Flexible-term contracts for road franchising

Private participation in road projects is increasing around the world. The most popular form of franchising is a concession contract, which allows a private firm to charge tolls to road users during a pre-determined period in order to recover investments. Concessionaires are usually selected through auctions at which candidates submit bids for tolls or payments to the government. This paper discusses how this mechanism does not generally yield optimal outcomes and it induces the frequent contract renegotiations observed in practice. A new franchising mechanism is proposed, based on a flexible-term contract and bi-dimensional bids for total net revenue and maintenance costs. This new mechanism improves outcomes compared to fixed-term concessions, by eliminating traffic risk and promoting the selection of efficient concessionaires.     

The effect of contract renewal and competitive tendering on public transport costs,subsidies and ridership

In this paper, we aim to estimate the effect of contract renewal as well as competitive tendering on public transport costs, subsidies, and ridership. More specifically, we examine to what extent (multiple) contract renewals and introduction of competitive tendering for long-term public transport contracts affect ridership, operational costs and subsidies in concession areas governed by public transportation authorities from 2001 until 2013 in the Netherlands. Our identification strategy improves on the literature as we are able to control for all time-invariant unobserved factors, such as network and area characteristics by using panel data. We show that when renewing long-term contracts, operational costs are reduced by at least 10%, whereas subsidies fall even stronger. For contracts that are renewed at least twice, the reduction in costs is even more substantial and in the order of 16%. We find that the effect of competitive tendering is completely absent, suggesting that the threat of competitive tendering is sufficient in a market where the majority of concessions is competitive tendered. Contract renewal not only reduces costs and subsidies, but simultaneously increases public transport ridership by 7.7%. Furthermore the vehicle-hours elasticity of operational costs is 0.40, pointing to strong economies of density. The geographical scale elasticity of operational costs is around one, which indicates constant returns to scale with respect to the geographical size of the concession area. This suggest that the current size of the Dutch concession area is optimal with respect to costs.     

Incentives in Bus Concession Contracts: A Review of Several Experiences in Latin America

Abstract

This paper reviews the incentive structure of concession contracts in several Latin American transit reforms. It also presents a conceptual analysis of the optimal design of concession contracts. The conceptual discussion and case studies reviewed indicate that payment to operators should be linked to operational variables and that some demand risk should optimally be transferred to operators. Performance standards linked to fines and penalties are not sufficient to guarantee good quality of service, particularly in citywide reforms and where institutional capacity ― in terms of size, experience and expertise of staff ― is lacking and regulatory processes are slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome. This review may be useful for policy-makers designing transit reforms in other countries. The policy lessons of the paper are particularly relevant to cities in the developing world but they are also important for reforms in other countries.     

Regulating concessions of toll motorways: An empirical study on fixed vs. variable term contracts

Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorways. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.     

Application of particle swarm optimization and robust net present value for BOT-type contracts

Major infrastructure construction projects contracted to private companies by governments are important for maximizing profitability. This paper extends an existing build–operate–transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) for identifying the reasonable concession period which would be profitable both to the government and to the private sector. There are some major limitations with BOTCcM – for example, the total investment cost is pre-given and the impact of uncertainty of parameters affecting the concession period were not considered. In this research, the total investment cost is assumed as variable which should be optimally determined and the uncertainty of net cash flows is considered. Further, the proposed model is implemented to calculate the robust concession period and required capital for the construction period, using the obtained values and particle swarm optimization method.     

The role of the discount rate in tendering highway concessions under the LPVR approach

Flexible-term highway concessions are becoming quite popular around the world as a means of mitigating the traffic risk ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. The most sophisticated mechanism within flexible-term concession approaches is the least present value of the revenues (LPVR). This mechanism consists of awarding the concession to the bidder who offers the least present value of the revenues discounted at a discount rate fixed by the government in the contract. Consequently, the concession will come to an end when the present value of the revenues initially requested has been eventually reached. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effect that the discount rate established by the government in the bidding terms has on the traffic-risk profile ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. To analyze this effect, a mathematical model is developed in order to obtain the results. I found that the lower the discount rate the larger will be the traffic risk allocated to the concessionaire. Moreover, I found that, if a maximum term is established in the contract, the lower the discount rate, the less skewed towards the downside will be the traffic-risk profile allocated to the concessionaire.     

Using bi-level programming to analyze the royalty for private–public partnership projects: the operational quantity-based model

Abstract

This paper develops a royalty negotiation model based on the operating quantity of Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) projects for both government and the private sector using a bi-level programming (BLP) approach. The royalty negotiation is one of many critical negotiation items of a concession contract. This study develops a royalty negotiation model to simulate the negotiation behavior of two parties, and derives the heuristic algorithm for the BLP problem. A number of factors are incorporated into this algorithm including the concession rate, the time value discount rate, the learning rate, and the number of negotiations. The paper includes a case study of the Taipei Port Container Logistic BOT Project. The results show that the two parties involved completed royalty negotiation at the sixth negotiation stage. The findings show that the government can receive a royalty from the concessionaire, calculated at 0.00386% of the operating quantity of this BOT project. Therefore, the royalty negotiation model developed here could be employed to explain negotiation behavior.     

Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports

This paper investigates the effects of concession revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be affected by how airlines’ services are related to each other (complements, independent, or substitutes). In particular, when carriers provide strongly substitutable services to each other, the airport has incentive to charge airlines, rather than to pay airlines, a share of concession revenue. In these situations, while revenue sharing improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is further found that airport competition results in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had in the case of single airports. The airport–airline chains may nevertheless derive lower profits through the revenue-sharing rivalry, and the situation is similar to a Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the chains move further away from their joint profit maximum, welfare rises beyond the level achievable by single airports. The (equilibrium) revenue-sharing proportion at an airport is also shown to decrease in the number of its carriers, and to increase in the number of carriers at competing airports. Finally, the effects of a ‘pure’ sharing contract are compared to those of the two-part sharing contract. It is found that whether an airport is subject to competition is critical to the welfare consequences of alternative revenue sharing arrangements.     

Yardsticks on the road: Regulatory contracts and cost efficiency in the Norwegian bus industry

In this paper a cost frontier model is estimated for an eleven-year panel of Norwegian bus companies (1136 company-year observations) using the methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). The main objective of the paper is to investigate to what extent different type of regulatory contracts affect company performance. The panel model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) allow for year/company specific efficiency measures to be estimated. Thus, unobservable network or other time invariant characteristic of the operating environment can be controlled for by analyzing the dynamics of measured productivity across time for firms regulated under different types of contracts, rather than relying solely on variations across companies during one time period. Therefore, the paper offers methodological and data advantages over previous work on this subject. The main and robust result of the paper is that the adoption of a more high-powered scheme based on a yardstick type of regulation significantly reduces operating costs. The results contained in this paper thus confirms theoretical predictions regarding the incentive properties of high powered incentive schemes and in particular the dynamic benefits of yardstick competition.     

Contract Design,Financing Arrangements and Public Ownership—An Assessment of the US Airport Governance Model

Abstract

US airports negotiate legally binding contracts with airlines and finance large investment projects with revenue bonds. Applying insights from transaction cost economics, we argue that the observed variation in contractual and financing arrangements at US airports corresponds to the parties' needs for safeguarding and coordination. The case evidence presented reveals that public owners set the framework for private investments and contracting. We suggest that airline contracts and capital market control result in comparative efficient investments and act as a check on the cost inefficiency typically linked to public ownership.     

Airport congestion pricing and terminal investment: Effects of terminal congestion,passenger types,and concessions

None of the airport-pricing studies have differentiated the congestion incurred in the terminals from the congestion incurred on the runways. This paper models and connects the two kinds of congestion in one joint model. This is done by adopting a deterministic bottleneck model for the terminal to describe passengers’ behavior, and a simpler static congestion model for the runway. We find that different from the results obtained in the literature, uniform airfare does not yield the first-best outcome when terminal congestion is explicitly taken into account. In particular, business passengers are at first-best charged a higher fare than leisure passengers if and only if their relative schedule-delay cost is higher. We further identify circumstances under which passengers are, given a uniform airport charge scheme, under- or over-charged with respect to the terminal charge. Furthermore, when concession surplus is added to the analysis, the airport may raise (rather than reduce) the airport charge in order to induce more business passengers who in turn will lengthen leisure passengers’ dwell time and hence increase their chance of purchasing concession goods. Finally, the impacts of terminal capacity expansion and time-varying terminal fine toll are discussed.     

Tolls,Terms and Public Interest in Road Concessions Privatization: A Comparative Analysis of Recent Transactions in the USA and France

Abstract

Recent concessions in France and in the USA have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was 12 times current cash flow whereas investors paid 60 times current cash flow for US toll roads. In this paper, we explore two questions: what accounts for the difference in these multiples? and what are the implications with respect to the public interest? Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.     

Do the organizational forms affect passenger satisfaction? Evidence from Chinese public transport service

This paper presents a discussion on the relationship between organizational forms (including the ownership structure and the contractual practices) and passenger satisfaction of Chinese public transport service. To test this proposition, an original rich data set covering 4702 respondents and 58 public transport operators of 13 cities for the period 2013–2014 is used. We firstly estimate the passenger satisfaction based on customer satisfaction theory and PLS-SEM, and then take into consideration the mixed logit model to assess the effect between them. Conclusions drawn from the study are summarized as follows: ① The effect of organizational forms on the passenger satisfaction of public transport service is confirmed. ② Public transport services franchised to public ownership offer higher passenger satisfaction than those franchised to private ownership and mixed ownership. ③ Public transport services regulated by the management contracts incite more passenger satisfaction than those regulated by net cost contracts and gross cost contracts.     

Efficient contracting and incentive agreements between regulators and bus operators: The influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice

Contracts that govern transactions between regulators and operators are an important feature of service delivery in public transport. This paper reviews the literature on efficient contracting in general and its application to public transport contracts and found little empirical evidence on the influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice, a fundamental premise of classical contracting theory. Departing from the existing literature, this paper develops a choice experiment to study public transport operators’ preferences for different contractual forms. People involved in the public transport industry across Australia are invited to do the survey but the respondents are mainly bus operators in New South Wales. The respondents are offered two hypothetical contracts with different risk profiles and incentives and asked to indicate their preferences as well as their acceptance to provide the services under the contract they prefer. A non-linear scaled multinomial logit model is estimated to establish the role of risk allocation on contract preference of bus operators and the optimal amount of risks and incentives, conditioned on the operators’ attitude towards risk. The results help authorities design performance-based contracts to obtain their objectives while maintaining the operators’ level of satisfaction.     

Integrated modeling framework for leasing urban roads: A case study of Fresno,California

Increasing private sector involvement in transportation services has significant implications for the management of road networks. This paper examines a concession model’s effects on a road network in the mid-sized city of Fresno, California. Using the existing transportation planning models of Fresno, we examine the effects of privatization on a number of typical system performance measures including total travel time and vehicle miles traveled (VMT), the possibility of including arterials, and the differences between social cost prices and profit maximizing prices. Some interesting insights emerge from our analysis: (1) roads cannot be considered as isolated elements in a concession model for a road network; (2) roads can function as complements at some levels of demand and become substitutes at other levels; (3) policy makers/officials should consider privatizing/pricing arterials along with privatizing highways; (4) temporally flexible but limited price schedule regulations should be part of leasing agreements; and (5) non-restricted pricing may actually worsen system performance, while limited pricing can raise enormous profits as well as improve system performance.     

Analyzing the gap between the QOS demanded by PT users and QOS supplied by service operators

This research evaluated the effectiveness of tendered bus public transportation (PT) in improving the attractiveness of that service in order to promote sustainable mobility. This was accomplished by characterizing the gap between the quality of service (QOS) supplied by contract regimes and that which is demanded by passengers. Analysis of a customer satisfaction survey aimed at bus users provided insight into their ranking of 14 QOS parameters while 13 active service contracts were analyzed for their impact on QOS. In-depth interviews with relevant experts completed the complex narrative that is Israel’s policy of privatization in PT. Both qualitative and quantitative analyses helped identify those QOS parameters most in demand by passengers and impacted by contracts. The results show that the gap is minimal, high demand parameters receive increased priority in contracts. In addition this research documented an evolution in the method contracts employed to provide QOS. Late model contracts define an increasingly higher minimum QOS; but also strongly limit the operator’s ability to make service changes. This is a trend which should improve QOS in Israel but reduce the incentive for operator enacted QOS initiatives. Despite its obvious success to date, it might be time to change again the contract regime for the provision of competitive bus services in Israel.     

Tour-based mode choice of joint household travel patterns on weekend and weekday

Joint household travel, with or without joint participation in an activity, constitutes a fundamental aspect in modelling activity-based travel behaviour. This paper examines joint household travel arrangements and mode choices using a utility maximising approach. An individual tour-based mode choice model is formulated contingent on the choice of joint tour patterns where joint household activities and shared ride arrangements are recognised as part of the joint household decision-making that influences the travel modes of each household member. Two models, one for weekend and one for weekday, are estimated using empirical data from the Sydney Household Travel Survey. The results show that weekend travel is characterised by a high joint household activity participation rate while weekday travel is distinguished by more intra-household shared ride arrangements. The arrangements of joint household travel are highly associated with travel purpose, social and mobility constraints and household resources. On weekends, public transport is mainly used by captive users (i.e., no-car households and students) and its share is about half of that on weekdays. Also, the value of travel time savings (VOTs) are found to be higher on weekends than on weekdays, running entirely counter to the common belief that weekend VOTs are lower than weekday VOTs. This paper highlights the importance of studying joint household travel and using different transport management measures for alleviating traffic congestion on weekdays and weekends.     

Traffic forecasts under uncertainty and capacity constraints

Traffic forecasts provide essential input for the appraisal of transport investment projects. However, according to recent empirical evidence, long-term predictions are subject to high levels of uncertainty. This article quantifies uncertainty in traffic forecasts for the tolled motorway network in Spain. Uncertainty is quantified in the form of a confidence interval for the traffic forecast that includes both model uncertainty and input uncertainty. We apply a stochastic simulation process based on bootstrapping techniques. Furthermore, the article proposes a new methodology to account for capacity constraints in long-term traffic forecasts. Specifically, we suggest a dynamic model in which the speed of adjustment is related to the ratio between the actual traffic flow and the maximum capacity of the motorway. As an illustrative example, this methodology is applied to a specific public policy that consists of suppressing the toll on a certain motorway section before the concession expires.     

The economics of road safety

In this paper we present a theoretical framework for the analysis of road safety in different contexts characterized by the following factors: the presence or the absence of externalities, moral hazard, taxes (subsidies), government regulation, liability insurance and multi-period insurance contracts. The main results are the following: (i) A Pareto optimal solution for insurance coverage and road safety is characterized by full insurance and a level of prevention which takes into account externalities between drivers. (ii) Without asymmetrical information, such a Pareto optimal solution can be obtained with or without a fault system for negligence if an adequate rating system is set up in order to induce individuals to take into account externalities. Taxes and subsidies can also be efficient. Government regulation of road safety is another way to reduce inefficies due to externalities. However, these interventions will not generally lead to a socially optimal level of road safety under asymmetrical information. (iii) Under asymmetrical information, two mechanisms are examined in some detail: fault for negligence and multi-period insurance contracts. It is shown that one-period liability insurance contracts (assuming that the legal system can observe the individual's level of road safety activities when accidents occur) or multi-period no-fault insurance contracts (assuming an infinite horizon with no discounting) based in part on the individual's past driving record can give individually rational self-protection activity levels which are socially efficient in presence of both moral hazard and externalities. Under less stringent assumptions, these contracts can give second-best solutions.     

Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach is one of the privatization mechanisms for promoting transportation infrastructure developments by using private funds to construct new infrastructure facilities. In a BOT scheme, it often involves three parties: the government, whose objective is to maximize the benefit defined in terms of social welfare added to the society; the private investors, whose objective is to maximize the profit generated from the investment; and the road users, whose objective is to minimize the inequality of benefit distribution among the road users traveling from different origin–destination pairs. Each of these parties has different objectives that often conflict with each other. In this paper, we develop various optimal road pricing models under demand uncertainty for analyzing the tradeoffs among the three objectives. In addition, a project evaluation framework is developed for assessing the effects of government policy and regulation on the BOT project. Seven cases of the BOT road pricing problem are analyzed: (1) BOT without regulation, (2) BOT with price control regulation, (3) BOT with equity regulation, (4) BOT with construction cost subsidy, (5) BOT with concession period extension, (6) BOT with construction cost subsidy and concession period extension, and (7) BOT with multiple objectives. Numerical results using a real case study of the Ban Pong–Kanchananburi Motorway (BMK) in Thailand are provided to examine the above seven cases.