Road pricing and parking policy

The starting point of this paper is that the collection costs of urban road pricing have turned out to be unexpectedly high. A comparative cost analysis of the congestion charging system of London, Stockholm, Oslo and Singapore also shows that there are large collection cost differences. The most striking difference is between Oslo and London. Oslo, like Stockholm has the necessary, natural, qualities for a central city toll ring with a limited number of entrances; just 18 and 19 tollgates are required. For large historic cities like London with hundreds of inlets to the central city, tollgates at every entrance would involve high investment costs and be very obtrusive in the street scene. The problem is, however, that the present London charging system, with no tollgates, shows high running costs, ten times higher than in Oslo, in spite of the fact that the charged number of vehicles is the same in the two cities. This is a formidable obstacle to alleviating urban traffic congestion in many big cities.The charging technology could hopefully be developed, however, another approach is to develop and combine other measures including traffic regulation, parking policy and public transport subsidisation, which would be only second-best in a hypothetical situation where road pricing is without costs. This paper focuses on parking policy. Two strands of parking policy reform are discussed; fringe benefit taxation of free workplace parking which has recently been introduced in Sweden and a two-part tariff at parking meters, which is suggested as an extension of congestion charging to all day traffic within the central city.     

Applying social marginal costs pricing to the road sector

This chapter, following the results of the case studies analyzed in the Enact project, will identify and analyze the implications of the possible application of SMCP in PPP’s in the road sector. The main issues analyzed include SMCP revenue formation and its ability to finance the PPP. The paper will focus on market and competition issues like: 1) the problems due to mispriced substitutes; 2) the interdependencies between the tolls and the capacity of different road infrastructures when these are competing for the same demand; 3) since short run social marginal costs do not repay for the investments costs (except in special cases), in the case tolls should cover also the investment costs this will lead to totally different pricing schemes between roads in a same area, with problem of demand shift toward cheaper existing infrastructures, therefore increasing the problem of cost recovery. The incentives caused by the introduction of prices based on SMC’s are also investigated.