The conflict between competition policy and the wider role of the local bus industry in Britain

Since the Transport Act of 1985, the local bus industry in Britain (outside London and Northern Ireland) has been subject to deregulation, removing previous restrictions on routes, service levels and fares. This also marked a reversal of the previous emphasis on co-ordination of services provided by different operators, and introduced competition law as applying to other industries to the local bus sector. This has been in conflict with other policy objectives aimed at stimulating greater use of public transport, such as harmonisation of ticketing systems. The underlying issues are examined, and recent changes in policy. The Local Transport Act of 2008 offers an opportunity to resolve some of these problems, and its application in Oxford is discussed as the first substantial example to date. However, a strong conflict remains between the role of competition agencies and other aspects of policy.     

Regulating the regulator: The impact of professional procuring bodies on local public transport policy and its effectiveness

During the past 15 years competitive tenders have become a common procedure when procuring local bus services in Europe. In particular, tenders with gross cost contracts and the so-called Scandinavian model have gained popularity, resulting in a vast amount of research on optimal contractual relationships between government and operators. This paper pays attention to a rather neglected part of the Scandinavian model: the construction of professional procuring bodies and their relationship to the local public administration, focusing on its implications for policy steering and service performance.The paper outlines briefly two different perspectives of analyses of organisational models: one perspective is anchored in principal-agent theory and institutional economics; and the other perspective in political science. Empirically, the article is based on an evaluation of the relation between two Norwegian counties and the administrative company responsible for planning and procuring public transport services. This evaluation indicates, firstly, important common challenges for the county administration due to lack of regional administrative competencies in relation to the administrative company, which also hampers the county’s role as coordinator of policy areas of importance for public transport. Secondly, due to increased transaction costs, the establishment of administrative companies does not seem compatible with contracts relying on net cost solutions with huge scope for operator initiatives.     

Effects of high-speed rail and airline cooperation under hub airport capacity constraint

This paper analyzes the effects of cooperation between a hub-and-spoke airline and a high-speed rail (HSR) operator when the hub airport may be capacity-constrained. We find that such cooperation reduces traffic in markets where prior modal competition occurs, but may increase traffic in other markets of the network. The cooperation improves welfare, independent of whether or not the hub capacity is constrained, as long as the modal substitutability in the overlapping markets is low. However, if the modal substitutability is high, then hub capacity plays an important role in assessing the welfare impact: If the hub airports are significantly capacity-constrained, the cooperation improves welfare; otherwise, it is likely welfare reducing. Through simulations we further study the welfare effects of modal asymmetries in the demands and costs, heterogeneous passenger types, and economies of traffic density. Our analysis shows that the economies of traffic density alone cannot justify airline–HSR cooperation.     

Air transport and high-speed rail competition: Environmental implications and mitigation strategies

We build a duopoly model to shed light on the environmental impact of HSR-air transport competition, capturing the effects of induced demand, schedule frequency and HSR speed. The net environmental effect can be negative since there is a the trade-off between the substitution effect – how many passengers using the HSR are shifted from air transport – and the traffic generation effect – how much new demand is generated by the HSR. We conduct a simulation study based on the London-Paris market where HSR has served 70% of the market. The introduction of HSR is detrimental to LAP, while it is beneficial to GHG emissions. HSR entry increases neither LAP nor GHG emissions when the ratio between HSR and air transport emissions is relatively low. Moreover, competition is more likely to be detrimental to the environment when the weight of the social welfare in HSR objective function is high. Since the magnitude of the environmental friendliness of HSR compared to air transport hinges on the mix of energy sources used to generate the electricity (which is heavily constrained by the country in which HSR operates), regulators should assess the implications of HSR entry taking into account the energy policy and mitigation strategies available to transport modes.     

港口的区域垄断和竞争:圆周模型

港口具有一定的地理垄断性,同时港口竞争也日益加剧,交叉腹地日益扩大。区域垄断和竞争成为港口共同的发展特征,协调两者之间的关系对于港口产业发展具有重要意义。圆周模型对于分析港口产业经济特性非常恰当。通过运用圆周模型来理解港口的区域垄断和竞争特性,可以为实现港口产业规模型竞争的公共政策制定提供基础性的理论依据。具体的政策建议包括港口业务的垂直分解及构建地主港模式、加快港口民营化进程、在放松规制的同时重建规制及推动形成区域内邻近港口间的协同竞争关系。     

浅谈蓝海战略

在红色海洋,企业有公认的明确界线,也有一套共通的竞争法则。虽然有些蓝色海洋扩展到远超过现有企业疆界,可是它们大部分是像太阳马戏团一样,借着扩展现有企业疆界,从红色海洋里面创造出来。在蓝色海洋,竞争无关紧要,因为游戏规则还待订定。     

关于提升我国港口物流国际竞争力的研究

现代港口作为全球综合运输网络的节点,其功能正在不断拓宽,正朝着提供全方位的增值服务方向发展。论文首先阐述了国外港口物流发展的现状及特点,结合我国港口物流的现状及存在的问题,提出了改进措施,从而在国际物流网络形成的有利时期,加速提升我国港口物流的国际竞争力。     

Competitive strategies for original equipment manufacturers considering carbon cap and trade

This paper considers an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) faces competition from an independent remanufacturer (IR) and they both are regulated by carbon cap and trade policy (CTP). We develop models to explore the OEM’s optimal competitive strategy in the face of IR’s competition and environmental regulation. We first investigate the impact of CTP on the OEM and IR. Then, we analyze three competitive strategies that the OEM may choose: remanufacturing, fixed-fee licensing, and royalty licensing. We investigate their optimal decisions under each strategy and identify the conditions under which these strategies can coordinate the OEM and IR. Finally, we explore conditions under which one strategy is superior to another. The results show that the OEM is worse off when competing with the IR under CTP if the carbon cap allocated to the OEM is small. Fixed-fee licensing and royalty licensing can coordinate the OEM and IR not only from an economic perspective but also from an environmental perspective. The OEM’s optimal competitive strategy is determined by thresholds of three critical parameters: the fixed cost of setting up a remanufacturing system, the fixed-fee, and the per-unit royalty. We provide specific guidance on strategy selection for the OEM.     

Joint impact of competition,ownership form and economic regulation on airport performance and pricing

The combined impact of ownership form, economic regulation and competition on airport performance is analyzed using data envelopment analysis to measure cost efficiency in the first stage and regression analysis to measure the impact of the environment in the second stage. The empirical results of an analysis of European and Australian airports over a 10 year timeframe reveal that under relatively non-competitive conditions, public airports operate less cost efficiently than fully private airports. Irrespective of ownership form, regulation is necessary to emulate competitive forces thus pushing airport management towards cost efficiency and reasonable pricing policies. Under potential regional or hub competition, economic regulation inhibits airports of any ownership form from operating and pricing efficiently. Although public and fully private airports operate equally efficiently in a competitive setting, private airports still set higher aeronautical charges. Furthermore, mixed ownership forms with a majority public holding are neither cost efficient nor low price, irrespective of the level of competition.