Revenue sharing with multiple airlines and airports

This paper investigates the effects of concession revenue sharing between an airport and its airlines. It is found that the degree of revenue sharing will be affected by how airlines’ services are related to each other (complements, independent, or substitutes). In particular, when carriers provide strongly substitutable services to each other, the airport has incentive to charge airlines, rather than to pay airlines, a share of concession revenue. In these situations, while revenue sharing improves profit, it reduces social welfare. It is further found that airport competition results in a higher degree of revenue sharing than would be had in the case of single airports. The airport–airline chains may nevertheless derive lower profits through the revenue-sharing rivalry, and the situation is similar to a Prisoners’ Dilemma. As the chains move further away from their joint profit maximum, welfare rises beyond the level achievable by single airports. The (equilibrium) revenue-sharing proportion at an airport is also shown to decrease in the number of its carriers, and to increase in the number of carriers at competing airports. Finally, the effects of a ‘pure’ sharing contract are compared to those of the two-part sharing contract. It is found that whether an airport is subject to competition is critical to the welfare consequences of alternative revenue sharing arrangements.     

Intercontinental-airport regulation

This paper analyzes strategic interaction between intercontinental airport regulators, each of which levies airport charges paid by airlines and chooses its airport capacity under conditions of congestion. Congestion from intercontinental flights is common across intercontinental airports since departure and arrival airports are linked one to one, while purely domestic traffic also uses each airport. The paper focuses on two questions. First, if both continents can strategically set separate airport charges for domestic and intercontinental flights, how will the outcome differ from the first-best solution? Second, how is strategic airport behavior affected by the extent of market power of the airlines serving the intercontinental market? We see that strategic airport pricing and capacity choices by regulators lead to a welfare loss: the regulators both behave as monopolists in the market for intercontinental flights, charging a mark-up and decreasing capacity. This welfare loss even overshadows possible negative effects from imperfect competition within the intercontinental airline market. We further discuss how the presence of multiple regulators on one continent or a simple pricing rule might constrain the welfare loss created by strategic airport regulation.     

On the relationship between airport pricing models

Airport pricing papers can be divided into two approaches. In the traditional approach the demand for airport services depends on airport charges and on congestion costs of both passengers and airlines; the airline market is not formally modeled. In the vertical-structure approach instead, airports provide an input for an airline oligopoly and it is the equilibrium of this downstream market which determines the airports’ demand. We prove, analytically, that the traditional approach to airport pricing is valid if air carriers have no market power, i.e. airlines are atomistic or they behave as price takers (perfect competition) and have constant marginal operational costs. When carriers have market power, this approach may result in a surplus measure that falls short of giving a true measure of social surplus. Furthermore, its use prescribes a traffic level that is, for given capacity, smaller than the socially optimal level. When carriers have market power and consequently both airports and airlines behave strategically, a vertical-structure approach appears a more reasonable approach to airport pricing issues.     

Airport congestion pricing and passenger types

We consider a public and congested airport served by airlines that may have market power, and two types of travelers with different relative values of time. We find that in the absence of passenger-type-based price discrimination by airlines, it can be useful to increase the airport charge so as to protect passengers with a great relative time value from excessive congestion caused by passengers with a low relative time value. As a result, the socially efficient airport charge can be substantially higher than what we learned from the recent literature on congestion pricing with non-atomistic airlines.     

A new era for airport regulators through capacity investments

Private and public airports’ optimal actions may not coincide. While private airports usually pursue profit maximization, publicly owned airports look for maximum social welfare. Thus, the prices charged by private airports may differ from the socially optimal charges and public intervention may be needed. In this paper, we analyze airport charges when an increase in frequency produces positive or negative externalities and carriers have market power. We use the methodology of game theory to show that there may exist a level of capacity for which private and social objectives coincide, so no price regulation is needed. Thus, the usual role of regulators and planners could be modified in order to decide the appropriate capacity investments for which airport regulation is no longer necessary.     

Airport and airlines competition: Incentives for vertical collusion

This paper develops a model of airport and airline competition in a three-stage game. We analyse incentives for vertical collusion between one airport and one airline that compete with another airport and another airline, by means of static and dynamic games. We find that incentives for collusion exist when airports and airlines have different market sizes and, under certain conditions, also when secondary airports and low cost airlines compete with main airports and full service airlines.     

Optimal assignment for check-in counters based on passenger arrival behaviour at an airport

Establishing how to utilize check-in counters at airport passenger terminals efficiently is a major concern facing airport operators and airlines. Inadequate terminal capacity and the inefficient utilization of facilities such as check-in counters are major factors causing congestion and delays at airport passenger terminals. However, such delays and congestion can be reduced by increasing the efficiency of check-in counter operations, based on an understanding of passengers' airport access behaviour. This paper presents an assignment model for check-in counter operations, based on passengers' airport arrival patterns. In setting up the model, passenger surveys are used to determine when passengers arrive at the airport terminals relative to their flight departure times. The model then uses passenger arrival distribution patterns to calculate the most appropriate number of check-in counters and the duration of time that each counter should be operated. This assignment model has been applied at the Seoul Gimpo International Airport in Korea. The model provides not only a practical system for the efficient operations of time-to-time check-in counter assignments, but also a valuable means of developing effective longer-term solutions to the problem of passenger terminal congestion and delays. It also offers airlines a means of operating check-in counters with greater cost effectiveness, thus leading to enhanced customer service.     

An aggregate demand model for air passenger traffic in the hub-and-spoke network

In this paper, we build an aggregate demand model for air passenger traffic in a hub-and-spoke network. This model considers the roles of airline service variables such as service frequency, aircraft size, ticket price, flight distance, and number of spokes in the network. It also takes into account the influence of local passengers and social-economic and demographic conditions in the spoke and hub metropolitan areas. The hub airport capacity, which has a significant impact on service quality in the hub airport and in the whole hub-and-spoke network, is also taken into consideration.Our demand model reveals that airlines can attract more connecting passengers in a hub-and-spoke network by increasing service frequency than by increasing aircraft size in the same percentage. Our research confirms the importance of local service to connecting passengers, and finds that, interestingly, airlines’ services in the first flight leg are more important to attract passengers than those in the second flight segment. Based on data in this study, we also find that a 1% reduction of ticket price will bring about 0.9% more connecting passengers, and a 1% increase of airport acceptance rate can bring about 0.35% more connecting passengers in the network, with all else equal. These findings are helpful for airlines to understand the effects of changing their services, and also useful for us to quantify the benefits of hub airport expansion projects.At the end of this paper, we give an example as an application to demonstrate how the developed demand model could be used to valuate passengers’ direct benefit from airport capacity expansion.     

Seaport investments in capacity and natural disaster prevention

Most seaports face constraints in financial resources to some degree, and thus need to balance the investments in capacity and natural disaster prevention. On the one hand, due to budget constraint, limited resources need to be allocated between the two tasks. On the other hand, the benefit of natural disaster prevention investment is likely to be higher for ports with larger capacity. This study builds a stylized analytical model to examine the managerial and policy implications of such interactions between the two counteracting mechanisms. We find that the port managers would always prioritize capacity investment over natural disaster prevention investment. Social welfare maximizing ports invest more in both capacity and disaster prevention than those chosen by profit maximizing operators. However, compared with profit maximizing ports, welfare maximizing ports also require a larger budget to justify the investment in disaster prevention. Moreover, with increasing intensity of natural disaster, a port’s capacity investment decreases and its disaster prevention investment increases, irrespective of its objective. The magnitudes of both changes are larger for welfare maximizing ports than for profit maximizing ports.     

High-speed rail and air transport competition and cooperation: A vertical differentiation approach

This paper considers vertical differentiation between air transport and high-speed rail (HSR) with different ranges of travel distance to analyze the air-HSR competition effects on fares, traffic volumes and welfare, as well as the conditions under which air-HSR cooperation is welfare-enhancing. The analysis is conducted in a hub-and-spoke network with a network carrier, an HSR operator, and a spoke airline, taking into account potential hub airport capacity constraint. We find that air-HSR competition in the connecting market may result in the network airline charging an excessively high price in the HSR-inaccessible market. This effect is present even when the HSR-inaccessible route is a duopoly-airline market. On the other hand, air-HSR cooperation increases fares in the connecting market, and an improvement in rail speed or air-HSR connecting time reduces airfare on the routes where HSR and the airline compete. When the airline cannot serve all the markets due to limited hub airport capacity, it would withdraw from the market in which it has less competitive advantage over HSR. Finally, air-HSR cooperation is more likely to be welfare-improving when the hub airport is capacity constrained, and when either air transport or HSR exhibits strong economies of traffic density.     

Multiple hub network and high-speed railway: Connectivity,gateway, and airport leakage

This paper considers the relation between the role of airport as gateway (inter–intra transit airport) and the connectivity between air transport and high-speed rail (HSR) transport to discuss the possibility of a multiple gateway system with HSR. We deal with both international and domestic transport markets in the model analysis. In the international markets, only airlines compete against each other, while in the domestic market airlines and HSR compete against each other. The results suggest that the improvement of connectivity between air and HSR at the airport increases its international passengers, and therefore, that strengthens its role as gateway, for example, gathering more inter–intra transit passengers. However, the results also suggest that the demand of the area which the airport belongs to affects the role of airport as gateway.     

Apron capacity at hub airports—the impact of wave‐system structure

At hub airports, dominant airlines/alliance coordinate their flights in time with the aim of increasing the number (and quality) of connections, thus producing a wave‐system in traffic schedules. This paper addresses the impact of concentrating aircraft into waves on airport apron capacity. Existing models for apron capacity estimation are based on the number of stands, stand occupancy time, and demand structure, differing between representative groups of aircraft served at an airport. Criteria for aircraft grouping are aircraft type and/or airline and/or type of service (domestic, international, etc.). Modified deterministic analytical models proposed in this paper also take into account the wave‐system parameters, as well as runway capacity. They include the impact of these parameters on the number of flights in wave, stand occupancy time, and consequently apron capacity. Numerical examples illustrate the difference between apron capacity for an origin–destination airport and a hub airport, under the same conditions; utilization of the theoretical apron capacity at a hub airport, given the wave‐system structure; and utilization of the apron capacity at a hub airport when point‐to‐point traffic is allowed to use idle stands. Furthermore, the influence of different assignment strategies for aircraft stands in the case of hub airports is also discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Airline’s choice of aircraft size – Explanations and implications

When facing a growth in demand, airlines tend to respond more by means of increasing frequencies than by increasing aircraft size. At many of the world’s largest airports there are fewer than 100 passengers per air transport movement, although congestion and delays are growing. Furthermore, demand for air transport is predicted to continue growing but aircraft size is not. This paper aims to investigate and explain this phenomenon, the choice of relatively small aircraft. It seems that this choice is associated mainly with the benefits of high frequency service, the competitive environment in which airlines operate and the way airport capacity is allocated and priced. Regression analysis of over 500 routes in the US, Europe and Asia provides empirical evidence that the choice of aircraft size is mainly influenced by route characteristics (e.g. distance, level of demand and level of competition) and almost not at all by airport characteristics (e.g. number of runways and whether the airport is a hub or slot coordinated). We discuss the implications of this choice of aircraft size and suggest that some market imperfections exist in the airline industry leading airlines to offer excessive frequency on some routes and too low frequency on others.     

Effects of high-speed rail and airline cooperation under hub airport capacity constraint

This paper analyzes the effects of cooperation between a hub-and-spoke airline and a high-speed rail (HSR) operator when the hub airport may be capacity-constrained. We find that such cooperation reduces traffic in markets where prior modal competition occurs, but may increase traffic in other markets of the network. The cooperation improves welfare, independent of whether or not the hub capacity is constrained, as long as the modal substitutability in the overlapping markets is low. However, if the modal substitutability is high, then hub capacity plays an important role in assessing the welfare impact: If the hub airports are significantly capacity-constrained, the cooperation improves welfare; otherwise, it is likely welfare reducing. Through simulations we further study the welfare effects of modal asymmetries in the demands and costs, heterogeneous passenger types, and economies of traffic density. Our analysis shows that the economies of traffic density alone cannot justify airline–HSR cooperation.     

Flight delays,capacity investment and social welfare under air transport supply-demand equilibrium

This paper analyzes benefits from aviation infrastructure investment under competitive supply-demand equilibrium. The analysis recognizes that, in the air transportation system where economies of density is an inherent characteristic, capacity change would trigger a complicated set of adjustment of and interplay among passenger demand, air fare, flight frequency, aircraft size, and flight delays, leading to an equilibrium shift. An analytical model that incorporates these elements is developed. The results from comparative static analysis show that capacity constraint suppresses demand, reduces flight frequency, and increases passenger generalized cost. Our numerical analysis further reveals that, by switching to larger aircraft size, airlines manage to offset part of the delay effect on unit operating cost, and charge passengers lower fare. With higher capacity, airlines tend to raise both fare and frequency while decreasing aircraft size. More demand emerges in the market, with reduced generalized cost for each traveler. The marginal benefit brought by capacity expansion diminishes as the capacity-demand imbalance becomes less severe. Existing passengers in the market receive most of the benefit, followed by airlines. The welfare gains from induced demand are much smaller. The equilibrium approach yields more plausible investment benefit estimates than does the conventional method. In particular, when forecasting future demand the equilibrium approach is capable of preventing the occurrence of excessive high delays.     

Dealing with the efficient allocation of scarce resources at congested airports

The existing slot allocation mechanism, based on the International Air Transport Association (IATA) system and its complementary version of the European Union (EU) regulation, produces rather poor capacity allocation outcomes for congested EU airports since it fails to properly match slots requested with slots allocated to airlines. Inefficiencies during the initial allocation are mainly due to the problem complexity in conjunction to limited decision support available to slot coordinators. On the other hand, substantial inefficiencies give rise to severe slot misuse and unreasonably low utilisation of airport resources running already into scarcity. The objective of this paper is to develop an optimisation-based model implementing the existing EU/IATA rules, operational constraints, and coordination procedures with the ultimate objective to better accommodate airlines’ preferences at coordinated airports through the minimisation of the difference between the requested and the allocated slot times to airlines. The results of the model are assessed and compared vis-à-vis the allocation outcome produced according to current slot coordination practice in three regional Greek airports. The proposed model produces very promising results and demonstrates that there is large room for improvement of the efficiency of the current allocation outcome in a range between 14% and 95%. The discussion of the model results is complemented by a sensitivity analysis highlighting the importance of declared capacity and the magnitude of its influence on slot allocation efficiency.     

Performance based clustering for benchmarking of US airports

Managing service operations is gaining significant attention in both academic and practitioner circles. In this broad area, performance evaluation and process improvement of airlines and air carriers has been the focus of several studies. Although efficient airport operations are critical for improved performance of airlines and air carriers, few studies have focused on airport performance measurement. This study evaluates the operational efficiencies of 44 major US airports across 5 years using multi-criteria non-parametric models. These efficiency scores are treated by a clustering method in identifying benchmarks for improving poorly performing airports. Efficiency measures are based on four resource input measures including airport operational costs, number of airport employees, gates and runways, and five output measures including operational revenue, passenger flow, commercial and general aviation movement, and total cargo transportation. The methodology presented here can be generalized to other industries and institutions.     

Airline network choice and market coverage under high-speed rail competition

While the existing literature has focused on the short-term impacts, this paper investigates the long-term impacts of high-speed rail (HSR) competition on airlines. An analytical model is developed to study how an airline may change its network and market coverage when facing HSR competition on trunk routes. We show that prior to HSR competition, an airline is more likely to adopt a fully-connected network and cover fewer fringe markets if the trunk market is large. Under HSR competition, the airline will, for a given network structure, have a greater incentive to cover more fringe (regional or foreign) markets if the trunk market is large, or the airline network is close to hub-and-spoke. Further, the airline will, for any given market coverage, move towards a hub-and-spoke network when the trunk market is large, or the number of fringe markets covered by the airline network is large. Both effects are more prominent when the decreasing rate of airline density economies is large. We further show that HSR competition can induce the airline to adopt network structure and market coverage that are closer to the socially optimal ones, thereby suggesting a new source of welfare gain from HSR based on its long-term impacts on airlines. Implications for operators, policy makers and specific countries (such as China) are also discussed.     

Airport demand management: The operations research and economics perspectives and potential synergies

Airport demand management aims to mitigate air traffic congestion by limiting the imbalances between demand and capacity at busy airports through administrative measures (e.g., slot controls) or economic incentives (e.g., congestion pricing, slot auctions). This paper provides an integrated synthesis of the contributions of the fields of operations research/management science (OR/MS) and economics on the subject matter. From an operating standpoint, assessing the benefits of demand management requires estimates of airport capacity and models of airport on-time performance. From a managerial standpoint, the design of demand management mechanisms can be supported by decision-making models of flight scheduling. From an economic standpoint, the welfare impact of congestion pricing, slot controls and slot auctions depends on the market structure at the airport. This paper proposes an integrated framework that underscores the interdependencies between these operating, managerial and economic aspects to foster cross-disciplinary approaches toward more effective demand management policies at busy airports worldwide.     

Airline competition and network structure

This paper studies airline networks and their welfare implications in an unregulated environment. Competing airlines may adopt either fully-connected (FC) or hub-and-spoke (HS) network structures; and passengers exhibiting low brand loyalty to their preferred carrier choose an outside option to travel so that markets are partially served by airlines. In this context, carriers adopt hubbing strategies when costs are sufficiently low, and asymmetric equilibria where one carrier chooses a FC strategy and the other chooses a HS strategy may arise. Quite interestingly, flight frequency can become excessive under HS network configurations.