Analysis of regulation and policy of private toll roads in a build-operate-transfer scheme under demand uncertainty

The build-operate-transfer (BOT) approach is one of the privatization mechanisms for promoting transportation infrastructure developments by using private funds to construct new infrastructure facilities. In a BOT scheme, it often involves three parties: the government, whose objective is to maximize the benefit defined in terms of social welfare added to the society; the private investors, whose objective is to maximize the profit generated from the investment; and the road users, whose objective is to minimize the inequality of benefit distribution among the road users traveling from different origin–destination pairs. Each of these parties has different objectives that often conflict with each other. In this paper, we develop various optimal road pricing models under demand uncertainty for analyzing the tradeoffs among the three objectives. In addition, a project evaluation framework is developed for assessing the effects of government policy and regulation on the BOT project. Seven cases of the BOT road pricing problem are analyzed: (1) BOT without regulation, (2) BOT with price control regulation, (3) BOT with equity regulation, (4) BOT with construction cost subsidy, (5) BOT with concession period extension, (6) BOT with construction cost subsidy and concession period extension, and (7) BOT with multiple objectives. Numerical results using a real case study of the Ban Pong–Kanchananburi Motorway (BMK) in Thailand are provided to examine the above seven cases.     

Time-dependent area-based pricing for multimodal systems with heterogeneous users in an agent-based environment

In this paper, we investigate an area-based pricing scheme for congested multimodal urban networks with the consideration of user heterogeneity. We propose a time-dependent pricing scheme where the tolls are iteratively adjusted through a Proportional–Integral type feedback controller, based on the level of vehicular traffic congestion and traveler’s behavioral adaptation to the cost of pricing. The level of congestion is described at the network level by a Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram, which has been recently applied to develop network-level traffic management strategies. Within this dynamic congestion pricing scheme, we differentiate two groups of users with respect to their value-of-time (which related to income levels). We then integrate incentives, such as improving public transport services or return part of the toll to some users, to motivate mode shift and increase the efficiency of pricing and to attain equitable savings for all users. A case study of a medium size network is carried out using an agent-based simulator. The developed pricing scheme demonstrates high efficiency in congestion reduction. Comparing to pricing schemes that utilize similar control mechanisms in literature which do not treat the adaptivity of users, the proposed pricing scheme shows higher flexibility in toll adjustment and a smooth behavioral stabilization in long-term operation. Significant differences in behavioral responses are found between the two user groups, highlighting the importance of equity treatment in the design of congestion pricing schemes. By integrating incentive programs for public transport using the collected toll revenue, more efficient pricing strategies can be developed where savings in travel time outweigh the cost of pricing, achieving substantial welfare gain.     

Welfare effects of road pricing and traffic information under alternative ownership regimes

This paper models strategic interactions between a road supplier, a provider of traffic information, and road users, with stochastic travel times. Using a game-theoretical analysis of suppliers’ pricing strategies, we assess the social welfare effects of traffic information under various ownership regimes. The results show that the distortive welfare effect of monopolistic information pricing appears relatively small. Collusion of the road operator and information provider yields higher social welfare than independent pricing by two firms. The intuition behind this result resembles that behind the welfare effects of double marginalization, but is not exactly the same, as traffic information is not strictly complementary to road use.     

Accounting for travel time variability in the optimal pricing of cars and buses

A number of studies have shown that in addition to travel time and cost as the common influences on mode, route and departure time choices, travel time variability plays an increasingly important role, especially in the presence of traffic congestion on roads and crowding on public transport. The dominant focus of modelling and implementation of optimal pricing that incorporates trip time variability has been in the context of road pricing for cars. The main objective of this paper is to introduce a non-trivial extension to the existing literature on optimal pricing in a multimodal setting, building in the role of travel time variability as a source of disutility for car and bus users. We estimate the effect of variability in travel time and bus headway on optimal prices (i.e., tolls for cars and fares for buses) and optimal bus capacity (i.e., frequencies and size) accounting for crowding on buses, under a social welfare maximisation framework. Travel time variability is included by adopting the well-known mean–variance model, using an empirical relationship between the mean and standard deviation of travel times. We illustrate our model with an application to a highly congested corridor with cars, buses and walking as travel alternatives in Sydney, Australia. There are three main findings that have immediate policy implications: (i) including travel time variability results in higher optimal car tolls and substantial increases in toll revenue, while optimal bus fares remain almost unchanged; (ii) when bus headways are variable, the inclusion of travel time variability as a source of disutility for users yields higher optimal bus frequencies; and (iii) including both travel time variability and crowding discomfort leads to higher optimal bus sizes.     

Optimal choice of capacity,toll and government guarantee for build-operate-transfer roads under asymmetric cost information

The private provision of public roads via the build-operate-transfer (BOT) mode has been increasingly used around the world. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of road capacity, toll and government guarantee, this paper investigates optimal concession contract design under both symmetric and asymmetric information about the marginal maintenance cost of private investors. Under asymmetric information, the government guarantee serves as an instrument to induce a private investor to reveal his true cost information. Compared with the situation under symmetric information, the government will suffer a loss of social welfare; the private investor will charge a higher toll that increases in his reported marginal maintenance cost, and specify a lower capacity that decreases with the reported cost. The results also show that the private investor obtains extra information rent beyond the reservation level of return and the rent decreases with his reported cost. However, the resulting volume-capacity ratios of the BOT road under both information structures are the same.     

Social welfare analysis of investment public–private partnership approaches for transportation projects

This paper has two objectives: (i) to introduce a new approach in order to gain widespread support for road pricing; and (ii) to develop a detailed social welfare analysis for road pricing schemes. We first describe our novel approach that stimulates public support for road pricing, which we refer to as an investment public–private partnership, or IP3. This approach returns a significant portion of the economic value created by road pricing back to the citizens who own the newly priced facility. We then present a social welfare framework that estimates the benefits and costs of using the IP3 approach on an urban transportation network. A P3 project’s impact on overall social welfare provides a more comprehensive evaluation criterion than the often-used Value for Money (VfM) analysis. Apart from several theoretical studies, a detailed social welfare analysis that includes all major P3 project stakeholders is absent from the literature. We use Fresno, California as our case study in order to conduct a welfare analysis on IP3s. Our results show that system-optimal tolling favors average users, but that government—and consequently taxpayers—should pay for costly tolling systems (negative profits). In contrast, unlimited profit-maximizing tolls raise substantial profits for government, for the infrastructure’s citizen-owners, and for the private sector, but the average user is worse off. From a social-welfare perspective, one should search for a Pareto improvement under which all major stakeholders are better off. Our estimates indicate that a mixed public and private tolling scheme offers such an improvement.     

Traffic dynamics in a bi-modal transportation network with information provision and adaptive transit services

This paper has two major components. The first one is the day-to-day evolution of travelers’ mode and route choices in a bi-modal transportation system where traffic information (predicted travel cost) is available to travelers. The second one is a public transit operator adjusting or adapting its service over time (from period to period) based on observed system conditions. Particularly, we consider that on each day both travelers’ past travel experiences and the predicted travel cost (based on information provision) can affect travelers’ perceptions of different modes and routes, and thus affect their mode choice and/or route choice accordingly. This evolution process from day to day is formulated by a discrete dynamical model. The properties of such a dynamical model are then analyzed, including the existence, uniqueness and stability of the fixed point. Most importantly, we show that the predicted travel cost based on information provision may help stabilize the dynamical system even if it is not fully accurate. Given the day-to-day traffic evolution, we then model an adaptive transit operator who can adjust frequency and fare for public transit from period to period (each period contains a certain number of days). The adaptive frequency and fare in one period are determined from the realized transit demands and transit profits of the previous periods, which is to achieve a (locally) maximum transit profit. The day-to-day and period-to-period models and their properties are also illustrated by numerical experiments.     

Analysis of the optimal length of road expansion – A case study of the Taipei metropolitan area

This study explores the optimal investment in the length of an expanded section of road to mitigate the congestion on a transportation corridor. It is assumed that one end of the road is in the central business district (CBD) and that the households are uniformly distributed along the road. Each individual makes trips from his/her residence to the CBD. Trip demand is elastic and depends on the cost of the trip (including congestion costs). During the first stage, the government determines the length of the expanded section given the width of that section. In the second stage, road users determine their trip demands by taking into consideration the trip cost function. In the process of solving this problem, the equilibrium traffic volume is first solved using differential equations. The optimal length of the expanded section is then solved by maximizing the social welfare. The analysis is then applied to the case of the Tucheng city – Banciao city – Taipei CBD corridor in the Taipei metropolitan area. The scheme of road expansion without tolling performs closely to the first-best scheme for the case of a high potential demand. This study’s approach can serve as valuable reference for city planners engaged in road planning in a transportation corridor between the CBD and satellite cities in a metropolitan area.     

Optimal selection of build-operate-transfer projects on transportation networks

This paper considers the problem of how to select highway projects for the build-operate-transfer (BOT) development with the objective of improving the social benefit while ensuring the marketability of those selected. The problem can be viewed as a tri-level leader-follower game and is formulated as a mixed integer program with equilibrium constraints. Without solving the associated problem, we show that optimal tolls and travel times on selected BOT highways can be determined from their attributes under mild assumptions. This leads to an efficient heuristic algorithm for solving the project selection problem.     

Implications of the cost of public funds in public transit subsidization and regulation

This paper identifies some implications of the cost of public funds (CF) in public transit subsidization and regulation. Regulation is considered because a monopolistic operator is assumed. A social welfare maximization model is proposed, subject to individual rationality and vehicle capacity constraints. Optimality conditions are provided and a key formula is derived about CF’s role in balancing the need to cover the fixed operation cost through fares on the operator’s side and the effort to maintain the user surplus on the passengers’ side. Major findings from this model’s formulation include: (1) CF determines the extent to which the passengers’ surplus is compromised in order to cover the fixed part of the operating cost, and (2) subsidy is unjustified when CF exceeds the critical shadow price of the financial constraint. Analytical relations are illustrated through numerical examples.     

Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area

In many countries passenger transport is significantly subsidized in a variety of ways for various reasons. The objective of this paper is to examine efficiency, distributional, environmental (CO₂ emissions) and spatial effects of increasing different kinds of passenger transport subsidies discriminating between household types, travel purposes and travel modes. The effects are calculated by applying a numerical spatial general equilibrium approach calibrated to an average German metropolitan area. In extension to most studies focusing on only one kind of subsidy, we compare the effects of different transport subsidies within the same unified framework that allows to account for two features not yet considered simultaneously in studies on transport subsidies: endogenous labor supply and location decisions. Furthermore, congestion, travel mode choice, travel related CO₂ emissions and institutional details regarding the tax system in Germany are taken into account. The results suggest that optimal subsidy levels are either small or even zero. While subsidizing public transport is welfare enhancing, subsidies to urban road traffic reduce aggregate urban welfare. Concerning the latter it is shown that making investments in urban road infrastructure capacity or reducing gasoline taxes may even be harmful to residents using predominantly automobile. In contrast, pure commuting subsidies hardly affect aggregate urban welfare, but distributional effects are substantial. All policies cause suburbanization of city residents and (except for subsidizing public transport) contribute to urban sprawl by raising the spatial imbalance of residences and jobs but the effect is relatively small. In addition, the policies induce a very differentiated pattern regarding distributional effects, benefits of landowners and environmental effects.     

Welfare evaluation with a road capacity constraint

Severe traffic congestion in and around many cities across the world has resulted in programmes of extensive road building and other capacity increasing projects. But traffic congestion has often not fallen in the long run and neither has journey speed increased. Demand for peak period road travel, particularly by car, has grown so strongly that increases in road capacity have been quickly matched by increased road use. This paper develops a model of a road network characterised by insatiable road passenger (car and bus) demand. The model parameters are calibrated on a typical urban road network, and a number of simulations conducted to determine social welfare after the introduction of a road capacity constraint into the optimisation process. The empirical results have an important policy implication for the evaluation of projects that increase road capacity, namely that standard methods of cost-benefit analysis may tend to overestimate the net benefits of such projects by a significant amount. Although the model is developed in the context of roads and road traffic congestion, it could also be applied to air travel.     

Selection bias in build-operate-transfer transportation project appraisals

Recent empirical studies have found widespread inaccuracies in traffic forecasts despite the fact that travel demand forecasting models have been significantly improved over the past few decades. We suspect that an intrinsic selection bias may exist in the competitive project appraisal process, in addition to the many other factors that contribute to inaccurate traffic forecasts. In this paper, we examine the potential for selection bias in the governmental process of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) transportation project appraisals. Although the simultaneous consideration of multiple criteria is typically used in practice, traffic flow estimate is usually a key criterion in these appraisals. For the purposes of this paper, we focus on the selection bias associated with the highest flow estimate criterion. We develop two approaches to quantify the level and chance of inaccuracy caused by selection bias: the expected value approach and the probability approach. The expected value approach addresses the question “to what extent is inaccuracy caused by selection bias?”. The probability approach addresses the question “what is the chance of inaccuracy due to selection bias?”. The results of this analysis confirm the existence of selection bias when a government uses the highest traffic forecast estimate as the priority criterion for BOT project selection. In addition, we offer some insights into the relationship between the extent/chance of inaccuracy and other related factors. We do not argue that selection bias is the only reason for inaccurate traffic forecasts in BOT projects; however, it does appear that it could be an intrinsic factor worthy of further attention and investigation.     

Optimal tolls for multi-class traffic: Analytical formulations and policy implications

This paper puts together an analytical formulation to compute optimal tolls for multi-class traffic. The formulation is comprised of two major modules. The first one is an optimization component aimed at computing optimal tolls assuming a Stackelberg game in which the toll agency sets the tolls, and the equilibrating traffic plays the role of the followers. The optimization component is supported by a set of cost models that estimate the externalities as a function of a multivariate vector of traffic flows. These models were estimated using Taylor series expansions of the output obtained from traffic simulations of a hypothetical test case. Of importance to the paper is the total travel time function estimated using this approach that expresses total travel time as a multivariate function of the traffic volumes. The formulation presented in the paper is then applied to a variety of scenarios to gain insight into the optimality of current toll policies. The optimal tolls are computed for two different cases: independent tolls, and tolls proportional to passenger car equivalencies (PCE).The numerical results clearly show that setting tolls proportional to PCEs leads to lower values of welfare that are on average 15% lower than when using independent tolls, though, in some cases the total welfare could be up to 33% lower. This is a consequence of two factors. First, the case of independent tolls has more degrees of freedom than the case of tolls proportional to PCEs. Second, tolls proportional to PCEs do not account for externalities other than congestion, which is likely to lead to lower welfare values.The analytical formulations and numerical results indicate that, because the total travel time is a non-linear function of the traffic volumes, the marginal social costs and thus the optimal congestion tolls also depend on the traffic volumes for each vehicle class. As a result of this, for the relatively low volumes of truck traffic observed in real life, the optimal congestion tolls for trucks could indeed be either lower or about the same as for passenger cars. This stand in sharp contrast with what is implied in the use of PCEs, i.e., that the contribution to congestion are constant. This latter assumption leads to optimal truck congestion tolls that are always proportional to the PCE values.The comparison of the toll ratios (truck tolls divided by passenger car tolls) for both observed and optimal conditions suggests that the tolls for small trucks are about the right level, maybe a slightly lower than optimal. However, the analysis of the toll ratio for large trucks seems to indicate a significant overcharge. The estimates show that the average observed toll ratio for large trucks is even higher than the maximum optimal toll ratio found in the numerical experiments. This suggests that the tolls for large trucks are set on the basis of revenue generation principles while the passenger car tolls are being set based on a mild form of welfare maximization. This leads to a suboptimal cross-subsidization of passenger car traffic in detriment of an important sector of the economy.     

The role of public authorities

Advances in information technology and telecommunications are opening up the possibility of transforming the capture, application and dissemination of information on transport operations and road traffic, at the same time as growing congestion makes accurate and timely information more valuable than ever to users and managers. Because of open access to road networks, public authorities are bound to intervene in the field of travel information: in the provision of infrastructure, the handling of the information, the licensing of services, and the regulation of users affecting safety or social well-being. The paper discusses these rôles and the levels at which they may be exercised, with particular reference to standardisation issues in Europe and internationally.     

Modeling and optimization of multimodal urban networks with limited parking and dynamic pricing

Cruising-for-parking constraints mobility in urban networks. Car-users may have to cruise for on-street parking before reaching their destinations. The accessibility and the cost of parking significantly influence people's travel behavior (such as mode choice, or parking facility choice between on-street and garage). The cruising flow causes delays eventually to everyone, even users with destinations outside limited parking areas. It is therefore important to understand the impact of parking limitation on mobility, and to identify efficient parking policies for travel cost reduction. Most existing studies on parking fall short in reproducing the dynamic spatiotemporal features of traffic congestion in general, lack the treatment of dynamics of the cruising-for-parking phenomenon, or require detailed input data that are typically costly and difficult to collect. In this paper, we propose an aggregated and dynamic approach for modeling multimodal traffic with the treatment on parking, and utilize the approach to design dynamic parking pricing strategies. The proposed approach is based on the Macroscopic Fundamental Diagram (MFD), which can capture congestion dynamics at network-level for single-mode and bi-modal (car and bus) systems. A parsimonious parking model is integrated into the MFD-based multimodal modeling framework, where the dynamics of vehicular and passenger flows are considered with a change in the aggregated behavior (e.g. mode choice and parking facility choice) caused by cruising and congestion. Pricing strategies are developed with the objective of reducing congestion, as well as lowering the total travel cost of all users. A case study is carried out for a bi-modal city network with a congested downtown region. An elegant feedback dynamic parking pricing strategy can effectively reduce travel delay of cruising and the generic congestion. Remarkably, such strategy, which is applicable in real-time management with limited available data, is fairly as efficient as a dynamic pricing scheme obtained from system optimum conditions and a global optimization with full information about the future states of the system. Stackelberg equilibrium is also investigated in a competitive behavior between different parking facility operators. Policy indications on on-street storage capacity management and pricing are provided.     

Morning commute problem considering route choice, user heterogeneity and alternative system optima

This paper extends the bottleneck model to study congestion behavior of morning commute and its implications to transportation economics. The proposed model considers simultaneous route and departure time choices of heterogenous users who are distinguished by their valuation of travel time and punctual arrival. Moreover, two dynamic system optima are considered: one minimizes system cost in the unit of monetary value (i.e., the conventional system optimum, or SO) and the other minimizes system cost in the unit of travel time (i.e., the time-based SO, or TSO). Analytical solutions of no-toll equilibrium, SO and TSO are provided and the welfare effects of the corresponding dynamic congestion pricing options are examined, with and without route choice. The analyses suggest that TSO provides a Pareto-improving solution to the social inequity issue associated with SO. Although a TSO toll is generally discriminatory, anonymous TSO tolls do exist under certain circumstances. Unlike in the case with homogenous users, an SO toll generally alters users’ route choices by tolling the poorer users off the more desirable road, which worsens social inequity. Numerical examples are presented to verify analytical results.     

Network-wide adaptive tolling for connected and automated vehicles

This article proposes Δ-tolling, a simple adaptive pricing scheme which only requires travel time observations and two tuning parameters. These tolls are applied throughout a road network, and can be updated as frequently as travel time observations are made. Notably, Δ-tolling does not require any details of the traffic flow or travel demand models other than travel time observations, rendering it easy to apply in real-time. The flexibility of this tolling scheme is demonstrated in three specific traffic modeling contexts with varying traffic flow and user behavior assumptions: a day-to-day pricing model using static network equilibrium with link delay functions; a within-day adaptive pricing model using the cell transmission model and dynamic routing of vehicles; and a microsimulation of reservation-based intersection control for connected and autonomous vehicles with myopic routing. In all cases, Δ-tolling produces significant benefits over the no-toll case, measured in terms of average travel time and social welfare, while only requiring two parameters to be tuned. Some optimality results are also given for the special case of the static network equilibrium model with BPR-style delay functions.     

An equilibrium analysis of commuter parking in the era of autonomous vehicles

This study is the first in the literature to model the joint equilibrium of departure time and parking location choices when commuters travel with autonomous vehicles (AVs). With AVs, walking from parking spaces to the work location is not needed. Instead, AVs will drop off the commuters at the workplace and then drive themselves to the parking spaces. In this context, the equilibrium departure/arrival profile is different from the literature with non-autonomous vehicles (non-AVs). Besides modeling the commuting equilibrium, this study further develops the first-best time-dependent congestion tolling scheme to achieve the system optimum. Also, a location-dependent parking pricing scheme is developed to replace the tolling scheme. Furthermore, this study discusses the optimal parking supply to minimize the total system cost (including both the travel cost and the social cost of parking supply) under either user equilibrium or system optimum traffic flow pattern. It is found that the optimal planning of parking can be different from the non-AV situation, since the vehicles can drive themselves to parking spaces that are further away from the city center and walking of commuters is avoided. This paper sheds light on future parking supply planning and traffic management.     

Incentive subsidy scheme design with elastic transport demand

Huge public transport subsidies caused by deficits have become a heavy financial burden on some local governments due to the decline of bus passenger numbers. It is essential to apply the performance‐based contract to bus services considering maximization of social welfare. This paper constructs an incentive subsidy contract considering the decision‐making powers of the service level and calculating the proper frequency elasticity aiming at two problems of performance‐based contracts. Meanwhile, we consider a role of bus operators ignored by most researchers. Under the scheme, the decision‐making power of the service level is discussed based on five assumptions, and meanwhile, bus operators are motivated to reduce cost and improve service level in the scheme. The case of the bus service of Arao city indicates that the optimal frequency equals to zero when bus operators decide frequency. If bus operators determine efforts, the optimal effort also equals to zero with the goal of maximizing the profit. Also, bus operators can play their roles in lessening cost and improving service level to help bus operators and the local government achieve a win‐win situation, which maximizes the social benefit in this subsidy scheme when all factors are decided by the government. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.