依法规范交通征稽程序

结合交通征稽工作的现状,从法学角度出发,提出加快全国养路费征收立法工作,并从用人制度、社会宣传等方面不断健全交通征稽工作程序.     

广西水运规费征收的现状和对策趋议

自“八五”期间全面开征水运规费以来,广西全区各项水运规费征收管理工作取得了令人瞩目的成绩。但是,随着水运市场经济和港航体制改革的不断深入发展,广西水运规费征收管理当中的各种矛盾和问题也日益凸现,对此,文章提出了一些解决的办法和措施,以供参考借鉴。     

浙江整治外挂毒瘤

挂外地牌开当地车,走本地路赚当地钱,却无需缴当地税费,道路货运“车辆外挂”已经成为一个全国性问题。全国交通能否“一盘棋”,规费征收标准能否统一,这些问题在2006年外挂车治理过程中显得异常尖锐。     

深化征稽改革 征好公路规费

<正> 湖北省征稽局与省公路运输局一门两牌,合署办公,从今年4月1日起,原由运管部门征收的客、货运附加费改由征稽部门征收,人员同级划转。这样,全省征稽部门“四费合一”。去年,全省征稽工作经过大胆探索,狠抓落实,各项工作都取得了较好成绩。养路费、车     

规费征收:执法还是竞争

在全国高速公路数量少、车辆运行距离短、运行区域主要在省内的上世纪80～90年代,交通规费的征收政策、规章、标准由各省(市、区)自行制定、并造成全国交通规费不统一的状况是可以理解的.     

适应市场经济形势 强化征费管理机制

<正> 湖北省地处我国腹地,位于长江中游,辖15个地市(州),70个县(市),面积18.6万平方公里,人口5600万。现有民用机动车24万余辆,公路通车里程4.77万公里。省运管、征稽系统省局是合署办公,一门两牌,统一领导。各地市(州)、县分别设处、所,运管、征稽分别建制。征稽部门财务统收统支,人员编制省里集中掌握,人事关系目前主要是由地方交通局管理,实行条块结合领导体制,业务以条条为主。全省15个征稽处,93个征稽所。目前我局负责征收的公路交通规费共“六种”:汽车养路费、     

福建限定自由裁量权浮动空间

8月4日,为了限制交通行政处罚的自由裁量权浮动空间,推进规范化、标准化执法,福建省交通厅根据<公路法>、<道条>、<福建省公路规费征收管理条例>等法律法规,制定印发了<福建省交通行政处罚自由裁量权基准及配套制度>.     

蓄势待发的五洲交通——广西五洲交通股份有限公司

广西五洲交通股份有限公司是广西首家经营收费公路、桥梁的交通上市公司,成立于1992年12月,2000年12月在上海证券交易所公开发行上市。2006年7月,公司顺利完成股权分置改革工作。截至2006年末,公司总股本共有44200万股。     

规费差别征收与货车结构调整

营业性道路货运车辆结构调整,是当前提高道路运输服务水平和保障公路交通安全、畅通的重点问题之一.改革现行交通规费和公路通行费征收办法,对养路费、货运附加费、车辆购置税、运管费和高速公路、国省道公路的通行费实行分类差别标准征收的措施,是交通部门提高经济调节能力、加快运输结构调整、保障公路安全畅通的重要手段.     

燃油附加费的海南实践——访海南省汽车运输总公司总经理夏亚斌

"从严格意义上讲,目前海南的燃油附加费,既不是传统意义上的公共交通规费的征收方法,也不是燃油税的征收方法。"在刚刚结束的2007中国运输巡回论坛(太原站)上,海南省汽车运输总公司总经理夏亚斌阐述了海南燃油附加费开征后对运输企业产生的双面影响。1994年,海南省做出了一个大胆尝试,把公路养路费、过路费、过桥费以及公路运输管理费四费合一,在全国率先征收燃油附加费。十几年来的实践表明:此举不仅改变了公路规费征收制度,也改变了海南省公路运输行业的利益分配格局。     

Suburban attitudes toward policies aimed at reducing solo driving

Policies that are aimed at discouraging commuters from solo driving have become a part of overall efforts to improve air quality and reduce traffic congestion. Since driving alone is the overwhelming choice of employed residents in US metropolitan areas, the political acceptability of proposed policy changes plays a role in their success. The 1992 Orange County (CA) Annual Survey asked employed solo drivers to rate their likelihood of changing from solo driving in response to various fees and incentives. Fewer say they would be very likely to stop solo driving if they were charged a parking fee at work (20%), a smog fee (17%) or a congestion fee (16%), than if their employers paid them a cash bonus for stopping solo driving (28%), or if more public transit (33%) or more carpools at work (35%) were available. Young and lower-status solo drivers are more likely than others to say they would stop driving alone if there were fees or cash bonuses. Current non-solo drivers tend to be young and low income, providing a validity check on the demographic predictors of stated preferences. The findings are discussed in light of recent policy changes in Southern California.     

Flexible parking requirements for office developments: New support for public parking and ridesharing

The author examines new, flexible parking requirements in several U.S. cities and Canada. Flexible requirements provide relaxations in zoning code specifications for off-street parking in return for developer commitments to ridesharing measures, support of transit or in-lieu fees for public parking. Issues examined include whether developers take advantage of flexible requirements, whether agreements with developers lead to agreed-upon action, and whether actions lead to desired results. Based on experiences of several cities, implications and cautions are drawn for local planners. The first caution relates to cities using flexible requirements to collect in-lieu fees in support of public parking. Where cities delay providing parking, inflation may make it difficult to provide the desired parking supply. Or, developers may not choose to pay the fee, such as in the case where cities grant relaxations for other measures more attractive than paying the fees.Other implications relate to flexible requirements in support of ridesharing or transit. Developers will not necessarily take advantage of relaxations tied to support of these modes. Generally, developers will take the least-cost ways to gain relaxations. They may choose to provide the parking where transit or ridesharing measures are too costly or complex. Or, they may take relaxations easier to obtain than those for ridesharing and transit. Finally, even where developers do agree to ridesharing measures, the measures may not be effective. On the other hand, developer-sponsored actions have proven effective in some cities where tight or expensive parking prevails, or where neighborhood residents have organized against office commuters parking on neighborhood streets, or where other economic or community variables favor ridesharing and transit.     

How will we fund our roads? A case of decreasing revenue from electric vehicles

Annual expenditures for transportation infrastructure have recently surpassed the funding available through tax and fee collection. One large source of revenue generation for transportation infrastructure is use fees that are charged through taxes on gasoline both on a federal and state level. A massive adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) in the United States would result in significantly lower gasoline consumption and thus reduce the revenue collected to maintain the U.S. transportation infrastructure. We investigate how different vehicles will change the annual fee collected on a marginal basis. In addition, we assess the effects of adoption of alternative vehicles on revenues using several projections of alternative vehicles adoption, both on a state-by-state basis and at the national level. We find that baseline midsize and compact vehicles such as the Toyota Camry and Honda Civic generate approximately $2500–$4000 in tax revenue over their lifetime. Under the current funding structure, battery-electric vehicles (BEVs) such as the Nissan Leaf generate substantially less at $400–$1300, while plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) such as the Chevrolet Volt generate $1500–$2700. Even in states with high lifetime fees due to fuel taxes, such as California, revenue generation can be upwards of 50% lower than in states with high registration fees such as Colorado. Total annual revenue generation decreases by about $200 million by 2025 as a result of EV adoption in our base case, but in projections with larger adoption of alternative vehicles could lead to revenue generation reductions as large as $900 million by 2025. Potential schemes that charge user fees on alternative fuel vehicles to overcome the decrease in revenue include a flat annual registration fee at 0.6% of the vehicle’s manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP) or 2

per mile fee.     

Nonlinear pricing on private roads with congestion and toll collection costs

Nonlinear pricing (a form of second-degree price discrimination) is widely used in transportation and other industries but it has been largely overlooked in the road-pricing literature. This paper explores the incentives for a profit-maximizing toll-road operator to adopt some simple nonlinear pricing schemes when there is congestion and collecting tolls is costly. Users are assumed to differ in their demands to use the road. Regardless of the severity of congestion, an access fee is always profitable to implement either as part of a two-part tariff or as an alternative to paying a toll. Use of access fees for profit maximization can increase or decrease welfare relative to usage-only pricing for profit maximization. Hence a ban on access fees could reduce welfare.     

Overcoming public aversion to congestion pricing

We have completed a survey of Southern California residents designed to examine whether the details of policy design can make congestion pricing more attractive to the motoring public. A congestion fee proposal is often regarded as simply a tax increase; also, especially in the US, motorists apparently regard the use of congestion fees as coercive, in that they often have few if any practical alternatives to paying the fee. Unlike most opinion surveys on congestion pricing, our survey was quite explicit about the fate of the collected revenues. For example, we presented respondents with policies that returned a substantial portion of the revenues to the public, either in the form of cash (through reductions in sales taxes and vehicle registration fees or through income tax credits) or in the form of coupons to be used for vehicle emissions equipment repair, transit, and the like. In addition, we examined whether the typically intense opposition to congestion pricing if applied only to a part of a roadway, leaving the motorist free to choose between free lanes and toll lanes. We find that a promise to offset the imposition of congestion fees by other taxes can result in a 7% point increase in support for congestion pricing policies, and the restriction of congestion pricing to a single lane on a freeway attracts from 9% to 17% points of additional support.     

Electric vehicle charging station locations: Elastic demand,station congestion,and network equilibrium

Battery-only electric vehicles (BEVs) generally offer better air quality through lowered emissions, along with energy savings and security. The issue of long-duration battery charging makes charging-station placement and design key for BEV adoption rates. This work uses genetic algorithms to identify profit-maximizing station placement and design details, with applications that reflect the costs of installing, operating, and maintaining service equipment, including land acquisition. Fast electric vehicle charging stations (EVCSs) are placed across a congested city's network subject to stochastic demand for charging under a user-equilibrium traffic assignment. BEV users’ station choices consider endogenously determined travel times and on-site charging queues. The model allows for congested-travel and congested-station feedback into travelers’ route choices under elastic demand and BEV owners’ station choices, as well as charging price elasticity for BEV charging users.Boston-network results suggest that EVCSs should locate mostly along major highways, which may be a common finding for other metro settings. If 10% of current EV owners seek to charge en route, a user fee of $6 for a 30-min charging session is not enough for station profitability under a 5-year time horizon in this region. However, $10 per BEV charging delivers a 5-year profit of $0.82 million, and 11 cords across 3 stations are enough to accommodate a near-term charging demand in this Boston-area application. Shorter charging sessions, higher fees, and/or allowing for more cords per site also increase profits generally, everything else constant. Power-grid and station upgrades should keep pace with demand, to maximize profits over time, and avoid on-site congestion.     

实行计重收费后交通量变化的原因与对策

文章针对广西高速公路实行计重收费后交通量、通行费收入的变化情况,分析了高速公路通行费收入变化的特点与原因,提出了应对高速公路交通量流失的对策和方法。     

Paying for harbor maintenance in the US: Options for moving past the Harbor Maintenance Tax

The Harbor Maintenance Tax is a fundamentally flawed maintenance funding mechanism for the critical US port system. Three alternatives were analyzed. User fee rates were estimated for either a national or regional tonnage based fee. Our results indicate that maintenance cost recovering regional fees could vary widely from about 10 cents per tonne to nearly 80 cents per tonne. A national rate would be about 30 cents per tonne. The large regional differences and affects on bulk shippers are likely to make implementing and maintaining cost recovering tonnage based fees infeasible. Two other mechanisms are considered. One possibility is to abolish the HMT without a replacement mechanism. The obvious strength of this approach is its simplicity, the weaknesses is that it is not budget neutral. Another possibility is to increase the federal diesel tax rate. One strength of the approach is the reasonable rate increase required to recover port maintenance costs (estimated between 0.278 and 0.315 cents per liter). An additional strength is that relatively inefficient fuel users will either make the largest share of the additional payments or the freight will shift modes to one that is more efficient. One weakness is that the rate has been unchanged since 1997, this points to the political difficulty involved in passing such a rate increase.     

Economic analysis of collecting parking fees by a private firm

The purpose of this paper is to show the possibility of a co-existence of public and private parking management systems even when all the parking spaces are owned by the government. This study focuses on the issue of collecting parking fees by a private firm that has been used by some local governments in Taiwan. We assume that the government behaves as a leader and a private firm as a follower in a Stackelberg three-stage game. At stage 1, the government selects its parking space. At stage 2, the government and the firm set their parking fees simultaneously. At the final stage, consumers (drivers) choose the parking lot between the space of the government and that of the firm by considering the full costs, consisting of the parking fee and the searching (with congestion) time cost. The objective of the government is to maximize welfare and that of the firm is to maximize profit. The model is constructed at first and a simulation analysis is then made. The result supports the strategy of adopting the franchise of collecting parking fees if the private firm is more efficient than the government. Moreover, the government may keep fewer parking spaces and release more parking spaces to the firm under the goal of maximizing welfare.