Impacts of increased rail infrastructure charges in Sweden

The impacts of the already decided increase in rail infrastructure charges in Sweden are described for various market segments within the rail transport system and on the aggregate level for society as a whole. The need for complementary measures in the road transport system is also discussed. Likewise, the paper also mentions the impact of increased rail infrastructure charges on certain significant industrial sectors. An increase in rail charges may reduce social welfare even though the reduction in rail transport mileage is small. This is mainly due to large non-internalised absolute externalities for road freight. For commuter trains, the infrastructure charges' share of the costs of rail transport is expected to rise to 13 percent, which in an international perspective still will be small.     

Applying social marginal cost pricing in rail PPPs: Present state, drawbacks and ways forward

The application of social marginal cost pricing (SMCP) in PPP's in the railway sector faces several challenges. We examine in detail the practical applicability of SMCP in railway PPPs from the perspectives of cost accounting and effectiveness of SMCP towards the allocative efficiency goal, addressing the likely drawbacks in conciliating the welfare objectives of SMCP with the objectives of project financing (cost recovery) and value for money that justify the realization of PPP's. To this end, we combine theoretical analysis with the observation of empirical results of a case study. We split the analysis per type of private service provision, which can be for service operation or infrastructure management. For infrastructure management, we recommend splitting the operator remuneration and the track access charges. For service operation, we argue that the correct decision on source of funding of the service operator should depend on the characteristics of the contract.     

Financing and charging for seaport and airport infrastructures in France

This paper questions responsibilities for the financing of infrastructure for sea and air transport in France. It is stressed that the State accords differential treatment in aid and subsidies to these means of transport and distinguishes between types of infrastructures and superstructure. Some principles concerning charging practices are discussed. Finally, the power of decision in financing infrastructure is examined and, in conclusion it is found that, while some public financing is necessary, this should follow a strict policy.     

Evaluating the long term impacts of transport policy: An initial assessment of bus deregulation

Local buses in Britain, outside London, were ‘deregulated’ as a result of the 1985 Transport Act, with most of the organisational changes implemented in 1986 but many of the ownership changes occurring over a longer period. By contrast, in London, the 1984 London Regional Transport Act introduced a system of comprehensive tendering – but it took 10 years for the organisational and ownership changes to be fully implemented. This paper examines the long term impacts of these changes. A key issue when examining long term changes is that of the counterfactual – what would have happened if the changes had not occurred? An econometric model of the demand for local bus services in Britain is outlined and used in conjunction with extrapolative methods for key variables such as fares and bus kms to determine demand-side counterfactuals. Some analyses of subsidy and of costs will also be outlined. This will then permit the examination of welfare change by estimating changes in consumer and producer surpluses, updating earlier studies. It is found that outside London, bus demand declined strongly, at least up to the year 2000 and some of this reduction can be ascribed to deregulation. By contrast in London, demand has generally been increasing. However, in both areas operating costs also declined strongly, again up to 2000, but since then there have been strong increases in costs and subsidy. Our initial finding is that there are net welfare increases both outside and inside London, but with welfare increases per capita being five times greater in London than elsewhere. However, sensitivity analysis shows that our results are sensitive to the specification of the modelling system and assumptions made concerning the counterfactual, particularly for the results for London.     

European rail reform and passenger services - the next steps

Whilst the emphasis of European Union rail legislation to date has been on freight, measures such as separation of infrastructure from operations, infrastructure charging regimes and regulation have major implications for the passenger sector. But implementation of these measures in many countries has been inadequate. Crucial to overcoming these problems is the establishment of strong independent regulators in all member states. There is currently no requirement for competition in the passenger sector except for international services, but there is experience both of open access for commercial services and of competitive franchising. However, even where permitted open access competition has been very limited and there is evidence that undesirable cream skimming may be a problem. Experience of franchising has generally been positive, but in some cases it has failed to drive down costs. It is concluded that a combination of more sensible risk sharing, a determination not to renegotiate, longer franchises and limited open access competition where justified by benefits is likely to be the best way forward.     

Part I: Externalities and economic policies in road transport

Road transport imposes negative externalities on society. These externalities include environmental and road damage, accidents, congestion, and oil dependence. The cost of these externalities to society is in general not reflected in the current market prices in the road transport sector.An efficient mobility model for the future must take into account the true costs of transport and its regulatory framework will need to create incentives for people to make sustainable transport choices. This paper discusses the use of economic instruments to correct road transport externalities, but gives relatively more weight to the problem of carbon emissions from road transport, as this is particularly challenging, given its global and long-term nature.Economics offers two types of instruments for addressing the problem of transport externalities: command-and-control and incentive-based policies.Command-and-control policies are government regulations which force consumers and producers to change their behaviour. They are the most widely used policy instruments. Examples include vehicle emission and fuel standards in the US as well as driving or parking restrictions in Singapore. The implementation cost of these instruments to the government is small. Although from an economic perspective these policies often fail to achieve an efficient market outcome, the presence of political constraints often make them the preferred option, in terms of feasibility and effectiveness.Economic theory shows how policies, which affect consumption and production incentives, can be used to achieve the optimal outcome in the presence of externalities. Incentive-based policies function within a new or an altered market. We first examine incentive-based policies, which cap the aggregate amount of the externality, such as carbon emissions, by allocating permits or rights to the emitters. The emitters are then free to trade their permits amongst them. The permit allocation mechanism is important-although market efficiency would be satisfied by an auction, political influences usually favour a proportional allocation based on historic emissions. We discuss EU ETS as an example of a cap-and-trade system, however, no such policy for CO₂ emissions in road transport has been implemented anywhere in the world to date.Fiscal instruments are, like command-and-control, widely used in road transport, because they are relatively cheap and simple to implement. They include the use of taxes and charges in order to bridge the gap between private and the social costs and, in principle, can lead to an efficient market solution. Registration, ownership, fuel, emissions, usage taxes, and parking and congestion charges have been implemented in many countries around the world. On the other side of the spectrum, subsidies can be given to those scrapping old cars and buying fuel-efficient vehicles. Some cities, such as London, have implemented congestion charges and many states in the United States have introduced high occupancy lanes. Other interesting possibilities include pay-as-you-drive insurance and other usage charges. However, the size and scope of taxes and subsidies are determined by governments, and because of their imperfect knowledge of the market the outcome is still likely to be inefficient.Governments have many effective economic instruments to create a sustainable road transport model. These instruments can be used separately or together, but their implementation will be necessary in the nearest future.     

Passenger railway reform in the last 20 years - European experience reconsidered

It is about 20 years since the rail reform process in Europe began with the separation of infrastructure from operations in Sweden. This paper reviews the entire process, examining the objectives of reform, the different models adopted, and the key elements of separation of infrastructure from operations, competition both through open access and franchising and regulation and infrastructure charging. It is concluded that separation of infrastructure from operations involves costs, but is the most effective way of achieving within mode competition. Where operations do not greatly overlap and open access passenger and freight are unimportant, leasing infrastructure to passenger franchisees may be effective, but the model of vertical integration as separate subsidiaries within a holding company structure makes it difficult to ensure a level playing field for new entrants and is only effective where the vertically integrated operator remains dominant.     

Public transport policy for central-city travel in the light of recent experiences of congestion charging

Excellent public transport which makes the private car a minority mode of central-city travel is a necessary condition for a political process towards the introduction of congestion charges. However, the charging system costs in London and Stockholm have proved to be unexpectedly high. Therefore, before these costs come down to an affordable level, zero-fares for central-city travel and stricter parking policy would be a first-best combination in many cities, always provided that the public transport is really competitive. A bold venture in public transport development is consequently the top priority irrespective of the transport pricing policy direction.     

Internalization of port congestion: strategic effect behind shipping line delays and implications for terminal charges and investment

This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze the congestion internalization of the shipping lines, taking into account the ‘knock on’ effect (i.e. the congestion delay passed on from one port-of-call to the next port-of-call). We find that with the presence of the knock-on effect, liners will operate less in terminals, and an increase of a liner’s operation in one terminal will decrease its operation in the other. If the liners are involved in a Stackelberg competition, whether they operate more or less in a terminal under the knock-on effect depends on the comparison between the marginal congestion costs of terminals. Furthermore, we find that the coordinated profit-maximizing terminal charges are higher than both the socially optimal terminal charges and the independent profit-maximizing terminal charges. When the knock-on effect is small, the independent profit-maximizing terminal charges are set at higher levels than the socially optimal terminal charges; but when the knock-on effect is sufficiently large, this relationship may reverse. Besides, the capacity investment rules are the same for welfare-maximizing terminal operator and coordinated profit-maximizing terminal operator, while independent profit-maximizing terminal operators invest less in capacity. The larger the knock-on effect, the larger this discrepancy.     

A dynamic model for marginal cost pricing of port infrastructures

ABSTRACT

A dynamic model for marginal cost pricing of port infrastructures links costs to system performance by combining a power-law function with time-dependent queueing analysis. Additionally, the model incorporates the marginal cost of capacity, including the effects of economies of scale. This allows the calculation of the marginal cost price under a dynamic framework. The model accounts for nonlinear behaviour of port demand, which is sensitive to price and service levels. The effects over time of cost and service levels on the port’s operational performance are quantified. The proposed model allows determining the optimal timing for capacity investment. The model is a starting point for the application of marginal cost pricing to ports. However, for practical application of such pricing method it is necessary to apply a system’s approach, as productivity and costs must be assessed at the terminal’s component level. This should allow the derivation of a marginal cost function at the terminal’s component level.     

Evaluating the long term impacts of transport policy: The case of passenger rail privatisation

Britain's national rail system was ‘privatised’ as a result of the 1993 Railways Act, with most of the organisational and ownership changes implemented by 1997. This paper examines the long term impacts of these changes. A key issue when examining long term changes is that of the counterfactual – what would have happened if the changes had not occurred? A simple econometric model of the demand for passenger rail services was developed and used in conjunction with extrapolative methods for key variables such as fares and train km to determine demand-side counterfactuals. Extrapolative methods were also used to determine counterfactual infrastructure and train operation costs. Although our results are sensitive to the assumptions we have made concerning the counterfactual they suggest a number of impacts. Since privatisation, rail demand has grown strongly but our analysis indicates that transitional disruptions suppressed demand by around 9% over a prolonged period (1992/3 to 2005/6), whilst the Hatfield accident reduced demand by about 5%, albeit over a shorter period (2000/1 to 2006/7). A welfare analysis suggests that although consumers seem to have gained as a result of privatisation, for most years this has been offset by increases in costs. An exception is provided by the two years immediately before the Hatfield accident. Overall the loss in welfare since the reforms were introduced far exceeds the net receipts from the sale of rail businesses. Thus although the reforms have had advantages in terms of lower fares and better service levels than otherwise would have been the case, this appears to have been offset by increased infrastructure and train operations costs. The source of these high costs remains an area of speculation but appear to be related to aspects of both market and regulatory failure.     

The regulatory function in public-private partnerships for the provision of transport infrastructure

A wide range of contractual arrangements are increasingly being used by the public sector to materialise the delegation of transport infrastructure provision tasks to the private sector, over long periods of time. This paper addresses the issue of transport infrastructure regulation in the specific context of public-private settings. Starting by the discussion on the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP) it is stressed that, despite the different meanings that can be found in the literature, it is possible to define a PPP by using a core group of characteristics, such as the bundling of services and the transference of a relevant part of the risks to the private sector on a long term basis. Regarding the action of the regulator, we look at three dimensions of efficiency that are expected to be pursued at the strategic level of regulatory action. However, it is acknowledged that the regulatory function is in practice rather complex since it requires balancing a multiplicity of other objectives or goals, which may vary according to specific economic conditions. In the domain of pricing, the review carried out suggests that since “first best” assumptions are not met in the “real world” it hardly seems possible that the short run marginal cost pricing “canon” could be directly used to shape pricing policies. Consequently, when considering the application of the standard neoclassical marginal cost pricing approach it is pertinent to ask whether the second best solutions can lead to efficient outcomes that might be accepted by the stakeholders. Bundling construction and maintenance tasks into a single long term contract, which is a typical characteristic of “standard” PPPs, could theoretically bring cost benefits since it allows for the possible internalization of any positive externalities that may be generated during the whole project life cycle. The economic rationale for the bundling of construction/maintenance with financing services is that it enhances the likelihood of submission of realistic bids at the procurement stage. In addition, the chances of the contractor sticking to the agreed contractual terms, after contract award, are potentially increased given the higher exposure to financial risk.     

Road pricing and parking policy

The starting point of this paper is that the collection costs of urban road pricing have turned out to be unexpectedly high. A comparative cost analysis of the congestion charging system of London, Stockholm, Oslo and Singapore also shows that there are large collection cost differences. The most striking difference is between Oslo and London. Oslo, like Stockholm has the necessary, natural, qualities for a central city toll ring with a limited number of entrances; just 18 and 19 tollgates are required. For large historic cities like London with hundreds of inlets to the central city, tollgates at every entrance would involve high investment costs and be very obtrusive in the street scene. The problem is, however, that the present London charging system, with no tollgates, shows high running costs, ten times higher than in Oslo, in spite of the fact that the charged number of vehicles is the same in the two cities. This is a formidable obstacle to alleviating urban traffic congestion in many big cities.The charging technology could hopefully be developed, however, another approach is to develop and combine other measures including traffic regulation, parking policy and public transport subsidisation, which would be only second-best in a hypothetical situation where road pricing is without costs. This paper focuses on parking policy. Two strands of parking policy reform are discussed; fringe benefit taxation of free workplace parking which has recently been introduced in Sweden and a two-part tariff at parking meters, which is suggested as an extension of congestion charging to all day traffic within the central city.     

The funding of hierarchical railway development in China

Transport networks are hierarchal in essence. In this paper, we explore the relationship between the financing structure and the hierarchal evolution of railway network development, using the case of China. Although privatization and corporatization in transport provision have been trends in some parts of the world, the national government is still the main body responsible for railway development in many countries. Among these countries, China and India are the only two that include the Ministry of Railways (MOR). In India, the entire country's railways are clearly defined as public services provided and managed by the MOR. In China, railways have been corporatized; yet, the MOR and the National Railway Corporation are still widely regarded as a single body that has monopolistic power over almost all railway systems at the national and regional levels in both infrastructure development and operation.     

Sustainable procurement and environmental life-cycle costing in maritime transport

Transportation sector, including maritime transport, exerts significant environmental impact. Public procurement as a policy strategy instrument which applies to the purchase of transport means, construction of infrastructure and the provision logistic services in supplying the goods, services and executing of works must integrate environmental considerations in the contract award procedures. While conventional life-cycle costing (LCC) is based on four categories to be assessed e.g. investment, operation, maintenance and end-of-life disposal expenses, the environmental LCC method also takes into account the external environmental costs. The paper is focused on sustainable public procurement and environmental life-cycle costing aspects of EU 2014 Directive. Analysis is made of the real cost of procurement, the externalities and the impact of maritime transport sector on the environment. The purpose of this research is to propose the framework for assessment of integral impact on the environment which combines environmental LCC approach with TBL concept using non-monetary units for measuring externalities. The authors advocate clean and energy-efficient maritime transport ensuring effective implementation of environmental policy objectives and targets and emphasize the role of public authorities and entities in fostering the inclusion of environmental externalities in calculation of LCC.     

Maritime security in the European Union—empirical findings on financial implications for port facilities

To address the maritime security issue, the IMO Diplomatic Conference adopted in December 2002 the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The European Union fully agreed with its contents; Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 transposes in Community Law the associated rules, which came into force on 1 July 2004. Interesting questions from an EU-policy point of view are then: What are the additional costs associated with the implementation of security regulations by port facilities (here in particular terminals) in EU-member states? Moreover, how are these additional costs being recovered by port facilities? Another inter-related question is: are there any subsidies involved in the cost recovery? The present paper addresses these questions with the presentation of the main results of an explorative empirical study on maritime security-related costs and their financing in EU-member states. Furthermore, a number of topics are recommended for further study on maritime security costs and financing and associated (EU) regulations.     

Maritime security in the European Union—empirical findings on financial implications for port facilities

To address the maritime security issue, the IMO Diplomatic Conference adopted in December 2002 the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. The European Union fully agreed with its contents; Regulation (EC) No. 725/2004 transposes in Community Law the associated rules, which came into force on 1 July 2004. Interesting questions from an EU-policy point of view are then: What are the additional costs associated with the implementation of security regulations by port facilities (here in particular terminals) in EU-member states? Moreover, how are these additional costs being recovered by port facilities? Another inter-related question is: are there any subsidies involved in the cost recovery? The present paper addresses these questions with the presentation of the main results of an explorative empirical study on maritime security-related costs and their financing in EU-member states. Furthermore, a number of topics are recommended for further study on maritime security costs and financing and associated (EU) regulations.     

An Economic Approach to Allocating River Water to Estuaries in South Africa

Estuaries are last in line as a recipient of river water and for this reason they are particularly vulnerable to negative environmental impacts due to water scarcity and pollution. They only receive the runoff that has not been abstracted or prevented from reaching rivers. When this runoff is substantially reduced their functionality is undermined and they often become less attractive for recreational use. This article explores some aspects entailed in efficiently managing the allocation of water to estuaries problem and some associated problems. It is shown that efficient management requires the marginal social costs of the inflows to be brought into equivalence with the marginal social values of the inflows, and these values may be estimated, but that there are the challenges in this estimation and in linking these estimates to the welfare of the people in whom the managers of river systems are (presumed to be) interested.     

A Bayesian model to assess rail track geometry degradation through its life-cycle

One of the major drawbacks in rail track investments is the high level of uncertainty in maintenance, renewal and unavailability costs for the Infrastructure Managers (IM) during the life-cycle of the infrastructure. Above all, rail track geometry degradation is responsible for the greatest part of railway infrastructure maintenance costs. Some approaches have been tried to control the uncertainty associated with rail track geometry degradation at the design stage, though little progress has improved the investors' confidence. Moreover, many studies on rail track life-cycle cost modelling tend to forget the dynamic perspective in uncertainty assessments and do not quantify the expected reduction of the uncertainty associated with degradation parameters as more inspection data is collected after operation starts.     

Vertical integration and its implications to port expansion

ABSTRACT

Over the years many shipping lines have established terminal operation companies, with some set up as independent firms. However, port authorities and local governments have not always welcomed external investment and control with open arms. The economic implications and each stakeholder’s best strategies remain unclear. This study develops an analytical model in order to study the effects of vertical integration, with a focus on shipping lines’ investment in ports’ capacity. Modelling results suggest that vertical integration between terminal operator and a shipping line leads to higher port capacity, port charge, market output and consumer surplus. It also reduces delay costs. All these results suggest that vertical integration can be an important source of synergy for the maritime industry. Although vertical integration increases the participating carrier’s output at the expenses of non-integrating rival shipping firms, our numerical analysis suggests that the overall social welfare is likely to increase. Preliminary empirical tests confirm that vertically integrated ports handle more traffic volumes and are associated with better infrastructure and equipment. Therefore, port authorities and government regulators should carefully review the market competition status as well as port expansion plans.