Rail infrastructure,ITS and access charges

This paper presents an overview of the principles and technologies relating to railway infrastructure. Specifically this paper includes rail–wheel contact, inspection and maintenance of rail. Intelligent transport systems (ITS) and their applications for the purposes of the railway transport in Europe are discussed. The potential, levels of development, technological and operational characteristics of the European Railway Traffic Management System (ERTMS) are presented. Finally, a discussion on methodologies, principles and current practices for access charging in Europe is provided.     

Rail access charges in France: Beyond the opposition between competition and financing

Access charges to the railway infrastructures, and in particular of the high speed lines, poses many theoretical and practical questions. Besides the need to decide whether it is better to apply a principle of marginal cost or a full cost approach, a difficulty arises with regard to the possibilities of competition between various operators. France is especially affected by this problem since access charges are particularly high while at the same time competition is non-existent. Is this absence of competition explained by the high level of access charges? After describing the principles which underlie the pricing scheme for high speed trains in France, this paper attempts to find out if these tolls constitute a barrier to entry. After building a model that summarizes the components of supply and demand on the Paris–Lyon journey, this paper shows that the considerations relating to demand (peak hour or off-peak hour) are more fundamental than access charges, which do not in themselves constitute a barrier to entry. Barriers exist, but they involve access charges in relation to the allocation of slots which would make it possible to guarantee certain profitability to a new entrant. Break-even points are proposed which show that SNCF's potential competitors have margins for manoeuvre.     

A Bayesian model to assess rail track geometry degradation through its life-cycle

One of the major drawbacks in rail track investments is the high level of uncertainty in maintenance, renewal and unavailability costs for the Infrastructure Managers (IM) during the life-cycle of the infrastructure. Above all, rail track geometry degradation is responsible for the greatest part of railway infrastructure maintenance costs. Some approaches have been tried to control the uncertainty associated with rail track geometry degradation at the design stage, though little progress has improved the investors' confidence. Moreover, many studies on rail track life-cycle cost modelling tend to forget the dynamic perspective in uncertainty assessments and do not quantify the expected reduction of the uncertainty associated with degradation parameters as more inspection data is collected after operation starts.     

Discussions on rail in urban areas and rail history

This paper includes discussions on rail in urban areas and railway history. More specifically commonly used terms and definitions for rail services, policy and practice in urban areas are discussed followed by an overview of railway developments around the world.     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

Risk and reward in rail contracting

This workshop considered the role of risks and rewards in rail transport by considering evidence on the impacts of industry structure, franchising and infrastructure charges. A schema for the allocation of risks and rewards was developed, which indicated that strategic risks should be borne by authorities and operational risks by operators, but that tactical risks were more difficult to allocate and appropriate reward mechanisms more difficult to design. The extent to which these difficulties can be addressed by competitive tendering and alternatives such as trusting partnerships and negotiated performance based contracts was considered.     

Influential factors in the design of port infrastructure tariffs

ABSTRACT

The main aim of this article is to examine the factors influential to the practical process of port infrastructure tariff design. The analysis is based on the survey data of 67 seaports representing the Australasian, East Asian, European, North American and South American regions. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was first carried out to identify the factors influential to the selection of the infrastructure tariff design model. Subsequently, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to confirm the relationship between the variables. The findings showed that demand, knowledge about pricing theories, the dynamics of port and shipping sectors (including competition and ship size), pricing objectives and port cost consideration are influential factors in infrastructure tariff design. Most ports use a mix of pricing approaches including price discrimination, cost-based pricing and market-based pricing. Ports are aware of the basic pricing approaches but have limited knowledge of their application. Based on the results of analysis, policy implications for port management in designing port infrastructure tariffs, limitations and recommendations for future research are discussed.     

A dynamic model for marginal cost pricing of port infrastructures

ABSTRACT

A dynamic model for marginal cost pricing of port infrastructures links costs to system performance by combining a power-law function with time-dependent queueing analysis. Additionally, the model incorporates the marginal cost of capacity, including the effects of economies of scale. This allows the calculation of the marginal cost price under a dynamic framework. The model accounts for nonlinear behaviour of port demand, which is sensitive to price and service levels. The effects over time of cost and service levels on the port’s operational performance are quantified. The proposed model allows determining the optimal timing for capacity investment. The model is a starting point for the application of marginal cost pricing to ports. However, for practical application of such pricing method it is necessary to apply a system’s approach, as productivity and costs must be assessed at the terminal’s component level. This should allow the derivation of a marginal cost function at the terminal’s component level.     

港口建设费＂稽查＂工作流程及策略研究

文中分析了港建费稽查工作的意义、现状及存在的问题,并提出了港建费稽查工作流程和相应策略,以及做好港建费稽查工作的保障措施．     

Future challenges for transport infrastructure pricing in PPP arrangements

In this paper we report the conclusion of a research project dedicated to pricing regimes in public-private partnership contracts for the provision of transport infrastructure (Macário et al., 2009). Several elements have been brought to the bulk of knowledge that supports the design and implementation of public-private partnership in the transport sector. These developments have been achieved in the following domain:

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Understand difficulties of price setting within the PPP environment, given the potential conflict of interest among the different parties engaged, go beyond the discussion of first best versus second-best price setting mechanisms.

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Understand the role of government and regulators in the performance of a PPP.

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Translate the issue of asymmetries of information between parties into a risk taking language.

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Devise alternative contractual designs that will enable competitive price setting.

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Understand that a structural element is missing to conciliate the views of the different stakeholders over a PPP: a bridge between infrastructure costs and charges.

The objective of this paper is to overview the main challenges ahead of transport infrastructure pricing, considering the current and likely future policies as well as the field constraints. Moreover, a proposal is formulated to overcome some of the current pitfalls associated to transport infrastructure pricing.     

Critical issues in the design of contractual relations for transport infrastructure development

The increasing use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) arrangements in the provision of transport infrastructure seems to be a trend all over the world with a very particular incidence in Europe. The arguments supporting these public decisions are several and their validity varies with the different realities where these instruments are applied. The paper highlights the critical issues around the design and implementation of PPPs in the transportation sector and makes a brief presentation of the rational behind the structure of papers presented in this special issue.     

Exploring the effects of passenger rail franchising in Britain: Evidence from the first two rounds of franchising (1997-2008)

This paper provides an up-to-date review of the previous literature concerning the impact of passenger rail franchising on productivity and costs in Britain, and also presents important new evidence. In particular, the extension in time of previously-used datasets offers the first opportunity to study the impacts of re-franchising. The previous literature emphasised the failure of franchising to produce sustained productivity gains, with a sharp deterioration in productivity after 2000. The new evidence presented offers a somewhat more positive view of the British experience. It suggests that part of what was previously considered to be falling productivity may in fact be due to exogenous changes in diesel prices. Further, new data suggests that the recent increases in costs have resulted in higher quality of service. Finally, competitive re-franchising, and the associated unwinding of short-term management and re-negotiated contracts, seems to have led to improvements in productivity between 2006 and 2008. Nevertheless, it remains the case that passenger rail franchising in Britain has failed to reduce costs in the way experienced in many other industries and in rail in other European countries. The evidence is that somewhat larger franchises, avoiding overlapping and optimising train density and length, should reduce costs. We also speculate that the major increase in wages and conditions of staff might be moderated by longer franchises, although that remains to be proved. This re-appraisal of the British case is important in the context of the wider international interest in the use of franchising in passenger rail, and its relevance to the current review of ways of introducing competition into the domestic rail passenger market in Europe.     

Impact of regulation on the performances of long-distance transport services: A comparison of the different approaches in Sweden and Norway

Despite the many socio-economic similarities between Sweden and Norway, differences in jurisdiction, organisation, cooperation, and financing of long-distance passenger train and coach services have led to the development of four distinctively different ways of serving the markets. This paper describes how the train and coach markets have developed in the two countries, with emphasis on regulatory and industrial structure and a couple of performance variables.Looking at passenger rail, both countries separated infrastructure from operation over a decade ago. However, while Norwegian rail is characterised by an almost monopoly supplier, rail services in Sweden are partly decentralised to the responsibility of county authorities and are widely subjected to competitive tendering. The rest of the network is about to be opened up for on-the-track competition. Swedish Rail (SJ) has spent the last decades consolidating its core business (passenger rail) and sold out its other businesses. In contrast, the Norwegian state rail (NSB) has expanded its business to become a major bus operator and property owner, with extensions also into the Swedish market.The coach industry was more recently deregulated in both countries. The Swedish coach market is dominated by privately owned companies operating services to and from Stockholm. In Norway, state-owned NSB is a major coach operator on medium distance routes, and is also the largest partner of Nor-Way Bussekspress which totally dominates long-distance coach services. Further, the Norwegian coach market is characterised by cross-ownership and cooperation which has enabled an extensive route network which covers most of Norway.We find distinct differences in achievements in the two modes and in the two countries. Swedish rail services have succeeded in winning market shares and in renewing and developing both infrastructure and service levels to a greater extent than the Norwegian model. On the other hand, the Norwegian coach market seems to be more developed and efficient compared to its Swedish counterpart.The paper concludes with a discussion on the possible links between the different approaches and the performance observed, with the aim to stimulate further and more detailed research on some important issues.     

The cost of second best pricing and the value of risk premium

Private provision of public infrastructure (PPP) is meant to give incentives to increased efficiency in construction as well in operation and maintenance of the infrastructure e.g. within the transport sector. Efficiency is not only (private) economic efficiency, but also social efficiency e.g. social marginal cost pricing of use of the infrastructure.Is it possible to design contracts concerning payment mechanisms and financial instruments for transport infrastructure that will stimulate social efficiency and optimal allocation of risks between parties? The paper discusses whether different targets can be met and whether compromises may lead to acceptable second best solutions.PPP implies an opportunity to let the user-payment give desired incentives in the form of Social Marginal Cost Pricing (SMCP). A PPP project is a set of contracts and agreements between several parties, including the Government, the private contractor, subcontractors, banks and infrastructure users. These contracts should be designed to give the right incentives to the parties to achieve optimal risk allocation and utilising of resources.Long contract-periods are a common feature of PPPs. The paper examines the way that financial solutions should be designed to achieve the goals for the PPP-projects concerning economic and social efficiency. The expected size and variation of the income stream from the project will influence the loan conditions offered by banks concerning interest rates, guarantees and repayment and also the ability to attract investors. The balance between equity and loans again influences the conditions of the loans. An additional problem is asymmetric information between parties. The private contractor usually knows more about the task than the Government (hidden knowledge), and the Government cannot have full knowledge of the efforts of the contractor (hidden actions).     

Applications of transport economics and imperfect competition

The great majority of analyses made in transport economics use, explicitly or, more often, implicitly, the common assumption of perfect competition. This is the case, for instance, when infrastructure projects are evaluated using the mere sum of the surpluses of transport users and providers. Even when putting aside the question of externalities such as noise, safety or environmental quality, the real chain of economic interactions that takes place in transport provision or downstream of transport provision is not taken into account. Surely enough, describing and simulating this chain could be quite complex. Nevertheless, it is not uninteresting to try to estimate if it does make a big difference or not to make this approximation. The paper makes such an attempt for two broad kinds of applications of transport economics:     

Transport pricing and Public-Private Partnerships in theory: Issues and Suggestions

This chapter offers a theoretical examination of the following questions: what are the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs); and how may these issues be dealt with?We first briefly discuss Public-Private Partnerships in transport: what are the defining characteristics and what are the main types that exist in the different modes of transport? Next we consider the economics of Public-Private Partnerships, in particular from the viewpoint of incentives. Subsequently we identify and examine the issues that arise when Social Marginal Cost Pricing is to be incorporated in PPPs as a regulation with regard to pricing in the transport sector. Lastly, we investigate the possibilities of resolving these issues.     

BIM技术在水运基础设施的应用及发展战略

建筑信息模型(BIM)技术及其应用体系已经开始给全球的土木建筑工程领域带来了革命性的转变。针对水运基础设施领域的BIM应用与建筑领域相比较为滞后的问题,对国内外的BIM应用现状、技术政策、技术标准等进行了全面梳理、总结,并进行了国内外BIM应用的对比分析,在此基础上从标准研究与编制、重点技术攻关方向、持续发展机制、鼓励政策措施、示范工程应用、推进路线图等方面提出建议,以全面促进行业的BIM应用。     

The role of inland terminal development in the hinterland access strategies of Spanish ports

The aim of this paper is to understand how inland terminals are developed in relation both to ports and to other inland terminals within a national system.The paper builds on previous work developing inland terminal taxonomies and applies them to the Spanish case, with supplementary focus on the relations between the “dry port” and “extended gate” concepts. Theoretical contributions include both the importance of development direction (land-driven vs sea-driven) and the identification of an emerging spatial disparity in port development strategies between coastal and inland nodes.In Spain, ports retain an interest in inland terminals through minority shareholdings but they are not the primary investors. The principal ports using Spanish inland terminals are Barcelona and Valencia, both of which are also developing logistics zones within their ports. Furthermore, while the ports are developing closer IT links with these inland locations, this does not necessarily indicate greater than normal levels of cooperation. A study of the Spanish system thus raises questions about whether the increasing academic focus on “dry ports” actually signals any change in strategies of port development or intermodal terminal operation. Therefore the final aim of this paper is to question the use of the “dry port” terminology.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Effect of transportation infrastructure on economic growth in India: The VECM approach

This paper examines the effect of transportation (road and rail) infrastructure on economic growth in India over the period 1970–2010. Using Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), the paper finds bidirectional causality between road transportation and economic growth. It also finds bidirectional causality between road transportation and capital formation, bidirectional causality between gross domestic capital formation and economic growth, unidirectional causality from rail transportation to economic growth and unidirectional causality from rail transportation to gross capital formation. The paper suggests that expansion of transport infrastructure (both road and rail) along with gross capital formation will lead to substantial growth of the Indian economy. Therefore, within its stated scope, this study suggests that a suitable transport policy should be retained to boost transportation infrastructure and hence sustainable economic growth in India.