存在立法滞后、设施设备不成系统、公共服务产品缺乏等诸多问题。“必须按照政府职能转变的要求，从加快立法进度、推广宣传教育、完善基础设施、发挥海事主导作用等方面，努力提供人民群众满意的海上搜救公共服务产品。     

Programming, optimal pricing and partnership contract for infrastructures in PPPs

The development of various forms of public-private partnerships for the financing, building and operating of public infrastructure has not fundamentally altered the economic calculations involved. This chapter examines to what extent it is necessary, however, to change the way that government uses socio-economic and financial evaluations, whether to optimise investment programming or pricing. Ensuring a coherent match between these two types of optimisation can provide a principle for determining the optimal programming price.We begin by showing that when projects are financed by both users (toll revenues) and taxpayers (subsidies), it is socially beneficial to plan these investments on the basis of the net present value (NPV) provided by each unit of public money invested. This NPV/subsidy ratio must obviously be higher than the public-funding scarcity coefficient or else the investment would destroy more wealth than it would produce.One of the ways of improving this ratio is also to optimise the toll level, since increasing it can lower the subsidy but has an adverse impact on the user surplus, it is essential to set the optimal toll.In the case of an approved project considered in isolation, we show that the optimal toll depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient. If there is no scarcity, the optimal toll is zero. As public-funding becomes scarcer, the optimal toll draws closer to the toll that optimises revenue.In the case of a programme of several projects subject to budget constraint, we show that the optimal toll no longer depends upon the public-funding scarcity coefficient and that there are several scenarios depending on the relative values of the maximum revenue and the total cost of the project:

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when, whatever the toll, revenue can no longer cover over half of the cost, it is socially beneficial to choose not to levy any toll;

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when there is a toll that covers the total cost, the operator may be left free to set it at the level he sees fit, with the issue of how the profits are to be shared between the franchisee and the franchisor being settled separately;

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when the maximum revenue of the project falls between half and all of the total cost, the value of the toll that maximises the welfare function is lower than the revenue-maximising toll and must therefore be set for the private operator by government.

Thus, the partnership contract must be given a different content in these three cases of optimal pricing.

Preamble

Most of the theoretical studies devoted to optimising public investment programming and infrastructure pricing have, since the work of Jules Dupuit (1844), focused on the salient issues of the transport sector, even though this work was relevant to all sorts of public infrastructure. The analysis presented in this paper deals with transport economics, but in line with this tradition, is also applicable to any field in which public-funding is combined with commercial revenue. For example, the question of determining how the financing of an opera should be shared between taxpayers and opera-goers raises the same type of issues as the optimal combination of tolls and subsidies for financing a motorway project. This report will be focused on these issues. We shall see that certain precautions are called for in investment programming together with some new thinking on pricing principles.