An algorithm for combining autonomous vehicles and controlled events in driving simulator experiments

Autonomous vehicles can be used to create realistic simulations of surrounding vehicles in driving simulators. However, the use of autonomous vehicles makes it difficult to ensure reproducibility between subjects. In this paper, an effort is made to solve the problem by combining autonomous vehicles and controlled events. A controlled event can be compared to a theatre play. The aim is to achieve the same initial play conditions for each subject, which can be problematic since the traffic situation around the subject will be dependent upon each subject’s actions while driving in autonomous traffic. This paper presents an algorithm that achieves the transition from autonomous traffic to a predefined start condition for a play. The algorithm has been tested in the Swedish National Road and Transport Research Institute (VTI) driving simulator III with promising results. In most of the cases we examined the algorithm could reconstruct the specified start condition and conduct the transition from autonomous to controlled mode in a inconspicuous way. Some problems were observed regarding moving unwanted vehicles away from the closest area around the simulator vehicle, and this part of the algorithm has to be enhanced. The experiment also showed that the subjects drove faster in the presence of controlled everyday life traffic normally used in the VTI driving simulator than in autonomous traffic.     

Public transport policy for central-city travel in the light of recent experiences of congestion charging

Excellent public transport which makes the private car a minority mode of central-city travel is a necessary condition for a political process towards the introduction of congestion charges. However, the charging system costs in London and Stockholm have proved to be unexpectedly high. Therefore, before these costs come down to an affordable level, zero-fares for central-city travel and stricter parking policy would be a first-best combination in many cities, always provided that the public transport is really competitive. A bold venture in public transport development is consequently the top priority irrespective of the transport pricing policy direction.     

Optimal economic interventions in scheduled public transport

This chapter analyses appropriate regulatory instruments for public transport markets under monopoly and competition, respectively. For the monopoly case, the operator chooses too low supply, compared to welfare optimum. In contrast, for the competition case the operators choose too high supply, at least for the competition model that we have considered most appropriate. It is found that under monopoly a subsidy should be applied, while under competition taxation should be applied.     

Road pricing and parking policy

The starting point of this paper is that the collection costs of urban road pricing have turned out to be unexpectedly high. A comparative cost analysis of the congestion charging system of London, Stockholm, Oslo and Singapore also shows that there are large collection cost differences. The most striking difference is between Oslo and London. Oslo, like Stockholm has the necessary, natural, qualities for a central city toll ring with a limited number of entrances; just 18 and 19 tollgates are required. For large historic cities like London with hundreds of inlets to the central city, tollgates at every entrance would involve high investment costs and be very obtrusive in the street scene. The problem is, however, that the present London charging system, with no tollgates, shows high running costs, ten times higher than in Oslo, in spite of the fact that the charged number of vehicles is the same in the two cities. This is a formidable obstacle to alleviating urban traffic congestion in many big cities.The charging technology could hopefully be developed, however, another approach is to develop and combine other measures including traffic regulation, parking policy and public transport subsidisation, which would be only second-best in a hypothetical situation where road pricing is without costs. This paper focuses on parking policy. Two strands of parking policy reform are discussed; fringe benefit taxation of free workplace parking which has recently been introduced in Sweden and a two-part tariff at parking meters, which is suggested as an extension of congestion charging to all day traffic within the central city.     

Network design for line-based autonomous bus services

Transportation - The maturing of autonomous driving technology in recent years has led to several pilot projects and the initial integration of autonomous pods and buses into the public transport...     

Do frequent satisfying trips by public transport impact its intended use in later life?

Transportation - Previous studies have indicated that factors such as the built environment, attitudes and past behaviour can influence travel behaviour. However, the possible effect of travel...     

Can high speed rail offset its embedded emissions?

This paper analyzes the climate implications of investments in high speed railway lines given uncertainty in future transport demand, technology and power production. To capture the uncertainty of estimated parameters, distributions for the annual traffic emissions reduction required to compensate for the embedded emissions from the construction of infrastructure are calculated using Monte Carlo simulation. In order to balance the annualized emissions from the railway construction, traffic volumes of more than 10 million annual one-way trips are usually required. Most of the traffic diverted from other modes must come from aviation and the project cannot involve the extensive use of tunnels.     

Quality incentives and quality outcomes in procured public transport - Case study Stockholm

Gross contracts appear to be the most common contract form for procured public transport in Sweden and elsewhere. This contract form, it has been argued, gives weak incentives for operators to deliver the desired quality level. Therefore many procuring public transport authorities amend contracts with quality incentives.This paper examines how such quality incentives influence quality outcomes with focus on cancelled departures and delays. The main findings are that the introduction of quality incentives are correlated with both increases and decreases of measured quality outcomes.We hypothesise that the results are driven by underlying cost changes for achieving desired quality objectives that exceed the possible revenues from the incentives. In interviews with the Stockholm public transport authority (SL) and some operators, two central observations surface. The first is that there are causes for quality failures that are not solely the responsibility of operators and that these are therefore not fully reached by the incentives, and the second is that the operators believe that they have exhausted what they can do under the current contracts.     

Workshop report - Public policy and transport

This workshop considered the wider public policy goals of a range of transport interventions. Particular attention was paid to assessing the role of integration of the different components of the transport system and of the integration of transport with other economic sectors. This assessment was informed by Ray Pawson’s realist evaluation approach, with its emphasis on the inter-relationships between context, process and outcome. The context was provided by case studies covering small urban areas, large urban areas and inter-urban corridors. The three key processes identified related to a regulated system with public ownership and control, a deregulated system with private sector ownership (‘competition in the market’) and a system in which there was public planning of the transport system but private provision (‘competition for the market’). Outcomes can be assessed using cost-benefit analysis tools to determine impacts on economic welfare or more qualitative approaches can be used to determine the extent to which accessibility or sustainability goals have been achieved. The evidence provided suggests that wider public policy goals are more important for urban than for inter-urban transport and it thus in urban areas where integration should be pursued with most vigour. The most relevant process for achieving this would seem to be variants of the competition for the market model. Some policy recommendations are made and implications for further research and for future conferences assessed.     

Vertical separation as means to establish interoperability in road tolling in Europe

As more European roads become tolled by various means, an increasing share of road users become subject to more than one tolling scheme in their regular driving. This can be especially burdensome for long distance hauliers, who may pass several countries and tolled motorway systems during the course of 1 day. For this reason, a range of projects have been initiated attempting to increase the level of interoperability between tolling systems, many of which with only limited success. By analyzing current incentives, costs and benefits for toll operators and road users, we conclude firstly that the current level of interoperability is likely to be lower than socially optimal, and secondly that a direct regulation making the provision of interoperability mandatory is likely to be in excess of what is socially optimal. We argue that vertically separating the monopolistic toll operators could be a cost-efficient way to achieve a socially optimal level of interoperability as a equilibrium market outcome.