Responses to differentiated road pricing schemes

Reducing traffic-related problems is an important issue that requires changes in travel behavior. It is argued that road pricing is an effective tool but that it would be more effective if charges are differentiated. A laboratory experiment employing a heterogeneous sample (n = 155) examined effects of differentiated road pricing schemes on understanding and behavioral change intentions. The results show that difficulties are experienced in calculating the charges for road pricing schemes differentiated with respect to both place and time. Suggesting learning effects, if presented with degree of differentiation gradually increasing compared to random orders, the highly differentiated schemes were evaluated faster, as more comprehensible, and perceived difficulty decreased. Elderly were less flexible than young people in indicating how they would respond, women were more flexible than men, and frequent drivers less flexible than non-frequent drivers. A distance-based road pricing scheme with a fixed charge per kilometer was on average ranked highest on preference compared to several other conceivable road pricing alternatives.     

Distributional impacts of road pricing: The truth behind the myth

This paper shows that road pricing can be regressive, progressive or neutral, and refutes the generalised idea that road pricing is always regressive. The potential distributional impacts of a road pricing scheme are assessed in three English towns. It is found that impacts are town specific and depend on where people live, where people work and what mode of transport they use to go to work. Initial impacts may be progressive even before any compensation scheme for losers is taken into account. When the situation before the scheme is implemented is such that majority of drivers entering the area where the scheme would operate come from households with incomes above the average, it can be expected that, once the scheme is implemented, these drivers coming from rich households will continue to cross the cordon and will be prepared to pay the charge. In such a case the overall effect will be that on average, rich people will pay the toll and poor people will not.     

Road pricing — should and might it happen?

This article discusses recent attempts to implement a federally sponsored road pricing demonstration in the United States. It examines reasons for the attempts, pointing to several enduring traffic related problems; the greater effectiveness and flexibility of road pricing compared to other measures; and the proven feasibility of area licenses as in Singapore. The generally negative reaction of city decision-makers to road pricing is specified, particularly concerns about harm to businesses, interference with the right to travel and discrimination against the poor. Some lessons for further attempts at implementation of road pricing include more attention to contingency planning for worst possible outcomes; the design of parking permit programs which might lead the way to road pricing; and the selection of recreational rather than downtown sites for first attempts at innovative parking permit and road pricing schemes.     

Optimal cordon pricing in a non-monocentric city

This paper examines the effect of cordon pricing based on an urban spatial model of a non-monocentric city where trips may occur between any pair of locations in the city. The model describes the spatial distribution of trip demand and traffic congestion under alternative pricing schemes. We evaluate the efficiency of resource allocation by comparing three schemes: no-toll equilibrium, first-best optimum, and optimal cordon pricing. Optimal cordon pricing is defined as a combination of cordon location and toll level that maximizes the social surplus in a city. Simulations show that cordon pricing is not always effective for congestion management: cordon pricing tends to be effective as the urban structure is more monocentric.     

Pricing road use: politico-economic and fairness considerations

Road pricing measures are rarely adopted in practice. In this review, we ask why citizens are not more supportive of road pricing. We identify two difficulties. First, the general public is often unwilling to embrace the price system as an allocation mechanism for scarce resources. Second, for politico-economic reasons, any latent support for road pricing schemes rarely translates into actual policy-making. Based on our analysis, we outline components of a road pricing policy that might receive greater electoral support.     

A Pareto-improving hybrid rationing and pricing policy with multiclass network equilibria

This paper extends the work on Pareto-improving hybrid rationing and pricing policy for general road networks by considering heterogeneous users with different values of time. Mathematical programming models are proposed to find a multiclass Pareto-improving pure road space rationing scheme (MPI-PR) and multiclass hybrid rationing and pricing schemes (MHPI and MHPI-S). A numerical example with a multimodal network is provided for comparing both the efficiency and equity of the three proposed policies. We discover that MHPI-S can achieve the largest reduction in total system delay, MHPI can induce the least spatial inequity and MHPI-S is a progressive policy which is appealing to policy makers. Furthermore, numerical results reveal that different classes of users react differently to the same hybrid policies and multiclass Pareto-improving hybrid schemes yield less delay reduction when compared to their single-class counterparts.     

Road pricing: An international perspective

This paper reviews experience with road pricing in Europe and Asia. It considers the objectives of road pricing, and demonstrates that differences in objectives lead to differences in scheme design and performance. It reviews the criteria for design of road pricing systems, and the development of charging structures and technologies to meet those criteria. In particular it discusses the relative merits of pre-determined and congestion-dependent charging structures, and of off-vehicle and on-vehicle charging systems. It assesses the performance of road pricing systems to date, discusses objections to road pricing and demonstrates that the role of road pricing within a wider transport strategy and the use made of the revenue generated, will be important determinants of public acceptability. Finally it assesses the relative merits of alternative approaches to implementation and argues that these will need to pay as much regard to public acceptability as to technical performance.     

Reducing traffic externalities by multiple-cordon pricing

The second-best congestion pricing schemes including common optimum, one cordon, and multiple cordons schemes are compared with the first-best optimum pricing scheme. A cross-subsidy effect exists in these second-best pricing models. However, the scheme with more cordons will diminish the cross-subsidy and approach an efficient and equitable outcome. The relative efficiency of a cordon pricing scheme for the case of Taipei metropolis is very high. One single cordon yields excellent performance of 93% relative efficiency. There might be some factors causing the good results: the uncongested traffic condition, the linear unit distance cost in traffic flow forming a nonlinear cost function, and the trip demands with continuous space and the same destination (the central business district) in the network.     

Capturing value of reliability through road pricing in congested traffic under uncertainty

Empirical studies showed that travel time reliability, usually measured by travel time variance, is strongly correlated with travel time itself. Travel time is highly volatile when the demand approaches or exceeds the capacity. Travel time variability is associated with the level of congestion, and could represent additional costs for travelers who prefer punctual arrivals. Although many studies propose to use road pricing as a tool to capture the value of travel time (VOT) savings and to induce better road usage patterns, the role of the value of reliability (VOR) in designing road pricing schemes has rarely been studied. By using road pricing as a tool to spread out the peak demand, traffic management agencies could improve the utility of travelers who prefer punctual arrivals under traffic congestion and stochastic network conditions. Therefore, we could capture the value of travel time reliability using road pricing, which is rarely discussed in the literature. To quantify the value of travel time reliability (or reliability improvement), we need to integrate trip scheduling, endogenous traffic congestion, travel time uncertainty, and pricing strategies in one modeling framework. This paper developed such a model to capture the impact of pricing on various costs components that affect travel choices, and the role of travel time reliability in shaping departure patterns, queuing process, and the choice of optimal pricing. The model also shows the benefits of improving travel time reliability in various ways. Findings from this paper could help to expand the scope of road pricing, and to develop more comprehensive travel demand management schemes.     

The acceptability of road pricing in Vienna: the preference patterns of car drivers

The acceptability of road pricing has attracted considerable attention among researchers over the last decade, as is evident in the amount of literature about transport and environmental economics. The general conclusion from these studies has been that there is low acceptability for road pricing among car users. In this paper, we add more knowledge to the existing literature by conducting an acceptability study of road pricing in Vienna, where such a study has never been conducted before. We used a replication study approach where a previous approach used in the EU research project AFFORD (acceptability of fiscal and financial measures and organisational requirements for demand management) was replicated for Vienna and further supplemented with a conjoint analysis. In order to examining whether the Vienna study confirms previous findings. We investigated the acceptability of two concrete policy packages factors influencing this acceptability, and preference patterns that can be used in designing a road pricing policy for Vienna. The survey reveals a higher acceptability if road pricing schemes lead to perceived personal benefits. According to the multivariate analyses, the “personal outcome expectations”, “social norm” and “perceived effectiveness” variables account for more than 50 % of the criterion variance and therefore these are the most influential factors. Road pricing schemes can be an effective transport management instrument for a city particularly if they are associated with direct investment in public transport and public infrastructure. Thus, personal benefits can be perceived more easily and direct effects can be expected.     

Pareto-improving congestion pricing and revenue refunding with multiple user classes

This study investigates Pareto-improving congestion pricing and revenue refunding schemes in general transportation networks, which make every road user better off as compared with the situation without congestion pricing. We consider user heterogeneity in value of time (VOT) by adopting a multiclass user model with fixed origin–destination (OD) demands. We first prove that an OD and class-based Pareto-improving refunding scheme exists if and only if the total system monetary travel disutility is reduced. In view of the practical difficulty in identifying individual user’s VOT, we further investigate class-anonymous refunding schemes that give the same amount of refund to all user classes traveling between the same OD pair regardless of their VOTs. We establish a sufficient condition for the existence of such OD-specific but class-anonymous Pareto-improving refunding schemes, which needs information only on the average toll paid and average travel time for trips between each OD pair.     

Road pricing for congestion control with unknown demand and cost functions

It is widely recognized that precise estimation of road tolls for various pricing schemes requires a few pieces of information such as origin–destination demand functions, link travel time functions and users’ valuations of travel time savings, which are, however, not all readily available in practice. To circumvent this difficulty, we develop a convergent trial-and-error implementation method for a particular pricing scheme for effective congestion control when both the link travel time functions and demand functions are unknown. The congestion control problem of interest is also known as the traffic restraint and road pricing problem, which aims at finding a set of effective link toll patterns to reduce link flows to below a desirable target level. For the generalized traffic equilibrium problem formulated as variational inequalities, we propose an iterative two-stage approach with a self-adaptive step size to update the link toll pattern based on the observed link flows and given flow restraint levels. Link travel time and demand functions and users’ value of time are not needed. The convergence of the iterative toll adjustment algorithm is established theoretically and demonstrated on a set of numerical examples.     

Optimal toll locations and toll levels in congestion pricing schemes: a case study of Stockholm

As congestion pricing has moved from theoretical ideas in the literature to real-world implementation, the need for decision support when designing pricing schemes has become evident. This paper deals with the problem of finding optimal toll levels and locations in a road traffic network and presents a case study of Stockholm. The optimisation problem of finding optimal toll levels, given a predetermined cordon, and the problem of finding both optimal toll locations and levels are presented, and previously developed heuristics are used for solving these problems. For the Stockholm case study, the possible welfare gains of optimising toll levels in the current cordon and optimising both toll locations and their corresponding toll levels are evaluated. It is shown that by tuning the toll levels in the current congestion pricing cordon used in Stockholm, the welfare gain can be increased significantly, and furthermore improved by allowing a toll on a major bypass highway. It is also shown that, by optimising both toll locations and levels, a congestion pricing scheme with welfare gain close to what can be achieved by marginal social cost pricing can be designed with tolls being located on only a quarter of the tollable links.     

Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs

Nonlinear pricing (a form of second-degree price discrimination) is widely used in transportation and other industries but it has been largely overlooked in the road-pricing literature. This paper explores the incentives for a profit-maximizing toll-road operator to adopt some simple nonlinear pricing schemes when there is congestion and collecting tolls is costly. Users are assumed to differ in their demands to use the road. Regardless of the severity of congestion, an access fee is always profitable to implement either as part of a two-part tariff or as an alternative to paying a toll. Use of access fees for profit maximization can increase or decrease welfare relative to usage-only pricing for profit maximization. Hence a ban on access fees could reduce welfare.     

Traffic congestion pricing methodologies and technologies

This paper reviews the methods and technologies for congestion pricing of roads. Congestion tolls can be implemented at scales ranging from individual lanes on single links to national road networks. Tolls can be differentiated by time of day, road type and vehicle characteristics, and even set in real time according to current traffic conditions. Conventional toll booths have largely given way to electronic toll collection technologies. The main technology categories are roadside-only systems employing digital photography, tag & beacon systems that use short-range microwave technology, and in-vehicle-only systems based on either satellite or cellular network communications. The best technology choice depends on the application. The rate at which congestion pricing is implemented, and its ultimate scope, will depend on what technology is used and on what other functions and services it can perform.     

Transit pricing research

Several decades of research on transit pricing have provided clear insights into how riders respond to price changes in both the transit and automobile sectors. For the most part, riders are insensitive to changes in either fare levels, structures, or forms of payments, though this varies considerably among user groups and operating environments. Since riders are approximately twice as sensitive to changes in travel time as they are to changes in fares, a compelling argument can be made for operating more premium quality transit services at higher prices. Such programs could be supplemented by vouchers and concessionary programs to reduce the burden of higher fares on low-income users. Also, cross-elasticity research suggests that higher automobile prices would have a significantly greater affect on ridership than lower fares. Most research on transit fare structures shows that the common practice of flat fares is highly inequitable, penalizing short-distance and off-peak users. Free fare programs have proven quite costly for each new transit user attracted and have rarely lured motorists to transit. Free fares limited to downtowns have been more successful than systemwide free fare programs. While prepayment schemes have met with success in the U.S. and Europe, honor fares have suffered from excessive revenue losses in at least one case in the U.S. Some of the more noteworthy fare policy successes in North America have been Bridgeport's combined pass-fare program, Allentown's deep discounts, Ottawa's major fare reduction and differentiation, and Columbus's substantial midday discount. As paratransit and other new transit alternatives to conventional bus continue to emerge, new, more differentiated fare practices can be expected in the future.     

Reactance or acceptance? Reactions towards the introduction of road pricing

We tested the opposite predictions of reactance and dissonance theory, two popular psychological theories, with regard to the responses of car drivers to the introduction of the road pricing. Reactance theory predicts that persons who are convinced that a toll will come are more opposed than less convinced persons. In contrast, dissonance theory expects that convinced persons are more in favour of road pricing than less convinced persons. Aim of the study was to test which theory is more appropriate to explain user reactions towards the toll introduction. We experimentally manipulated the perceived likelihood (low, middle, high and a control condition) of a toll introduction for private cars on German motorways (N = 140 car drivers). In accordance with the predictions of dissonance theory, results revealed clearly that convinced persons about a definite introduction of road pricing developed more positive attitudes towards road pricing than less convinced persons, i.e., the strength of conviction about the introduction of road pricing has a strong effect on the attitudinal evaluation of road pricing. The implications are discussed.     

A dynamic cordon pricing scheme combining the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram and an agent-based traffic model

Pricing is considered an effective management policy to reduce traffic congestion in transportation networks. In this paper we combine a macroscopic model of traffic congestion in urban networks with an agent-based simulator to study congestion pricing schemes. The macroscopic model, which has been tested with real data in previous studies, represents an accurate and robust approach to model the dynamics of congestion. The agent-based simulator can reproduce the complexity of travel behavior in terms of travelers’ choices and heterogeneity. This integrated approach is superior to traditional pricing schemes. On one hand, traffic simulators (including car-following, lane-changing and route choice models) consider travel behavior, i.e. departure time choice, inelastic to the level of congestion. On the other hand, most congestion pricing models utilize supply models insensitive to demand fluctuations and non-stationary conditions. This is not consistent with the physics of traffic and the dynamics of congestion. Furthermore, works that integrate the above features in pricing models are assuming deterministic and homogeneous population characteristics. In this paper, we first demonstrate by case studies in Zurich urban road network, that the output of a agent-based simulator is consistent with the physics of traffic flow dynamics, as defined by a Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD). We then develop and apply a dynamic cordon-based congestion pricing scheme, in which tolls are controlled by an MFD. And we investigate the effectiveness of the proposed pricing scheme. Results show that by applying such a congestion pricing, (i) the savings of travel time at both aggregated and disaggregated level outweigh the costs of tolling, (ii) the congestion inside the cordon area is eased while no extra congestion is generated in the neighbor area outside the cordon, (iii) tolling has stronger impact on leisure-related activities than on work-related activities, as fewer agents who perform work-related activities changed their time plans. Future work can apply the same methodology to other network-based pricing schemes, such as area-based or distance-traveled-based pricing. Equity issues can be investigated more carefully, if provided with data such as income of agents. Value-of-time-dependent pricing schemes then can also be determined.     

Pareto-improving transportation network design and ownership regimes

Private provision of public roads signifies co-existence of free, public-tolled and private-tolled roads. This paper investigates the Pareto-improving transportation network design problem under various ownership regimes by allowing joint choice of road pricing and capacity enhancement on free links. The problem of interest is formulated as a bi-objective mathematical programming model that considers the travel cost of road users in each origin-destination pair and the investment return of the whole network. The non-dominated Pareto-improving solutions of toll and/or capacity enhancement schemes are sought for achieving a win-win situation. A sufficient condition is provided for the existence of the non-dominated Pareto-improving schemes and then the properties of those schemes are analyzed. It is found that, under some mild assumptions, the optimal capacity enhancement is uniquely determined by the link flow under any non-dominated Pareto-improving scheme. As a result, the joint road pricing and capacity enhancement problem reduces to a bi-objective second-best road pricing problem. A revenue distribution mechanism with return rate guarantee is proposed to implement the non-dominated Pareto-improving schemes.     

Credible commitment and congestion pricing

Transportation analysts frequently assert that congestion pricing’s political obstacles can be overcome through astute use of the toll revenue pricing generates. Such “revenue recycling,” however, implies that the collectors of the toll revenue will not be its final recipients, meaning that any revenue recipient must believe that the revenue collector will honor promises to deliver the money. This raises the potential for credible commitment problems. Promises to spend revenue can solve one political problem, because revenue is an easy benefit to understand, but create another one, because revenue is easy to divert. Revenue recycling may therefore not be a promising way to build political support for congestion pricing. We highlight the role commitment problems have played efforts to implement congestion pricing, using examples from around the world and then focusing on California. Because congestion reduction is a more certain benefit than any particular use of the toll revenue, demonstration projects, rather than revenue promises, will be key to pricing’s political success.