浅谈港口建设费稽查工作

文章介绍了港建费稽查工作的概念,阐明了港建费稽查工作的重要意义,并就现状及存在的问题提出了港建费稽查工作策略及港建费稽查工作建议。     

港口建设费征稽工作中存在的主要问题及对策

为解决港口建设费征收过程中出现的问题,对港建费的征稽工作现状进行分析,指出存在的5个主要问题:征稽制度不够完善,取消船舶签证制度的影响,对偷逃规费行为制约手段薄弱,稽查人力资源有限,信息化建设不够完善。针对目前所存在的问题提出对策:进一步完善征稽工作机制;合理选择直收、代收模式;合理利用船舶报港制;加强现场稽查;稽查工作与日常执法检查结合;构建规费征稽综合信息平台。     

基于码头装卸信息的港建费电子稽查实践探究

稽查是减少港口建设费偷缴漏征的有效手段。针对取消船舶签证实行进出港报告制以来重庆海事局辖区港建费征稽工作存在的问题,探索智慧海事规费征稽的路径和方法。建议建立港口码头船舶载运货物装卸作业信息采集系统,强化三方信息比对,以解决港口建设费征稽面临的困难,保障港口建设费应征不漏。     

厦门港港口建设费征收模式

立足于厦门港口货物吞吐以及港建费征收的实际情况,将码头公司代收与船代代收的可行性进行比较分析,介绍外贸货物原则上以委托船舶代理代征为主,内贸货物采取委托码头公司以及海事处直接征收的厦门港港建费征管模式。该模式既吸收了船代代收的信息化、管理化、规范化等优点,又保留了码头公司代征的传统征收优势和经验,可为海事部门开展港建费征收工作提供一定的参考。     

茂名：港口建设费征收工作获肯定

日前，为深入了解港口建设费的征管工作，交通运输部海事局崔景波处长和广东海事局港建费征管筹备组副组长宋开明一行莅临茂名海事局检查该局港建费征管工作。茂名海事局副局长梁达和财务处、水东海事人员陪同检查。     

港口建设费征收对水运经济及地方政府影响机理分析

从港建费的使用方向出发,以港口为纽带,分析了港建费征收后对于水运经济及地方政府的正向与负向、直接与间接的影响机理,从而为明确港建费征收对水运经济及地方政府的具体作用。     

完善港建费交通专项资金使用管理机制及政策研究

自1986年开征以来,我国累计投入水运建设和发展的港建费资金超过450亿元,在使用安排上注重适应不同时期水运基础设施建设和体制改革的发展要求,主要用于沿海港口公共基础设施、内河水运和支持保障系统,有效推动了我国水运事业的发展。2011年,财政部会同交通运输部共同制定了《港口建设费征收使用管理办法》（财综〔2011〕29号）,决定将港建费征收政策延续到2020年。港建费征收和使用的二十多年间,我国     

浅谈湛江港保税货物港口建设费的征管模式

保税货物的港建费征管工作涉及保税进出的免征或清关的补征。湛江海事部门研究了保税货物的规律与特性,探索湛江港保税货物的征管模式。     

要闻

《港口建设费征收使用管理办法》将于10月起实施8月29日,交通运输部在京召开《港口建设费征收使用管理办法》(简称《办法》)实施工作动员部署会议。《办法》将于10月1日起正式实施,届时,港建费征收主体将统一改为港口所在地海事管理机构,征费标准降低20%。港建费资金主要用于港口航道等水运公益性基础设施和支持保障系统建设。此次政策调整涉及财政和交通运输主管部门、海事机构、原征管单位、义务缴费人等多方关系,目前,相关各方正相互配合,积极推进政策调整完善工作。     

《港口建设费征收使用管理办法》10月1日正式实施

8月29日,交通运输部在京召开《港口建设费征收使用管理办法》(简称《办法》)实施工作动员部署会议,副部长高宏峰在会上要求,精心准备、扎实工作,确保港建费征管政策调整完善工作平稳推进。副部长徐祖远主持会议。     

Rail access charges in France: Beyond the opposition between competition and financing

Access charges to the railway infrastructures, and in particular of the high speed lines, poses many theoretical and practical questions. Besides the need to decide whether it is better to apply a principle of marginal cost or a full cost approach, a difficulty arises with regard to the possibilities of competition between various operators. France is especially affected by this problem since access charges are particularly high while at the same time competition is non-existent. Is this absence of competition explained by the high level of access charges? After describing the principles which underlie the pricing scheme for high speed trains in France, this paper attempts to find out if these tolls constitute a barrier to entry. After building a model that summarizes the components of supply and demand on the Paris–Lyon journey, this paper shows that the considerations relating to demand (peak hour or off-peak hour) are more fundamental than access charges, which do not in themselves constitute a barrier to entry. Barriers exist, but they involve access charges in relation to the allocation of slots which would make it possible to guarantee certain profitability to a new entrant. Break-even points are proposed which show that SNCF's potential competitors have margins for manoeuvre.     

Internalization of port congestion: strategic effect behind shipping line delays and implications for terminal charges and investment

This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the congestion internalization of the shipping lines, taking into account the ‘knock on’ effect (i.e. the congestion delay passed on from one port-of-call to the next port-of-call). We find that with the presence of the knock-on effect, liners will operate less in terminals, and an increase of a liner’s operation in one terminal will decrease its operation in the other. If the liners are involved in a Stackelberg competition, whether they operate more or less in a terminal under the knock-on effect depends on the comparison between the marginal congestion costs of terminals. Furthermore, we find that the coordinated profit-maximizing terminal charges are higher than both the socially optimal terminal charges and the independent profit-maximizing terminal charges. When the knock-on effect is small, the independent profit-maximizing terminal charges are set at higher levels than the socially optimal terminal charges; but when the knock-on effect is sufficiently large, this relationship may reverse. Besides, the capacity investment rules are the same for welfare-maximizing terminal operator and coordinated profit-maximizing terminal operator, while independent profit-maximizing terminal operators invest less in capacity. The larger the knock-on effect, the larger this discrepancy.     

Rail infrastructure charging EU-directive,Swedish concerns and theory

The first railway package is being recast by the legislative bodies of the European Union. One point of departure in this paper is how Swedish agencies treat issues concerning marginal cost based charges, financing charges and allocation of scarce capacity and it discusses these issues from a welfare point of view, partly by use of theoretical modelling. It is seen here that the Swedish infrastructure manager (the Swedish Transport Administration) so far has no method for calculation of marginal costs as a base for charging, especially for costs of scarce capacity, and that the infrastructure manager is applying or discussing various methods for allocations of scarce track capacity. The EU-recast gives no guidance on principles for calculation of charges for scarce capacity, so we recommend the Swedish Transport Administration to develop such charges. The Administration seems to ignore important externalities that should be taken into consideration from a welfare point of view, with respect both to efficient charging and to allocation of scarce capacity. The analytical modelling part of the paper aims to derive these charges in principle, taking these externalities into account. If financing charges exceeding social marginal costs are applied, the model shows how to minimise the welfare loss of these increases. It also shows that financing charges should primarily be applied to market segments that cause large external costs from the operation of the train, where its customers have low valuation of wait time and delay time, where customers of other segments have high valuations of delay and where increased profits for other operators are induced.     

Impacts of increased rail infrastructure charges in Sweden

The impacts of the already decided increase in rail infrastructure charges in Sweden are described for various market segments within the rail transport system and on the aggregate level for society as a whole. The need for complementary measures in the road transport system is also discussed. Likewise, the paper also mentions the impact of increased rail infrastructure charges on certain significant industrial sectors. An increase in rail charges may reduce social welfare even though the reduction in rail transport mileage is small. This is mainly due to large non-internalised absolute externalities for road freight. For commuter trains, the infrastructure charges' share of the costs of rail transport is expected to rise to 13 percent, which in an international perspective still will be small.     

谈小型油船利用双层底舱装运货油违章行为处置

文中分析了部分小型油船利用双层底舱装运货油为多赚运费的违章行为,指出了违章原因,并提出了相应的建议。     

长江航运企业的国际化经营战略

勿庸质疑,吨位对任何一条船都是非常重要的数据,因为吨位除了表征船舶的大小和运输能力外,还是船舶一些收费和安全配额的基准,所以准确计算一条船的吨位十分重要。     

Worldscale: what does it actually measure?

Worldscale is the dominant system for setting freight rates in ocean-tanker shipping. Its structure is hampered by administrative rigidity which easily disguises the effects of rate changes and complicates the comparison of rates between vessel size segments. The angle is the charterer's, and the shipowner is left to his/her own devices. The sparseness of spot rates between ports (not regions) and the individuality of flat rates due to varying port charges, make functional generalizations between Worldscale (WS) and time charter equivalents (TCE) hazardous. The publishing of rate parameters for all ship segments and possibly port charges for each port would substantially upgrade the value of the system.     

港口建设费收费争议解决机制的思考

港口建设费收费争议难以避免,正确对待争议问题,建立一个良好的解决机制是当前海事部门需要深入研究的一项工作内容。公平公正解决争议问题、及时有效地化解缴费纠纷,符合党的十八届四中全会提出的“健全社会矛盾纠纷预防化解机制”的会议精神,同时也可以提高海事部门的公信力,提升海事形象。     

Worldscale: what does it actually measure?

Worldscale is the dominant system for setting freight rates in ocean-tanker shipping. Its structure is hampered by administrative rigidity which easily disguises the effects of rate changes and complicates the comparison of rates between vessel size segments. The angle is the charterer's, and the shipowner is left to his/her own devices. The sparseness of spot rates between ports (not regions) and the individuality of flat rates due to varying port charges, make functional generalizations between Worldscale (WS) and time charter equivalents (TCE) hazardous. The publishing of rate parameters for all ship segments and possibly port charges for each port would substantially upgrade the value of the system.     

Public transport policy for central-city travel in the light of recent experiences of congestion charging

Excellent public transport which makes the private car a minority mode of central-city travel is a necessary condition for a political process towards the introduction of congestion charges. However, the charging system costs in London and Stockholm have proved to be unexpectedly high. Therefore, before these costs come down to an affordable level, zero-fares for central-city travel and stricter parking policy would be a first-best combination in many cities, always provided that the public transport is really competitive. A bold venture in public transport development is consequently the top priority irrespective of the transport pricing policy direction.